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Abstract 
This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive theory of age discrimination that can guide the 
direct and indirect age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010. The Act holds that 
unequal treatment on the grounds of age and measures that are on their face age-neutral but 
have the effect of disadvantaging particular age groups are lawful only if the treatment can be 
shown either to be a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ or if the treatment 
fits into a specifically prescribed exception. In this way, the proportionality test distinguishes 
justified and unjustified age-differential treatment with only the former legally permissible. 
I outline and defend a pluralist theory of age discrimination that assists in making the 
distinction between justified and unjustified age-differential treatment. The theory identifies 
the principles that explain when and why age-differential treatment wrongs people and the 
principles that can justify this treatment. It is a pluralist theory because it recognises that age-
differential treatment can wrong people for a number of different, overlapping reasons, and 
these different reasons should inform how we apply age discrimination law. The pluralist 
theory of age discrimination theory can improve legal reasoning in age discrimination cases 
by articulating the relevant principles and competing interests that are at stake in age 
discrimination claims. 
In constructing the theory, I adopt the reflective equilibrium method. This requires 
that I ‘test’ my starting moral intuitions against other beliefs, seeking coherence among these 
beliefs, and revising the beliefs as a result of particular challenges to them. In applying this 
method, I identify the following five principles to form a pluralist theory of age 
discrimination: equality of opportunity, social equality, respect, autonomy and efficiency. 
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1    
Introduction 
 
The economic and social issues raised by age and ageing have become increasingly 
prominent in the UK. As the UK faces an ageing population, there is much debate and 
concern about what impact this will have on welfare costs, economic growth and 
opportunities for the young.
1
 This has led to questions about how to distribute fairly between 
the generations.
2
 At the same time, the gradual incorporation of anti-discrimination policies 
into mainstream political discourse has led policymakers to grapple with the question of age 
discrimination.   
Legal interventions concerning age were once generally limited to setting minimum 
age limits for activities such as marriage, leaving education, paid employment, consuming 
alcohol and driving and for establishing rules concerning retirement. However, increasingly 
there is a recognition that the law should engage with promoting fairness between age groups, 
most recently in the Equality Act 2010.   
Despite the legal intervention banning age discrimination in the UK, there is relatively 
little commentary on the rationales for age discrimination law, and much of the literature on 
                                                          
1
 David Bloom, David Canning, and Günther Fink, 'Implications of Population Ageing for Economic Growth' 
(2010) 26.4 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 583. 
2
 See David Willetts, The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took Their Children's Future-and Why They Should 
Give it Back (Atlantic Books 2011). 
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the topic is dismissive of age discrimination as a problem requiring a legal solution.
3
 A theory 
of age discrimination, however, is essential to the process of applying the direct and indirect 
age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010. I argue in this thesis that the Equality 
Act 2010 requires courts and tribunals to consider the morality of age discrimination as part 
of its assessment of the legality of impugned treatment.  
The Equality Act 2010 requires a moral theory of age discrimination because age-
differential treatment is subject to a proportionality test. The proportionality test holds that 
less favourable treatment on the grounds of age (which engages the direct age discrimination 
provisions) and measures that are age-neutral but have the effect of disadvantaging particular 
age groups (which engages the indirect age discrimination provisions) are justified and lawful 
only if the treatment is a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ or if the 
treatment fits into a specifically prescribed exception.
4
 Measures are only proportionate when 
they pursue a legitimate aim, are necessary to achieve that aim and do not impose burdens or 
cause harms to other legitimate interests that outweigh the objectives achieved.
5
 As I argue in 
detail in Chapter 2, this proportionality assessment requires courts and tribunals (and anyone 
else seeking to determine the lawfulness of treatment subject to the proportionality test) to 
                                                          
3
 Richard Posner in Aging and Old Age (The University of Chicago Press 1995) 204 argued that age 
discrimination is not a real problem and that the concept only exists in the minds of ‘some radical egalitarians’ 
who ‘see discrimination everywhere’ (1995). See also Issacharoff and Harris for an argument that age 
discrimination should not be banned because it does not reach the level of seriousness of race or sex 
discrimination. Samuel Issacharoff and Erica Worth Harris, ‘Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination: 
The ADEA's Unnatural Solution’ (1997) 72 NYUL Rev 780. 
4
 Equality Act 2010 s 13 and s 19 holds that impugned treatment does not constitute unlawful age discrimination 
if the treatment is a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’ 
5
 In Seldon v Clarkson, Wright and Jakes [2012] UKSC 16, [2012] ICR 716, the Supreme Court held this is the 
appropriate test for proportionality assessments in age discrimination cases.  
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engage with and choose between competing moral interests and principles at stake. This 
means courts and tribunals should engage with theoretical questions about the principles that 
determine when it is unjustified to treat people less favourably on the grounds of age and 
when it is unjustified to disadvantage particular age groups.  
The aim of this thesis is to construct a comprehensive theory of age discrimination 
that can support this process. This theory consists of a framework of principles that assist in 
determining whether an impugned measure pursues a legitimate aim and whether an 
impugned measure adopts an appropriate balance between competing interests at stake. I 
construct this theory of age discrimination by outlining substantive anti-discrimination and 
equality principles that both fit and justify our moral intuitions about different forms of 
discrimination and inequality. I then verify the extent these principles explain age 
discrimination and, in doing so, form a theory of age discrimination that can distinguish 
justified from unjustified age-differential treatment. I argue that in applying this theory of age 
discrimination, courts and tribunals should also be aware of the need to follow legal 
precedent and to show deference to the original decision-maker where the original decision-
maker is better placed to determine proportionality.
6
 
 
1.1 The Value of a Theory of Age Discrimination 
There are a number of benefits to constructing a theory of discrimination to guide age 
                                                          
6
 In Chapter 7, I detail the circumstances where it is appropriate for the courts and tribunals to defer to the 
original decision-maker. 
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discrimination law. Most notably, it can improve legal reasoning in age discrimination 
disputes by articulating the relevant principles and competing interests at stake. Without a 
comprehensive theory of age discrimination, it is easy for courts and tribunals to overlook 
important moral considerations or to make assumptions about other forms of discrimination 
and apply those assumptions to age issues.  
A theory of age discrimination can ensure courts and tribunals have a greater 
understanding of the moral issues of age discrimination by offering a framework to approach 
these issues. Age discrimination is morally complex. There are many age issues that provoke 
controversial and difficult moral dilemmas. For example, there are questions about whether it 
is it justified to help the disadvantaged young if this means diverting resources away from 
older people; questions about when is it justified to use age distinctions to further business 
interests, including improving competitiveness; or questions relating to distribution of 
healthcare, for example, whether the state should use age to distribute healthcare if this is 
more efficient than other methods. It is difficult to find satisfactory answers to these 
dilemmas without a theory of age discrimination. Furthermore, it is improbable that a court or 
tribunal will be able to consider all the interests and moral requirements at stake without 
some guidance.  
The pluralist theory of age discrimination also provides for greater transparency in 
legal judgments by requiring courts and tribunals to articulate all the relevant principles that 
are at stake in a case and to require courts and tribunals to make judgments founded on sound 
principles. This enhances accountability by ensuring that it is possible to criticise the legal 
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reasoning.
7
 As I explain in Chapter 2, the courts and tribunals have been approaching age 
discrimination cases without a comprehensive theory of age discrimination, and therefore the 
reasons and principles for deciding cases have remained opaque and difficult to critique.
8
      
The pluralist theory of age discrimination can also help non-lawyers determine 
whether measures are justified and therefore lawful. For example, employers can use the 
theory to consider whether their recruitment practices and redundancy policies can be 
justified. In addition, employees can use the theory to help determine whether their 
employer's actions are justified and lawful.  
 Furthermore, the theory of age discrimination can enhance the legitimacy of age 
discrimination law by ensuring that courts and tribunals can apply the law in a way that is 
sensitive to principles of justice.
9
 Law is inherently an act of coercion. To have moral 
legitimacy, the law must justify this coercion. We can promote the legitimacy of the law by 
ensuring that those enforcing the law are guided by principles that justify reasons for having 
the law in question. The pluralist theory of age discrimination can do this by directing courts 
and tribunals to apply age discrimination law in a way that supports the point of having age 
discrimination law.
10
  
                                                          
7
 For an account of the value of judicial accountability, see David Shapiro, 'In Defense of Judicial Candor' 
(1987) 100.4 Harvard Law Review 731. 
8
 In Chapter 2, I detail the opaqueness of the reasoning in the age discrimination case law. 
9
 Michael Daneker, ‘Moral Reasoning and the Quest for Legitimacy’ (1993) 43.1 Am UL Rev 49. 
10
 The theory of discrimination operates in a way similar to Dworkin's theory of adjudication. Dworkin in 
Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977) 165 argued that ‘judges should decide hard cases by 
interpreting the political structure of their community in the following, perhaps special way: by trying to find the 
best justification they can find, in principles of political morality, for the structure as a whole, from the most 
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A theory of age discrimination is particularly valuable because it can capture the 
unique features of age discrimination. We cannot assume that truths about a general concept 
of discrimination covering, say, race, sex and religious discrimination can help us understand 
age discrimination. Age is unique because it is a trait that naturally changes over time as we 
move from being young to old. As we age, we experience the benefits and burdens associated 
with different age groups. In this way, age discrimination can be different from other forms 
of discrimination because a stable policy imposing a disadvantage on a particular age group 
applies to everyone who lives long enough to reach the age subject to the policy.
11
 A policy 
disadvantaging a particular race, in contrast, will impose disadvantages on particular groups 
of people with those disadvantages persisting over their lives. The unique feature of age 
discrimination requires that we think about which anti-discrimination principles are 
specifically able to explain age discrimination and therefore help guide age discrimination 
law.
 
 
 1.2 Rejecting Unitary Theories of Discrimination   
In constructing a theory capable of guiding age discrimination law, we must look for the 
justifying aims of these laws. In other words, we must look for when and why discrimination 
wrongs people and the principles that explain how the law can address these wrongs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
profound constitutional rules and arrangements to the details of, for example, the private law of tort or contract.’ 
To ensure the legitimacy of age discrimination law, judges should postulate a principled purpose or point to the 
legislation in deciding cases.  
11
 Geoffrey Cupit in ‘Justice, Age, and Veneration’ (1998) 108 Ethics 702 notes that ‘the alleged injustice of age 
discrimination presents a puzzle’ because the ‘[s]tandard argument against discrimination – the argument from 
equalizing benefits – seems not to apply.’  
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Academics have argued for various principles that explain the justifying reasons for 
discrimination law.
12
 A common approach has been to provide a norm that can work to 
explain all the reasons why we have such a law. There is no consensus, however, on which 
norm should prevail as a foundation of discrimination law and some theorists have doubted 
that a single norm can provide a complete explanation.
13
  
The literature on the subject has advanced a number of principles including equality, 
autonomy and respect that individually provide a foundation for discrimination law. On the 
equality account, for example, Segall has argued that discrimination wrongs people when it 
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Law Review 175; Deborah Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? (Harvard University Press 2008); Sophia 
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Discrimination Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011); Shlomi Segall, ‘What’s so Bad about 
Discrimination?’ (2012) 24 Utilitas 82; Deborah Hellman and Sophia Moreau (eds), Philosophical Foundations 
of Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press 2013); Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal? A 
Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination (Oxford University Press 2014); Re’em Segev, ‘Making 
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places the discriminatee at a disadvantage because of a trait that a person should not be held 
responsible for.
14
 Discrimination law, on this account, has a justifying aim of promoting 
equality of opportunity.    
Another account holds that discrimination is wrong when it has the effect of harming 
the capacity of people to live autonomous lives.
15
 Khaitan, for example, has argued that 
discrimination law is not primarily concerned with equality but with attempting to create 
valuable opportunities for disadvantaged social groups.
16
   
The respect account holds that discrimination is wrong when it demeans people. 
Discrimination demeans when it has the effect of conveying that certain people have a 
diminished social and moral worth.
17
    
These accounts each provide insight into the wrong of discrimination, but, as I 
demonstrate in Chapter 4, no single principle can explain every case of wrongful 
discrimination in the remit of discrimination law. Some forms of wrongful discrimination do 
not create inequality of opportunity, some forms do not harm autonomy and some forms do 
not disrespect people. Instead, we should adopt a pluralist account of age discrimination that 
accepts that there are a number of different, sometimes conflicting, principles that must be 
used together to explain the concept.
18
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1.3 Towards a Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination  
I present five principles in this thesis that distinguish justified from unjustified age-
differential treatment. These principles can assist in determining the proportionality of 
measures that engage the direct and indirect age discrimination provisions. I arrive at these 
five substantive principles by assessing the different ways discrimination wrongs people and 
apply these principles to age discrimination to determine whether they provide a 
comprehensive account of age discrimination. This pluralist account, I argue, is necessary to 
capture the complexity and richness of age discrimination as a concept and to explain our 
intuitions about different forms of age discrimination.  
The principles of my theory of age discrimination include equality of opportunity, 
social equality, respect, autonomy and efficiency. Equality of opportunity requires an equal 
distribution of benefits and burdens over a complete life except in so far as an individual is 
personally responsible for their unequal position.
19
 This principle can justify some forms of 
age-based distinctions. Age distinctions promote equality of opportunity when they are stable 
over time and apply uniformly to all people as they reach the age subject to the age-based 
distinction. For example, policies such as flu vaccines for people over 65 years of age ensures 
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that each person will benefit from the resource provided they live to 65 years of age.  
Social equality requires individuals are capable of participating equally in social, 
economic and political life.
20
 Less favourable treatment on the grounds of age and age-neutral 
measures that disadvantage particular age groups can violate social equality by creating 
conditions that undermine individuals' status as equals in society. An example I discuss is a 
mandatory retirement age that can lock older people out of the labour market. Social equality 
can also justify some age distinctions, including positive age discrimination that aims to 
promote social inclusion of disadvantaged age groups.  
The principle of autonomy requires conditions where people have control over their 
lives. Age discrimination can undermine autonomy by diminishing choice over a person's 
lifetime. An example is older people internalising the message that they are less useful and 
productive than other age groups and must leave the labour force when they may prefer to 
carry on.  
The principle of respect recognises the harm of denying access to goods when that 
denial expresses that some age groups are less entitled to proper treatment. On this account, 
age-differential treatment can harm people by communicating the message that particular age 
groups have a diminished moral or social worth.    
The principle of efficiency explains that it is possible to justify age-differential 
treatment if the treatment efficiently promotes valuable social goods. Age distinctions can be 
                                                          
20
 David Miller ‘What Kind of Equality Should the Left Pursue?’ in J Franklin (ed), Equality (Institute for 
Public Policy Research 1997) 83. 
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efficient because age can be an accurate proxy for some attributes. Using age as a proxy for 
these traits is less costly than assessing each person individually for them. Age distinctions 
can also be efficient by forcing people to sequence and order their lives chronologically. This 
can force people to undertake tasks at a time of life when there is the greatest benefit to the 
individual and wider society.   
These principles should figure in the different stages of the proportionality test to 
determine whether a measure furthers a legitimate aim, is necessary to achieve that aim and 
does not impose burdens or cause harms to other legitimate interests that outweigh the aims 
achieved.  
Importantly, however, I argue that courts and tribunals should apply the pluralist 
theory of age discrimination alongside considerations about whether judges are in an 
appropriate position to substitute their view on the morality of the action for that of the 
original decision-maker. In other words, I argue that judges must consider both substantive 
reasons for deciding a case (and this includes the moral principles of the pluralist theory of 
age discrimination) and the appropriateness of applying this reasoning to decide a case given 
any possible institutional limitations of the judicial process.
21
 Deference can be appropriate at 
the necessity stage and the final balancing stage of the proportionality test. The court or 
tribunal must make a judgment concerning whether the original decision-maker has more 
expertise to determine whether a measure is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim and 
                                                          
21
 For the argument that judges should consider both the substantive reasons for a decision and the institutional 
limitations of the judicial process, see Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Judicial Restraint in the Pursuit of Justice’ (2010) 60.1 
University of Toronto law Journal 23. 
 
22 
 
whether the original decision-maker is in a better position to weigh up competing interests in 
a justifiable way. If the courts or tribunals have reason to think that a party to the case is more 
likely to get these considerations right, then there is a strong reason to defer to that party.
22
    
The level of deference depends on the severity of a violation of the interests of the 
person subject to the impugned treatment. For example, the greater a measure contributes to 
oppressive relations, expresses contempt, or violates autonomy, the greater the need to 
scrutinise the decision-maker’s treatment. This means that institutional questions about the 
extent judges should defer to the primary decision-maker depend in part on the extent of 
harm against an individual's interests. Where the extent of violation of interests is low, then 
institutional considerations and deference towards the primary decision-maker should play a 
more prominent role. But when there is a clear and substantial violation of an individual's 
equality interests (say by the measure negatively stereotyping a person), this may outweigh 
concerns about institutional limitations of the judicial process. In such situations, the balance 
may favour judicial intervention and intense scrutiny of the measures on the substantive 
principles.    
Importantly, judges should decide consistently with previous cases that have 
relevantly similar facts. This has implications for applying the pluralist theory of 
discrimination. Precedent might conflict with the framework of principles I defend in this 
thesis. In these circumstances, it follows from the purpose of my thesis (which is concerned 
with recommending an appropriate method of applying age discrimination law) that I 
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recommend the framework of principles should prevail in the circumstances where courts are 
capable of overturning precedent.  
      
1.4 The Scope of this Thesis  
The principles identified in this thesis work in relation to the full scope of the direct and 
indirect age discrimination provisions, including relating to employment, training and 
education; membership of associations and clubs; and provision of goods and services. This 
thesis, however, does not concern the harassment and victimisation provisions of the Equality 
Act 2010. Harassment and victimisation are different concepts from direct and indirect age 
discrimination, and they will not be the focus of my inquiry.
23
   
  This thesis relates to the legal concept of discrimination provided in the Equality Act 
2010 and not the colloquial understanding of the term. In ordinary language, discrimination 
relates to the intentional and wrongful use of a trait to impose a disadvantage, for example, 
racism.
24
 The legal concept of discrimination, in contrast, includes conduct that does not 
reflect an intention to disadvantage or cause harm to others. It includes actions that are age-
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neutral that have the effect of disadvantaging people of a particular chronological age.
25
 The 
discrimination concept in the Equality Act 2010, therefore, is not directly related to fault. As 
a result, the Equality Act 2010 labels as discrimination a much wider range of actions than 
the colloquial understanding of discrimination. I focus my analysis on core elements of UK 
age discrimination law rather than trying to capture a universal concept of discrimination.  
Furthermore, my thesis does not concern whether or not age discrimination is an area 
in which the law should intervene. This is a vital question, but it is not the focus of this thesis. 
Instead, this work starts from the assumption that the law, for better or worse, will continue to 
play a part in regulating social and economic relations around age and that legal intervention 
in this area is likely to increase. If so, we need to base that legal intervention on a sound 
moral framework. The aim of this work is to contribute to this project. 
My thesis relates to UK discrimination law, but the arguments and conclusions made 
are likely to have relevance in other jurisdictions.
26
 Age discrimination law varies between 
jurisdictions, but many states have age discrimination laws similar to that of the UK and 
similar justifying aims, including, for example, the EU member states, South Africa, Canada 
and the United States. EU member states, for example, are each required to have age 
discrimination laws in accordance with the Employment Equality Framework Directive 
200/78/EC ('Framework Directive').  
States that have age discrimination laws also tend to share certain normative 
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assumptions, for example, a commitment to equality. Given the similar aims and normative 
foundations of age discrimination laws in a range of jurisdictions, the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination may (although probably subject to adaptation) work as a guide in these states.  
Although this thesis is concerned with UK discrimination law, it cannot be isolated 
from EU law. EU law obligates the UK to implement age discrimination laws to further the 
aims of the Framework Directive. While the UK remains a member of the EU, decisions of 
the CJEU are binding on the UK courts to ensure that the UK does not undermine the aims of 
the Framework Directive. However, the UK national courts may not be under an obligation to 
follow the jurisprudence of the CJEU once the UK leaves the EU.
27
  
  
1.5 Possible Objections to Courts and Tribunals Using a Theory of Age 
Discrimination in Adjudication  
This thesis argues that courts and tribunals should engage in moral reasoning about age 
discrimination by weighing and choosing between different interests and moral 
considerations. Some may object to this argument. For example, Richard Posner argues that 
moral reasoning is something judges, for the most part, should eschew.
28
 Posner attacks 
moralising in legal judgments because judges are not moral philosophers. Judges, Poser 
argues, should be willing to defer to democratic institutions on moral questions.  
In reply to Posner, democratic institutions can and do pass legislation that can direct 
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judges to engage in moral reasoning. This means legislation gives judges the responsibility 
and legitimacy to engage directly with moral problems. For example, I argue in this thesis 
that the Equality Act 2010 directs judges to engage in moral reasoning by requiring judges to 
assess whether impugned measures are a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 
One of the features of the proportionality test is that it directs judges to assess the weights of 
the competing principles. When courts and tribunals must decide whether age distinctions or 
measures causing disadvantage to certain age groups are justified or not, they must consider 
what equality requires and whether the requirements of equality trump other values that may 
be advanced by the measures.    
A further objection to judges engaging with moral reasoning is the argument that 
these institutions are not free to do moral reasoning because the doctrine of precedent 
requires that they defer to findings in cases with similar facts. However, this process still 
constitutes moral reasoning because judging relative similarity is also a moral judgment.
29
 
For example, to compare and contrast cases requires finding principles to determine whether 
cases are in fact morally alike. And applying precedent is to defer to the moral reasoning of 
another court in undertaking the proportionality assessment.   
Even taking a legal positivist stance (the position that rejects any dependence of the 
existence of law on its merits), we can still accept the law can in certain instances, like the 
age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010, direct courts and tribunals to switch 
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to a role of making moral judgments to determine legality.
30
 When a law instructs judges to 
reason morally, the courts and tribunals have a legal duty to do so. The Equality Act 2010 is a 
statute that determines the legal validity by moral criteria by directing courts and tribunals to 
consider a range of moral questions (e.g. does the measures pursue a legitimate aim? Is it 
necessary to achieve that aim? And does the measure impose burdens or cause harms to other 
legitimate interests that outweigh the aims achieved?).  
  
1.6 The Reflective Equilibrium Method    
To construct a theory of age discrimination capable of guiding age discrimination law, I 
adopt the reflective equilibrium method.
31
 Reflective equilibrium is a method that requires 
that we start from our intuitions about the morality of a situation and, on reflecting on the 
plausibility of the intuitions in light of other beliefs that we hold, to be open to revising those 
beliefs. The reflection process requires taking everything relevant into account about age 
discrimination (all the relevant principles that can explain why it is a moral problem and all 
theories relating to the phenomena of age and ageing) and seeks to form a set of beliefs that 
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are coherent and stable.
32
 This method tests the plausibility of moral principles by evaluating 
whether the principles fit and explain our moral judgments.    
There are two versions of reflective equilibrium: narrow reflective equilibrium and 
wide reflective equilibrium. I argue that narrow reflective equilibrium is a starting point for 
ensuring our beliefs are coherent, but it is too limited to provide justification for using 
particular principles. Instead, I adopt a 'wide' version of reflective equilibrium, which, in 
addition to building coherence between moral beliefs, provides justification for principles by 
requiring these beliefs are consistent with background theories – for example, theories of the 
nature of age and ageing.  
    
1.61 Narrow reflective equilibrium    
Reflective equilibrium starts with moral intuitions about a scenario.
33
 The next stage is to find 
principles that can account for the intuitions. The third stage is to reach narrow reflective 
equilibrium by seeking coherence between the set of moral beliefs we hold and the principles 
that account for these judgments. If we find principles conflict with our moral judgments, 
then we should try to create coherence by revising either the principles or the moral beliefs 
until we have a coherent set of beliefs and principles.  
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1.62 An example of finding narrow reflective equilibrium    
We can start with the moral intuition that it is wrong to deny a person a job because of their 
race. The next step is to provide a moral principle to explain this intuition. For example, the 
principle that it is wrong to deny opportunities because of immutable traits. At first, we may 
believe this to be an appropriate principle to explain the wrongness of race discrimination 
since race is an immutable trait.
34
     
But on testing this principle against our other moral intuitions we will find that it fails 
to account for our beliefs regarding discrimination. It is often justifiable to treat people 
differently because of immutable traits.
35
 For example, we would consider it justifiable to 
deny a blind person a driver's licence. Additionally, many forms of wrongful discrimination 
concern mutable traits, for example, discrimination on the grounds of religion.     
To find equilibrium, we may consider a different principle to explain the wrongness 
of discrimination – for example, the principle that it is wrong to use 'irrelevant' traits such as 
race to determine whether to distribute opportunities and goods. Again, we may revise this 
principle when we consider that it fails to explain other moral judgments. Consider an 
employer who denies a person a job because the applicant had blue eyes. While we consider 
this to be wrongful treatment, we consider that it is a different kind of wrong to race 
discrimination since our intuition suggests that race discrimination is different and more 
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offensive than eye-colour discrimination. The moral principle of 'irrelevance' fails to be a 
complete explanation of the wrongness of race discrimination since it cannot explain why we 
feel a moral difference between the irrelevant trait of race and that of eye colour.    
To create coherence and therefore reach equilibrium, we need to find a moral 
principle that can account for our different moral understanding of race discrimination, eye-
colour discrimination and other forms of wrongful discrimination. As we reflect further, we 
may start to consider the quality of traits that we believe can be the subject of wrongful 
discrimination. We may consider that there has been a historical practice of discriminating 
against race as a way to signify that some people have a diminished moral status. As a result, 
race discrimination may have taken on the meaning of an expression of the inferiority of 
particular groups. We could suggest a further moral principle, namely that discrimination 
manifests an attitude that members of certain races are morally inferior to members of other 
races.
36
 Then we can move on to see if this principle coheres with our other intuitions about 
discrimination. We keep doing this until we have a stable set of principles and then we have 
reached a narrow reflective equilibrium.  
 
1.63 Wide reflective equilibrium 
The problem for narrow reflective equilibrium is that people may start with different moral 
intuitions and therefore find after the reflective equilibrium process that they have reached 
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different results from others. From the narrow reflective equilibrium approach, there would 
be no way to determine which person has reached the correct judgment.
37
 To overcome this 
problem, we should adopt a wider version of reflective equilibrium.    
Wide reflective equilibrium requires that we consider anything that might have an 
impact on our moral beliefs, and requires adjusting our beliefs to cohere with factual issues 
and background theories, including theories about personhood and the nature of morality.
38
 
The importance of adopting wide reflective equilibrium is that the adoption of a plausible 
background theory may force us to revise our initial moral judgments. For example, to 
determine the morality of abortion, we must consider not just our immediate intuitions and 
their coherence to other beliefs we hold but also the background theory of personhood. Since 
persons have the right to life, then we need to consider if a foetus constitutes a person. If we 
understand that personhood requires sentience, then abortion is permissible in the early stages 
of pregnancy when a foetus does not have sentience and therefore lacks the right to life 
generated by personhood. In this way the background theory of personhood generates a 
philosophical argument that supports moral principles that are in coherence with our moral 
judgments, and this, in turn, should increase the support for the moral conclusion that 
abortion in early stages of pregnancy is morally justified.    
To construct a theory of age discrimination, we need a background theory on the 
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meaning of age in society. We can construct such a theory by looking at the science 
concerning ageing and the meaning of age in society. This empirical data can provide 
important facts that are relevant in forming moral judgments.
39
     
A background theory of age may force us to revise our beliefs about the wrongness of 
age discrimination. Norman Daniels gives the example of an initial moral judgment that age 
distinctions in healthcare is wrong because it creates inequality in accessing valuable 
resources.
40
 Daniels then highlights that a background theory of age reveals that we all 
gradually age and this can lead to the realisation that age distinctions in healthcare do not 
create inequality in access if we apply age distinctions over complete lifespans. Age 
distinctions favouring older people will lead to a detriment for young people, but as young 
people age they will benefit from the age distinction. This forces us to discard the moral 
principle that age distinctions in healthcare are wrong because age distinctions lead to 
inequality in access to resources. 
 
1.64 Reasons for adopting the wide reflective equilibrium method 
I adopt the wide reflective equilibrium method in constructing a theory of age discrimination 
because it is the method best directed to providing answers to moral questions. This is 
because alternative methods must either 'abandon reflection entirely, direct the inquirer to 
reflect, but to do so incompletely (that is, to leave certain beliefs, principles, theories, or what 
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have you out of account), or not allow the results of the inquirer’s reflections to determine 
what the inquirer goes on to believe.'
41
 Wide reflective equilibrium, in contrast, subjects 
moral beliefs to detailed reflection and ensures coherence with background theories.    
Wide reflective equilibrium can also increase the credibility of our moral beliefs by 
incorporating the intuitions of other thinkers. For example, Ghislaine van Thiel offers a 
version of reflective equilibrium that requires reflecting upon the beliefs of people who work 
within a moral practice and who, therefore, possess a specific form of moral wisdom gained 
from working in that practice.
42
 For example, in constructing a theory of age discrimination, 
we should consider and reflect on the moral beliefs of people who have experience working 
on issues relating to age discrimination. If we incorporate their moral intuitions in our moral 
reasoning, we are more likely to arrive at judgments that grasp their moral experience and 
therefore reach the right answers to problems.  
I adopt this approach by considering the moral beliefs of people in the practice of 
thinking and suggesting solutions to age discrimination. For example, in Chapters 3 and 4, I 
incorporate the moral beliefs of academics about equality and discrimination. In Chapter 6, I 
consider the moral beliefs of governments that have been responsible for introducing age 
discrimination law. In Chapter 7, I consider the moral beliefs of judges responsible for 
deciding age discrimination cases. I scrutinise these different moral beliefs and only retain the 
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 Ghislaine van Thiel calls this method Normative-Empirical Reflective Equilibrium (NE-RE). See Ghislaine 
van Thiel, and Johannes van Delden, ‘Reflective Equilibrium as a Normative Empirical Model’ (2010) 17.2 
Ethical Perspectives-Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 183. 
 
34 
 
beliefs that I consider to have sufficient justificatory power.  
   
1.7 Criticism of Reflective Equilibrium    
To demonstrate that the reflective equilibrium method is the best method for finding 
principles to guide age discrimination law, it is important to deal with some important 
criticisms of the method. The strongest criticism is that reflective equilibrium fails to produce 
justified moral beliefs because it relies on unreliable intuitions. Peter Singer, for example, has 
argued that our moral intuitions are the byproducts of evolution and therefore track the 'gene 
survival norm.'
43
 This means, Singer argues, that our moral intuitions reflect norms that help 
us survive rather than reflecting moral truth.
44
   
In answer to Singer’s argument, we can acknowledge that the gene-survival norm 
influences the content of our moral intuitions, but we can deny that this means that we cannot 
have confidence in the truth of the outcomes of the reflective equilibrium method. Reflective 
equilibrium requires that we arrive at beliefs by intelligent reflection on the reasons why a 
particular action is wrong. We should not, according to wide reflective equilibrium, 
uncritically accept that our intuitions represent moral truth. We must always be open to 
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revising our beliefs if reason dictates this.
45
 For example, we may start with the intuition that 
age discrimination is less serious than race discrimination, but if on reflection we find that the 
principles that explain why we consider race discrimination wrong also applies to some 
instances of age discrimination, then the reflective process of reflective equilibrium requires 
that we revise our initial moral intuition that age discrimination is always less serious than 
race discrimination.  
Another argument against reflective equilibrium is that it cannot provide an 
objectively truthful answer to moral problems because different people adopting wide 
reflective equilibrium based on their personal intuitions will reach different conclusions.
46
 
Reflective equilibrium, according to this argument, is simply shuffling personal beliefs.
47
 
My adoption of Van Thiel’s version of reflective equilibrium seeks to avoid this 
charge of relativism by ensuring I consider the intuitions and beliefs of a range of people who 
have moral experience with discrimination issues, including academics, legislators and 
judges. This ensures that the outcome of the reflective equilibrium method is a process of 
incorporating and evaluating beliefs from a range of sources rather than shuffling personal 
                                                          
45
 See Thomas Nagel’s argument that we are capable of autonomous thought that can release us from 
evolutionary constraints: '...people have, to greater or lesser degrees, a capacity for reasoning that follows 
autonomous standards appropriate to the subjects in question, rather than in slavish service to evolutionarily 
given instincts merely filtered through cultural forms or applied in novel environments. Such reflection, 
reasoning, judgment and resulting behavior seem to be autonomous in the sense that they involve exercises of 
thought that are not themselves significantly shaped by specific evolutionarily given tendencies, but instead 
follow independent norms appropriate to the pursuits in question.' Thomas Nagel, ‘Ethics Without Biology’ in 
Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press 1979) 142. 
46
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intuitions. 
 
1.8 The Limitations of Reflective Equilibrium    
A limitation of the reflective equilibrium method is its difficulty in selecting between 
conflicting and incommensurable values.
48
 John Finnis describes the problem of 
incommensurability as follows:    
 
There are many basic forms of human good, all equally or incommensurably basic 
and none reducible to any or all of the others; none of them is attainable by any one 
choice or finite set of choices; to commit oneself to one course of action, project, 
commitment, even life-plan, is to turn one's back on perhaps countless other 
opportunities of worthwhile action, project, commitment, life…
49
     
 
An example of the incommensurability of values in age discrimination is the conflict with the 
possible efficiency of an age distinction and its discriminatory impact. Imagine an employer 
dismisses older employees who command higher salaries and justifies this on the grounds 
that it improves the efficiency of the business by cutting costs. If a court or tribunal prevents 
                                                          
48
 For classic texts arguing for value pluralism see Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Four Essays on 
Liberty (Oxford University Press 1969); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980); 
Bernard Williams, 'Conflicts of Values' in Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press 1981); and Joseph Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986). 
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the employer from dismissing older workers, then this will remove the discriminatory impact 
and promote equality. However, if we prioritise the value of removing measures that 
disadvantage particular age groups, then this will lead to employers becoming less efficient 
possibly resulting in lower productivity and lower wages.   
Values are incommensurable when they cannot be measured in terms of a single 
value. In other words, values are incommensurable if the values conflict and pull in different 
directions without there being a common metric to determine which values should prevail.  
Incommensurability of values is a problem for applying age discrimination law 
because the Equality Act 2010 has a proportionality test that requires 'balancing' conflicting 
values in order to determine the legality of any impugned treatment. If values are plural and 
incommensurable (as I defend in the context of discrimination in Chapter 4), then there is 
difficulty determining which value should prevail in any given case.  
And reflective equilibrium does not solve the problem of incommensurability since it 
does not offer a method to choose between competing values. Reflective equilibrium requires 
building coherence so that each principle, so far as possible, is able to support other beliefs. 
Empirical research, however, reveals that people share a range of moral values that are 
conflicting..
50
 The problem for the reflective equilibrium method is the difficulty of building 
coherence in moral theory given that we intuitively support principles that are often 
                                                          
50
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conflicting and distinct.
51
 Reflective equilibrium does not assist in choosing between different 
and competing values since there is no principle that can determine which outcome should 
prevail in any given case. We could eliminate inconsistency in principles by adopting one 
single principle, but this unitary approach conflicts with the widespread, possibly universal, 
intuition that there are multiple conflicting principles.  
Due to the difficulty of relevant principles pulling in different directions, my thesis 
does not provide a theory on how we can find the right answer to every case but will instead 
create a framework of principles that a judge (or anyone else seeking to follow the law) ought 
to consider in applying age discrimination law. In finding an outcome to a case, we should 
assess which of these principles are satisfied and which are violated, and we must determine, 
as best as we can, which among various arguments we find most compelling for deciding a 
case. The value of the pluralist theory of age discrimination is that it gives a principled 
framework for coming to a conclusion in identifying unlawful age discrimination. 
 
1.9 The Structure of my Argument 
I consider different sources for identifying principles concerning equality and discrimination, 
drawing upon many theories concerning these themes, and from reflecting on judgments and 
theories, build a theory of age discrimination that provides an explanation for our intuitions 
and moral judgments about age discrimination.   
                                                          
51
 See Patricia Marino, ‘Moral Coherence and Value Pluralism’ (2013) 43.1 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
117 for an account of the difficulty of building coherence in moral theory given the fact of value pluralism.  
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 Further to this, in Chapter 2 I explain the meaning of direct and indirect age 
discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 and the exceptions and defences to claims under 
these provisions, including positive action, genuine occupational requirements and 
proportionality. I argue that determining the legality of measures that engage the direct and 
indirect age discrimination provisions require that we consider the moral principles and 
competing interests at stake and choose whether, on the balance of reasons, the principles 
require holding the measure is proportionate and therefore lawful. This analysis reveals the 
need for a theory of age discrimination to undertake the proportionality test in a way that is 
transparent about the competing moral interests at stake. The UK courts and tribunals have 
failed to approach cases with a comprehensive theory of age discrimination to date.  
In Chapter 3, I move on to the process of constructing a theory of age discrimination 
that should guide age discrimination law. Age discrimination is a concept linked to equality. 
The Equality Act 2010 identifies the features of age discrimination as including less 
favourable treatment on the grounds of age and disadvantage to particular age groups. 
Therefore, discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 is concerned with actions that place 
people in a worse position than others. Given the connection between the legal definition of 
age discrimination and inequality, it is important to identify equality principles that can 
explain when and why it is wrong for some to be worse off than others in order to determine 
when and why age-differential treatment is unjustified. Further to this, I identify the 
principles of equality of opportunity and social equality.  
In identifying these principles, I compare equality of opportunity, which holds that it 
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is wrong for someone to be worse off when they are not directly responsible for their 
condition of being worse off, with equality of outcome, which requires equal distribution of 
resources regardless of individual behaviour. I find that equality of opportunity fits better 
with our intuitions because a background theory of personal responsibility coheres with this 
principle. Equality of outcome, in contrast, is implausible because it requires significant 
invasions into people’s free choices undermining personal responsibility.  
There are, however, limitations to equality of opportunity as an explanation for when 
and why it is wrong for some to be worse off than others. Equality of opportunity can 
produce inequalities in social status – a result that follows from some citizens being more 
productive than others – to the extent that some social groups can be in a position of 
dominance over others. To explain our intuition that it is wrong for a society to permit the 
domination of some groups of people over other groups, I appeal to the principle of social 
equality, which requires conditions in which people can participate in democratic society as 
equals.  
Finally, I argue that we should understand equality as the aim to secure equal 
opportunities to experience the constitutive components of a flourishing life. Rather than 
selecting one value to equalise, I argue that egalitarians ought to be concerned with creating 
equal opportunities to experience a range of intrinsic goods, including welfare, autonomy, 
health and education.    
In Chapter 4, I move on to assess the principles that explain when and why 
discrimination wrongs people. This creates a groundwork theory of discrimination that I use 
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to later verify when and why age-differential treatment wrongs people. I argue that the 
equality of opportunity principle identified in Chapter 3 explains that discrimination is wrong 
when it imposes disadvantages on the grounds of traits that people should not be held 
responsible for, including characteristics such as sex, race and religious status. The social 
equality principle explains that discrimination wrongs people when it contributes to 
oppressive social relations. I also argue that autonomy as a principle can explain the wrong of 
discrimination. Each of these accounts explains the wrong of discrimination in the 
consequences of the action – its effects on distribution and social relations. However, we can 
also identify the wrong of discrimination in the message conveyed. The principle of respect 
explains that disadvantaging on the grounds of social-group membership can convey a 
message that the discriminatee has a diminished moral or social worth. There are, however, 
cases of discrimination that the respect account is unable to explain.  
I argue that there is no distinctive wrong of discrimination, but instead there are a 
number of explanations for the wrong of discrimination depending on the particular 
circumstances. A pluralist account of discrimination that includes equality of opportunity, 
social equality, autonomy and respect is more plausible than an attempt to define the wrong 
of discrimination by reference to one principle.  
In Chapter 5, I begin constructing the theory of age discrimination by verifying 
whether the principles identified in Chapters 3 and 4 explain when and why age-differential 
treatment is wrong. I argue that the principles of equality of opportunity, social equality, 
autonomy and respect can explain age discrimination as a concept (including explaining 
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when less favourable treatment on the grounds of age and measures that disadvantage 
particular age groups can be justified or unjustified). However, I also consider the principle of 
efficiency as an important part of a theory of age discrimination because it explains the 
potential benefits of age distinctions that can justify the treatment.   
I consider a background theory of age and ageing and its meaning as a concept. I 
examine how this theory supports moral principles and in turn our moral intuitions. Age is 
both a biological and sociological concept connected to the passing of time. Age is correlated 
to physical, emotional and intellectual changes. The connection between age and other traits, 
such as intellectual and physical ability, means we can use age classifications as useful 
proxies for these traits. By using age as a reliable proxy, we can maximise efficiency in 
pursuing a number of social goods.    
Further, age distinctions can be a useful way of sequencing people’s lives 
chronologically, for example, to be involved with education in youth, productive work in 
adulthood and retirement in older age. This forces people to sequence their lives to undertake 
certain tasks at a time of life when there is the greatest benefit to the individual and society. 
However, there are many age distinctions that wrong individuals by violating equality of 
opportunity, social equality, autonomy and respect. This chapter concludes with a 
groundwork theory of age discrimination. In the rest of the thesis, I consider revising the 
theory in light of the government rationales for age discrimination law, the approaches to age 
discrimination law in UK case law and, finally, I consider how the theory works against age-
based healthcare rationing in the UK.   
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In Chapter 6, I consider the case for and against courts and tribunals using the 
legislative history of age discrimination law as an aid in determining whether age-differential 
treatment is justified or unjustified. I argue that there are a number of problems with relying 
on legislative history in this context and argue that courts and tribunals should not defer to the 
judgments in these sources.  
Chapter 6 then moves on to consider whether the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination should incorporate the approaches to age discrimination found in the 
legislative history of age discrimination law. This process furthers my method, reflective 
equilibrium, which requires assessing moral beliefs from a range of sources to gain 
knowledge from people with direct experience of confronting the problem of age 
discrimination.  
The consultation documents on the introduction of age discrimination law outline two 
major rationales (found in different consultation documents written by different governments) 
for age discrimination law: the promotion of efficiency and tackling unfair treatment on the 
grounds of age. I consider and reject the governments' view that age-differential treatment is 
wrong because it inhibits efficiency.  The efficiency account of the wrongness of age 
discrimination is problematic because it can lead to the view that age discrimination is 
justified so long as it does not harm efficiency. On the contrary, efficiency should not be 
capable of justifying certain types of age-differential treatment. In particular, it should not 
justify demeaning age-differential treatment. In light of these considerations, I argue that the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination should incorporate the idea that efficiency should not 
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justify treatment that communicates that particular age groups have a diminished moral or 
social worth. 
In Chapter 7, I consider how courts and tribunals ought to apply the pluralist theory of 
age discrimination in age discrimination cases. An important argument in this chapter is that 
the theory of age discrimination constructed in Chapter 5 does not contain the only 
considerations that a judge must take into account in assessing the proportionality of age-
differential treatment. A judge must also consider the institutional limitations of courts and 
tribunals. A judge's institutional position means that sometimes it is appropriate to defer to 
the judgment of the original decision-maker if that decision-maker is in a better position to 
make a judgment on proportionality.     
In Chapter 7, I move on to consider how the theory of age discrimination can assist in 
deciding age discrimination cases. I compare and contrast the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination to the UK case law’s approach. I assess whether the courts' moral judgments 
and moral principles concerning unequal treatment on the grounds of age are consistent with 
my own theory of age discrimination. This process demonstrates how my framework works 
in practice but also, further to my method of reflective equilibrium, ensures that I assess any 
potential weaknesses in my approach and consider revision ofthe framework. This is an 
essential process of testing my framework. In forming a guide for age discrimination law, it is 
particularly important to consider the practical implications of the theory and to determine 
whether it can successfully guide age discrimination disputes.  
In Chapter 8, I test the pluralist theory of age discrimination against the method of 
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healthcare rationing in the UK – the Quality-Adjusted Life-Year method ('QALY'). This is a 
way of testing my framework to determine whether it is capable of successfully and fairly 
guiding the resolution of age discrimination issues. The QALY method of health rationing 
aims to maximise health benefits in allocating resources, but some argue the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence’s (NICE) use of the QALY method is indirectly 
discriminatory against older people because older people are more likely to have a low 
QALY score and therefore are less likely to be granted access to treatment. I argue that 
NICE’s use of the QALY method can engage the indirect age discrimination provisions, but 
NICE can nonetheless justify using QALY on the grounds that they use the method as a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim and therefore the use of the method is 
lawful under section 19(2)(d) of the Equality Act 2010. In making this argument, I consider 
each of the principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination at different stages of the 
proportionality test and use these principles to support the position that NICE’s use of the 
QALY method is proportionate. 
Finally, in Chapter 9, I summarise the main findings of this thesis, the value and 
limitations of the reflective equilibrium method, and explain the possible implications of the 
findings of the thesis on areas outside its scope, including the implications of the pluralist 
theory of age discrimination for understanding discrimination law more generally, the 
usefulness of the theory in relation to other systems than the UK and the possible value of the 
theory for identifying which grounds should be protected under discrimination law.  
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2   
The Legal Context 
 
This thesis aims to offer a theory of age discrimination that is the best explanation for the 
sorts of wrongs that direct and indirect age discrimination provisions should address. To 
create a theory of age discrimination that can guide the direct and indirect age discrimination 
provisions of the Equality Act 2010, we must first determine the nature and scope of the 
direct and indirect age discrimination duties. By understanding how the direct and indirect 
age discrimination provisions work, we can then begin to outline a theory that can guide how 
these provisions should determine people's rights. This chapter proceeds as follows: I first 
outline the age provisions of the Equality Act 2010; then I argue that the concept of 
proportionality embedded in age discrimination law requires a moral theory of age 
discrimination; and, finally, I consider examples of case law on the proportionality test and 
the unsatisfactory way this test has been undertaken to date, which reveals the need for a 
theory of age discrimination to guide the application of age discrimination law to ensure all 
relevant principles are taken into account. 
I discuss the leading cases on the proportionality test, including Seldon v Clarkson, 
Wright and Jakes
52
 (which related to the operation of the proportionality test for direct 
discrimination), and Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police
53
 (which related to 
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53
 [2012] UKSC 15, [2012] ICR 704. 
 
47 
 
the operation of the proportionality test for indirect discrimination). These cases outline the 
Supreme Court's view on the proportionality test and the sorts of aims that should be capable 
of justifying treatment that engages the age discrimination provisions. I also discuss other 
cases that have adopted the approaches in Seldon and Homer, including White v Ministry of 
Justice
54
 (which concerned the retirement age of 70 for judges), and Lockwood v Department 
of Work & Pensions & Anor
55
 (which concerned redundancy pay). I explain why these cases 
illustrate the problem of courts using the proportionality test without a theory of age 
discrimination. 
I have also selected Cross v British Airways plc
56
 and Woodcock v Cumbria Primary 
Care Trust
57
 that relates to the extent costs can justify measures that engage the age 
discrimination provisions. The importance of this issue and the implications for employees 
requires an assessment to ensure that the finding of the courts are justified by reference to 
sound moral principles, which the pluralist theory of age discrimination aims to offer.  
  
2.1 Basic Structure of Age Discrimination Law   
The Equality Act 2010 protects individuals from direct and indirect age discrimination in 
relation to the following: access to employment, training and education; membership of 
associations and clubs (with some exceptions); and provision of goods and services. These 
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provisions protect all people over 18 years of age in relation to the field of goods, facilities 
and services. The Equality Act 2010 protects all age groups in relation to associations and 
work. 
Direct age discrimination occurs when, because of age, an individual is treated less 
favourably, and this treatment is not a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
58
 
Indirect age discrimination occurs when there is an ostensibly age-neutral provision, criterion 
or practice that puts individuals of a particular age group at a particular disadvantage and the 
policy, criterion or practice is not a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
59
 
Some features of direct and indirect age discrimination are controversial. I explain the 
concepts in more detail in the sections below.  
Exceptions to direct and indirect age discrimination include the following: the use of 
age distinctions in financial services such as offering loans, saving accounts or mortgages;
60
 
charities offering proportionate assistance to particular age groups;
61
 proportionate action to 
safeguard national security;
62
 using age to assess risk for the purpose of deciding what 
premium to charge a customer for motor or travel insurance;
63
 the use of age in controlling 
immigration;
64
 age requirements in sport;
65
 companies offering holidays for particular age 
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groups;
66
 age restrictions for selling alcohol, tobacco or fireworks;
67
 age-based ‘concessions’ 
including admission to associations;
68
 age distinctions in offering residential mobile homes;
69
 
decisions relating to the content or scheduling of television or radio programmes, such as 
depicting particular age groups or selecting people of a particular age to take part;
70
 receiving 
people of a particular age into a private home to offer care;
71
 and exceptions to the national 
minimum wage permitting employers to pay lower rates for young workers.
72
   
There are also exceptions for positive action measures (i.e. measures designed to 
favour disadvantaged groups).
73
 For example, the Equality Act 2010 permits unequal 
treatment on the grounds of age when this treatment is a proportionate means to enable age 
groups to overcome age-related disadvantages, to meet age-related needs or to encourage 
people in age groups to participate in a particular activity where there are disproportionately 
small numbers of that age group participating in that activity.
74
 This provision does not apply 
to recruitment and promotion.  
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Relating to recruitment and promotion, section 159 of the Equality Act 2010 permits 
employers to favour particular age groups in job recruitment and promotion opportunities if 
the employer reasonably believes members of the age group are disadvantaged because of 
their age or are a member of an age group with disproportionately low numbers participating 
in a particular activity, but employers can only favour particular age groups if the person 
benefiting from the favourable treatment is as qualified as another candidate or candidates 
who are competing for the job or promotion, the treatment is a proportionate means of 
addressing the disadvantage of the age group and the employer does not have a policy of 
favouring that age group in recruitment and promotion.
75
 
Further, an employer can also escape a finding of discrimination in respect of 
recruitment, access to promotion, transfer or training, or dismissal, by demonstrating that, 
having regard to the nature or context of the work, being a particular age is an occupational 
requirement.
76
 For example, old age can be an occupational requirement to act the role of 
King Lear given the character's old age forms an integral part of the play's plot.   
If a measure engages the direct or indirect discrimination provisions but does not fit 
within one of these exceptions, then the measure will still be lawful if it is a proportionate 
                                                          
75
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means of achieving a legitimate aim.
77
 In section 2.3, I explain in detail the meaning of this 
proportionality test and, in section 2.4, I discuss how the courts have applied the test.  
The Equality Act 2010 also protects against harassment and victimisation on the 
grounds of age. The Act defines harassment as occurring when a person subjects another to 
unwanted conduct related to age which has the purpose or effect of either violating a person's 
dignity; or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment.
78
 Victimisation occurs when a person, B, is subjected to a detriment by A 
because B has made or intends to make (or is suspected of making or intending to make) a 
claim or allegation of age discrimination, or has assisted another in their claim or allegation 
of age discrimination.
79
  
A complainant can pursue a claim of age discrimination, harassment or victimisation 
in relation to the provision of services, public functions or associations through the civil 
courts. The deadline for bringing a claim is within six months of the treatment.
80
 
Since this thesis concerns the direct and indirect age discrimination provisions of the 
Equality Act 2010, I go into more detail on the features of these legal concepts.  
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2.21 Features of direct age discrimination (Equality Act 2010 s 13)  
As outlined above, direct age discrimination occurs when, because of age, an individual is 
treated less favourably, and this treatment is not a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim. Less favourable treatment includes refusal of services, providing an inferior 
service, denial of employment, denial of promotion and disrespectful conduct such as age-
related insults and bullying. 
The case law has found that less favourable treatment includes age-related banter and 
jokes. For example, in Dove v Brown & Newirth Ltd,
81
 the ET held that calling an employee 
‘gramps’ amounted to less favourable treatment on the grounds of age even though these 
comments were not intended to be discriminatory. In Nolan v CD Bramall Dealership 
Limited t/a Evans Halshaw Motorhouse Worksop,
82
 the ET found that the claimant was 
subject to direct discrimination after having his car number plate changed from ‘OAB’ to 
‘OAP’ and being frequently referred to as ‘yoda’ (a character from the film Star Wars 
described by the ET as ‘a small, wizened character who is several hundred years old’). 
An important feature of direct discrimination is that there must be a necessary link 
between the less favourable treatment and the protected characteristic. In other words, if the 
less favourable treatment is not ‘because of’ the protected characteristic, there can be no 
direct discrimination. There has been controversy on how to determine when treatment is 
‘because of’ a protected characteristic, but the House of Lords in James v Eastleigh Borough 
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Council
83
 clarified this by holding that impugned treatment engages the direct discrimination 
provisions when the complainant would have received the same treatment from the decision-
maker but for his or her protected characteristic. It follows from this ‘but for’ test that a 
finding of direct discrimination does not require an intention, purpose or motive to treat 
someone less favourably because of a protected characteristic. If the reason for less 
favourable treatment is not on its face based on a protected characteristic, it might 
nevertheless be ‘inherently’ discriminatory. This is illustrated by the facts of James v 
Eastleigh. The defendant provided free access to its swimming pools for those of pensionable 
age. Parliament had set the pensionable age at 60 for a woman and 65 for a man. The 
claimant, a man, had to pay for swimming while his wife had free admission. The less 
favourable treatment of men did not feature in the purpose for adopting the policy. The aim 
of the defendant's policy was to assist those with low incomes rather than to harm men. 
Nonetheless, the court held that the defendant's policy was ‘inherently discriminatory’ 
because the complainant would have received the same treatment as his wife but for his or 
her sex.
84
  
The ‘but for’ direct discrimination test is likely to be satisfied when the reason for a 
decision directly correlates with the protected ground. In James v Eastleigh, there was a 
direct correlation between the reason for the decision (helping people of pensionable age) and 
the protected characteristic (the status of being a man or woman). However, there is 
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confusion in the case law over the extent the reason for the less favourable treatment should 
correlate with the protected ground. In Hall v Bull,
85
 the Supreme Court found direct 
discrimination even when there was not a direct correlation between the less favourable 
treatment and the protected characteristic. The case concerned civil partners who booked a 
hotel room but, on arriving at the hotel, were turned away because the hotel owners restricted 
double rooms to ‘heterosexual married couples.’ Lady Hale, in the majority, held that the 
difference in treatment was direct discrimination because the reason for the decision (married 
status) was indissociable from sexual orientation. Gay people could not (at the time) marry 
someone of the same sex but only enter a civil partnership. Lord Kerr, also in the majority, 
held that the treatment was direct discrimination because a civil partnership is in a not 
materially different position from a married couple, and therefore the only remaining basis on 
which the defendants treated the gay couple was their sexual orientation.   
However, Lords Neuberger, in dissent, highlighted that the hotel owners did not only 
target homosexuals but also unmarried hetrosexual couples. Since unmarried heterosexuals 
were disadvantaged in the same way as homosexuals, they were treated equally to 
homosexuals, and therefore the impugned treatment should not constitute direct 
discrimination.   
It seems Hall v Bull sets a precedent that treatment engages the direct discrimination 
provisions when the reason for less favourable treatment is linked to the protected 
characteristic even if there is not a perfect correlation between the less favourable treatment 
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and the protected characteristic. 
For a finding of direct age discrimination, the primary decision-maker must have 
made the decision because of the claimant's age. The mental processes of people other than 
the primary decision-maker are irrelevant. For example, in CLFIS (UK) Ltd v Reynolds,
86
 the 
Court of Appeal held that when a person subjects someone to a detriment and does so by 
relying upon information expressed by others whose motivation was discriminatory, this will 
not amount to discrimination if the person responsible for the detriment did not also act on 
discriminatory reasons.   
In this case, the claimant argued that they were the victim of direct age discrimination 
when a managing director reported performance concerns to a general manager, who 
subsequently dismissed the claimant. The claimant argued that the managing director 
reported these concerns for age discriminatory reasons. The Court of Appeal held that since 
the general manager did not treat the claimant less favourably because of age, there was no 
age discrimination in the decision to dismiss the claimant. 
Treating a person less favourably because of a person’s perceived age rather than 
their actual age is enough to engage the direct discrimination provisions. For example, an 
employer’s decision not to employ an applicant because the employer falsely believed the 
applicant was 65 years of age is direct age discrimination unless the employer can 
demonstrate that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The 
fact that the applicant was younger than their perceived age does not prevent the employer’s 
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action from constituting direct discrimination.   
Furthermore, treating someone less favourably because that person associates with 
someone of a particular age is also an action that engages the direct discrimination 
provisions. For example, in EAD Solicitors LLP v Abrams,
87
 Mr Abrams set up a company to 
take his place in a limited liability partnership. When Mr Abrams reached the retirement age 
of the partnership, the firm objected to Mr Abram working in the firm in his role as an 
employee of the company he had set up. The EAT held that Mr Abram’s company could 
bring a direct discrimination claim because the company was treated less favourably for 
being associated with Mr Abram, and this less favourable treatment was because Mr Abram 
had reached the firm's retirement age.   
The case law has taken discrimination by association further in Lee v McArthur.
88
 The 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal held that treating a person less favourably because that 
person associates with a community of people who share a protected characteristic is enough 
to engage the direct discrimination provisions. In this case, the claimants requested that the 
defendant bake a cake depicting the slogan ‘Support Gay Marriage.’ The defendant, a 
company owned by devout Christians, refused the order because they disapproved of the 
slogan. The Court held that the slogan ‘Support Gay Marriage’ was ‘inextricably linked’ to 
sexual orientation. In refusing to produce a cake with this slogan, the defendants treated the 
claimants less favourably because the claimants were associating with the gay community 
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and this, the Court held, amounted to direct discrimination.  
This case might reveal a legal duty obligating commercial printers to print requested 
materials supporting, say, the removal of lower minimum wage requirements for people 
under 25 years of age. Following the reasoning of Lee v McArthur, it is possible that 
statements concerning minimum wage are ‘inextricably linked’ to age groups (since age 
determines minimum wage rates) and therefore refusing to print the materials is 
discrimination by association on the grounds of age.   
Another important feature for identifying direct discrimination is that a decision-
maker must put an individual in a worse position than a similarly situated person. In the 
context of age discrimination, courts and tribunals can identify age discrimination by making 
a comparison between the complainant, who is of a certain age, with a similarly situated 
person (real or hypothetical) of a different age, and determine whether a decision-maker 
treated that individual less favourably compared to people of a different age.   
According to section 5 of the Equality Act 2010, people who share an age are those in 
‘the same age group’ with age group defined ‘by reference to age, whether by reference to a 
particular age or to a range of ages.’ If the claimant is 40 years of age, they can identify 
themselves as being in a middle-age group and compare themselves to how older people 
over, say, 60 years of age were treated. Claimants must decide which age group to compare 
themselves to. They need to consider whether their case is more likely to be successful by 
comparing themselves against a wide age gap, such as all people over 65 years of age, or to 
compare themselves to a narrower group, such as people 65 to 70 years of age.  
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If a decision-maker treats an individual less favourably because of age, then the 
treatment is be unlawful unless it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim or if 
the treatment fits into one of the exceptions outlined above. The Supreme Court in Seldon 
confirmed that only ‘social policy objectives’ can justify treatment that engages the direct age 
discrimination provisions. Costs reduction and improving competitiveness cannot alone 
justify the treatment. As we will see in the next section, the range of aims capable of 
justifying measures that engage the indirect age discrimination provisions are wider than aims 
capable of justifying measures that engage the direct discrimination provisions.     
However, less favourable treatment because of age cannot be justified by the 
proportionality test if that treatment also treats people less favourably because of another 
protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010. For example, a broadcaster dismissing older 
women from television work cannot attempt to justify this treatment on the grounds that it is 
proportionate and therefore justified age-differential treatment. The dismissal is sex 
discrimination in addition to age discrimination, and the Equality Act 2010 does not offer a 
general proportionality defence for unequal treatment on the grounds of sex or protected 
characteristics other than age.  
  
2.12 Features of indirect age discrimination (Equality Act 2010 s 19)   
Indirect age discrimination occurs when there is an ostensibly age-neutral provision, criterion 
or practice that puts individuals of a particular age at a disadvantage and that policy, criterion 
or practice is not a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.  
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Indirect discrimination concerns the effect a measure has on people, namely the effect 
of creating or perpetuating disadvantage of particular social groups. It is ‘an attempt to level 
the playing field by subjecting to scrutiny requirements which look neutral on their face but 
in reality work to the comparative disadvantage of people with a particular protected 
characteristic.’
89
  
To engage the indirect discrimination provisions, a complainant must demonstrate 
that an individual is put at a particular disadvantage when compared with people of a 
different age. In other words, there must be a connection between the protected characteristic 
and the disadvantage. The Supreme Court in Homer held that there will be a connection 
between a protected characteristic and disadvantage when there is an association between the 
protected characteristic and any particular disadvantages. For example, the defendant in 
Homer enacted a rule that a law degree was necessary to be eligible for promotion to legal 
advisor for the police. The claimant was 61 years of age at the time of the introduction of the 
rule. He argued that completing a law degree would take him beyond his retirement date and 
therefore he was disadvantaged because of his age. The EAT and the Court of Appeal ruled 
that the employer had not applied any provision, criterion or practice that disadvantaged the 
claimant's age group. What put the claimant at a disadvantage, the ET and the Court of 
Appeal held, was his proximity to leaving the defendant’s employment. The Supreme Court 
rejected this rigid approach and found that there was an association between the claimant’s 
age and the disadvantage of reaching the retirement age, and this was enough to engage the 
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indirect age discrimination provisions.  
Indirect discrimination also requires a comparison between groups rather than 
individuals. We can use statistics to compare different groups to reveal disadvantage. 
However, not all disadvantages can be revealed through statistics, particularly if the sample 
size is very small. In London Underground Ltd v Edwards (No 2),
90
 the Court of Appeal held 
that it is enough to rely on common knowledge that people with a protected characteristic are 
likely to be disadvantaged.
91
  
To establish indirect discrimination, there is no requirement that the claimant 
demonstrate the reason why a policy, criterion or practice causes disadvantage to people who 
have a particular protected characteristic. The Supreme Court in Essop and others v Home 
Office (UK Border Agency)
92
 held that while direct discrimination requires a causal link 
between the protected characteristic and the less favourable treatment, indirect discrimination 
only requires a causal link between the policy, criterion and practice and the disadvantage 
suffered by people who have a particular protected characteristic. In this case, civil servants 
claimed indirect discrimination when statistics revealed that black people, people from other 
ethnic minorities and people over 30 years of age had significantly lower pass rates than 
white people and younger people in a test that civil servants had to pass to be eligible for 
promotion to the level of Higher Executive Officer. The claimants, however, were unable to 
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show why the test disadvantaged people from certain ethnic groups and older people. The 
failure to prove the reason why the groups were disadvantaged did not prevent a finding of 
indirect discrimination. 
The type of measures likely to engage the indirect age discrimination provisions 
include qualification requirements that are harder for older people to obtain and redundancy 
schemes that have length of service as a criterion. These are both examples of age-neutral 
policies that disadvantage particular age groups. The facts of Homer illustrate an indirectly 
discriminatory policy. The claimant had to complete a law degree to be eligible for 
promotion. The Supreme Court held the rule was indirectly discriminatory because the 
claimant’s age group (60 to 65 years of age) would have less time than younger people to 
obtain the degree before reaching the employer’s mandatory retirement age. 
Rolls-Royce plc v Unite the Union
93
 illustrates a redundancy scheme that engages the 
indirect discrimination provisions. The claimant operated a redundancy scheme with the 
agreement of the trade union Unite that awarded points to employees by six different criteria, 
one of which was length of service. Employees with the lowest points score could face 
redundancy. The Court of Appeal held that using length of service as part of an assessment 
for redundancy engages the indirect discrimination provisions because younger employees 
are disadvantaged in accruing length of service.  
Measures that engage the indirect age discrimination provisions can be justified and 
lawful if the decision-maker establishes that the measure is a proportionate means of 
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achieving a legitimate aim. In common with the direct age discrimination provisions, the 
Equality Act 2010 provides no explanation of the sorts of aims capable of justifying 
measures. The case law provides guidance. The Supreme Court in Homer found that ‘[t]he 
range of aims which can justify indirect discrimination on any ground is wider than the aims 
which can, in the case of age discrimination, justify direct discrimination. It is not limited to 
the social policy...but can encompass a real need on the part of the employer's business.’
94
 In 
other words, private interests, including business efficiency, can justify treatment that 
engages the indirect discrimination provisions. Also, ‘to be proportionate, a measure has to be 
both an appropriate means of achieving the legitimate aim and (reasonably) necessary in 
order to do so.’
95
 Moreover, ‘[p]art of the assessment of whether the criterion can be justified 
entails a comparison of the impact of that criterion upon the affected group as against the 
importance of the aim to the employer.’
96
 
   The proportionality test in age discrimination law is an essential concept for 
determining the lawfulness of measures that engage the direct and indirect age discrimination 
provisions. In section 2.3, I explain that the proportionality test requires moral reasoning. The 
theory of age discrimination defended in this thesis offers guidance on the principles that can 
assist in determine proportionality and therefore assist in determining legality. In the next 
section, I explain possible implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on age 
discrimination law. 
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2.2 The Possible Implications on Age Discrimination Law of the UK Exiting 
the European Union  
While the UK remains a member of the EU, EU law binds it. The UK is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU, which answers questions relating to the interpretation of EU law. 
The UK courts can refer questions to the CJEU to resolve any doubts about the interpretation 
and application of age discrimination law and its compatibility with the legal obligations 
under EU law.
97
  
The UK has signalled its intention to leave the EU. This means that once a deal is 
formed between the Council of the EU and the UK government or two years elapse before a 
deal is negotiated, the EU Treaties will no longer apply to the UK unless there is agreement 
between the UK and the Council to extend the two year negotiating period. Once it is 
confirmed that the UK has withdrawn from the EU, section 2 of the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill indicates that existing EU laws will take effect in English law and the UK 
Parliament will have the power to “amend, repeal and improve" the laws as it pleases. After 
withdrawal, the UK will no longer be obligated to implement EU laws unless the terms of 
any agreement with the Council determines otherwise. The implications for age 
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discrimination law in the UK include the possibility for the UK to repeal age discrimination 
law entirely (although the government has not indicated any plans to repeal these laws). 
The other possible implication for age discrimination law relates to the status of the 
case law of the CJEU. The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill proposes that CJEU decisions 
decided before the UK leaves the EU  will have the status of Supreme Court decisions. It is 
possible for the UK Supreme Court to take this as an opportunity to overrule judgments of the 
CJEU should it consider that justice requires departure from that precedent. The Great Repeal 
Bill also proposes that future decisions of the CJEU will not bind the UK courts after the 
UK’s exit of the EU. The possible implication of this is that the UK courts may develop age 
discrimination jurisprudence by ignoring future developments of age discrimination law 
developed by CJEU. UK age discrimination law may then start to differ in operation from EU 
age discrimination laws. 
 
2.3 Proportionality as Moral Reasoning  
As I have established in section 2.1, a measure can only be a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim and therefore lawful if it is (1) suitable for achieving a legitimate 
aim, (2) necessary to achieve that aim and (3) proportionate in the narrower sense: it must not 
impose burdens or cause harms to other legitimate interests that outweigh the objectives 
achieved.
98
 A central contention of this thesis is that this proportionality test is a direction to 
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courts and tribunals to engage in moral reasoning to determine whether the impugned 
measure is justified or unjustified. In other words, proportionality requires courts and 
tribunals to weigh and choose between competing principles and interests to determine 
whether the impugned measure is lawful. My thesis aims to assist this process by identifying 
the moral principles relevant to assessing the proportionality of age-differential treatment.   
Proportionality requires moral reasoning from courts and tribunals (and anyone else 
seeking to apply the law) because the three-stage proportionality assessments are value-
laden.
99
 For example, identifying ‘legitimate’ aims to justify measures that engage the direct 
and indirect age discrimination provisions requires moral argument. It requires that we 
identify which objectives are important enough to justify treating people unequally on the 
grounds of age or disadvantaging particular age groups. This requires a moral theory to 
identify legitimacy in the context of age discrimination. In other words, we need a theory of 
age discrimination to identify the principles that can work to justify age-differential 
treatment.  
The necessity stage of the proportionality test requires determining whether there are 
alternative measures that can further the legitimate aim without impacting so much on the 
interests of people affected by the impugned measure. This is an empirical undertaking. The 
final stage of the proportionality test requires balancing the value of an individual being free 
from less favourable treatment against the values promoted by the impugned measure. In 
Homer, the Supreme Court held that the final stage of proportionality requires comparing, 
                                                          
99
 For the argument that proportionality assessments require moral reasoning, see Kai Möller, ‘Proportionality: 
Challenging the Critics’ (2012) 10.3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 709. 
 
66 
 
contrasting and weighing the impact of the measures taken on the disadvantaged age group 
against the significance and importance of the decision maker's aims, requirements and 
needs.
100
 In other words, the final test requires weighing and choosing between competing 
moral considerations. Increasing harms to the interests of an individual requires 
proportionately greater realisations of other principles to outweigh the harm.  
Suitability, necessity and proportionality are exactly the sorts of considerations that 
need to be taken into account in making typical moral judgments. For example, in a scenario 
where we consider the morality of lying to someone, the decision-making process might 
involve determining whether lying would pursue a legitimate goal by asking ourselves 
whether it is legitimate to lie to avoid hurting a person's feelings. We might then consider 
whether it is possible to spare someone's feelings without lying (the necessity assessment) 
and, finally, whether the goal of sparing feelings outweighs any competing value in telling 
the truth, including an assessment into whether this should trump the value of maintaining 
trust in the relationship (the final balancing proportionality assessment). The proportionality 
test therefore contains the structure of a classic form of moral reasoning and, as such, the 
proportionality test is a process of investigating whether an impugned measure is morally 
justified.
101
  
Moral reasoning in the proportionality test is particularly prominent when there is a 
clear conflict of important moral values. This occurs then there is a rights conflict. For 
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example, the press has a right to disseminate information under article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, and individuals have a right under article 8 to be free from 
invasions into their private lives. Sometimes these rights conflict and judges must use the 
proportionality test to form a moral argument on which interest should prevail. In Campbell v 
Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd,
102
 the claimant argued that the defendant infringed her right 
to respect for her private life when the defendant published a story with photographs of the 
claimant leaving a drug addiction clinic. In deciding whether the claimant’s right to a private 
life prevailed over the defendant's rights to disseminate information, the House of Lords 
formed a moral argument about the value of free speech and privacy. Lord Nicholls argued 
that ‘[t]he need to be free to disseminate information regarding Miss Campbell's drug 
addiction is of a lower order than the need for freedom to disseminate information on some 
other subjects such as political information. The degree of latitude reasonably to be accorded 
to journalists is correspondingly reduced, but it is not excluded altogether.’
103
 In conflicts of 
values like this case and many others, the courts have no choice but to form moral arguments 
to settle which interest should prevail. 
A number of academics have supported the idea of proportionality as moral 
reasoning. Möller, for example, characterises the proportionality test as a procedure that 
guides judges through the ‘reasoning process of determining whether a policy does or does 
not respect rights.’
104
 Proportionality assessments, for Möller, ‘deliberately release judges 
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from interpretative constraints and direct them to the development of a moral argument about 
the acceptable balance of reasons.’
105 
Robert Alexy has argued that proportionality requires 
the weighing of values.
106 
Mattias Kumm has argued that proportionality is an assessment 
into whether ‘a public action can be demonstratively justified by reasons that are appropriate 
in a liberal democracy.’
107
   
 
2.4 The Proportionality Test in the UK Case Law   
The need for a theory of age discrimination to guide the proportionality test arises because 
the UK courts and tribunals have failed to undertake the proportionality test in a way that 
ensures an open assessment into the competing interests and principles at stake in age 
discrimination claims. This failure is evident in the courts' and tribunals’ approach to the first 
stage of the proportionality test – identifying the legitimate aims capable of justifying 
measures – and in the final stage of the proportionality test – balancing the competing 
interests at stake in the case.   
The leading case on direct age discrimination, Seldon, held that, in undertaking the 
proportionality test, only ‘social policy objectives’ should be capable of justifying measures 
that engage the direct age discrimination provisions. These objectives include a wide variety 
of aims related to employment policy, the labour market and vocational training. The 
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Supreme Court divided these social policy legitimate aims into two categories. The first 
category includes aims that promote ‘inter-generational fairness,’ which includes facilitating 
access to employment for young people, sharing work fairly between the generations and 
enabling older people to remain in the workforce. The second category of ‘social policy 
objectives’ includes aims to protect ‘dignity,’ which includes aims justifying mandatory 
retirement ages on the grounds of avoiding the involvement of older workers in capacity or 
underperformance processes.   
The Supreme Court described the legitimacy of ‘inter-generational fairness’ aims as 
uncontroversial but failed to assess whether inter-generational fairness has a sound theoretical 
basis for justifying unequal treatment on the grounds of age. The Supreme Court relied on EU 
case law, including Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA
108
 and Rosenbladt v 
Oellerking Gebaudereinigungsgesellschaft mbH,
109
 which held that measures disadvantaging 
older people are capable of being justified by furthering the aim of promoting youth 
employment. The Supreme Court also cited Georgiev v Tehnicheski universitet - Sofia, filial 
Plovdiv,
110
 which held that it was legitimate to justify a retirement age by the ‘encouragement 
of recruitment in higher education by means of the offer of posts as professors to younger 
people...’ It is not clear, however, from the EU cases or the reasoning in the Supreme Court in 
Seldon why these aims should justify forcing older people out of work to provide 
opportunities for younger people. 
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There is a need to explain why it is justified to prioritise the interests of younger 
people at the expense of older people. We might argue that inter-generational fairness aims 
are positive-action measures designed to give assistance to the particular needs of 
disadvantaged age groups. But it still warrants an explanation why positive action should be 
capable of justifying unequal treatment on the grounds of age in the general proportionality 
test when positive action is only available under the more restrictive provisions of section 158 
and 159 of the Equality Act 2010 for other protected grounds such as the race and sex. A 
theory of age discrimination can aim to provide such an explanation.   
In Lockwood, the Court of Appeal accepted the legitimacy of positive action in 
justifying age-differential treatment, but did not explain why these aims are legitimate. The 
Court of Appeal held that it was a legitimate aim to provide a financial cushion to older 
workers to cover a period until those workers find alternative employment. In this case, the 
claimant began working at the Department for Work and Pensions (‘DWP’) at 18 years of 
age. She continued working at the DWP for eight years until she was 26 years old. The 
claimant then applied for redundancy and was accepted. The redundancy scheme entitled her 
to £10,849.04. However, the same scheme would have entitled her to significantly more 
money if she were over 30 years of age and had worked the same number of years at the 
DWP. The claimant argued this was direct age discrimination because it treated her less 
favourably because she was a young employee.  
In rejecting the direct discrimination claim, the Court of Appeal held the policy was 
justified by statistics demonstrating that it was more difficult for older people to find 
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employment. The Court of Appeal also relied on the assumption that older people need more 
redundancy pay because older people are more likely to have families and dependants than 
young people, which makes it more difficult for older workers to relocate to find 
employment. The DWP's scheme was a positive action measure. 
There was no analysis, however, explaining why it was justified to generalise about 
age groups in this way. Financially cushioning older workers is a form of age stereotyping 
because it reflects a generalisation that young people react differently to unemployment when 
compared to older people. The ET reasoned (which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal) that 
'[i]ndividuals in the younger categories and in their twenties can generally be expected to 
react more easily and more rapidly to the loss of their jobs and greater flexibility can, in 
general, be expected of them given their lesser family and financial obligations.' The ET 
referred to 'the average date of marriage was 34 for women, and 38 years for men' as an 
explanation for why greater financial assistance was needed for people in their 30s compared 
to people in their 20s.   
Using race, sex and many other protected grounds under the Equality Act 2010 to 
grant higher redundancy pay would be unlawful. It warrants a theory of age discrimination to 
explain why unequal treatment on the grounds of age can be justified in this way when it is 
unlawful in relation to other grounds of discrimination. And a theory of age discrimination 
can examine whether the sorts of age generalisations in Lockwood are an acceptable way to 
identify justified age-differential treatment.  
In relation to the second category of legitimate aims identified by Seldon, namely 
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‘dignity’ aims, the Supreme Court in Seldon held that retirement ages are capable of being 
justified by avoiding the need to involve older workers in incapacity or underperformance 
processes. Lady Hale expressed sympathy for the view that this aim was ‘suspiciously like 
stereotyping’ because it used age as a proxy for poor performance. The Court held that they 
were bound by the EU case law, which held that avoiding ‘unseemly debates about capacity’ 
was a legitimate aim.
111
 The Court, however, failed to offer analysis for why avoiding 
humiliation is enough to justify a mandatory retirement age and failed to explain why it is 
acceptable to assume older workers are less capable. The Court accepted stereotypes as 
capable of justifying unequal treatment on the grounds of age without explaining the reason 
why age stereotyping is legitimate.  
A further example of the acceptance of age stereotyping for justifying unequal 
treatment is the decision in White,
112
 which applied the Seldon approach to the retirement age 
of 70 for judges. In finding that the retirement age for judges was justified and therefore 
lawful, the ET referred to a letter from the Lord Chief Justice to the Lord Chancellor that 
explained that a retirement age of 70 was necessary for avoiding the problem of having to ask 
judges to retire when judges have ‘gone off the boil intellectually.’ The ET held that it was 
legitimate to act on a presumption that judges are likely to decline in ability after 70 years of 
age. This presumption, the ET held, is to ensure public confidence that they are not 
undergoing age-based intellectual decline. The ET offered no explanation, however, for why 
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negative age stereotyping should be capable of justifying this unequal treatment. We would 
consider race or sex stereotyping unacceptable as a reason to remove a person from their 
work. A theory of age discrimination is necessary to examine age stereotyping and the reason 
for the acceptability or otherwise of age stereotyping.     
The failure to engage openly with the principles at stake is also clear in relation to 
indirect discrimination claims. The Supreme Court in Homer held that the sorts of aims 
capable of justifying treatment that engages the indirect age discrimination provisions are not 
limited to social policy, but can encompass a real need on the part of an employer's business. 
No explanation, however, was offered as to why the sort of aims that can justify measures 
engaging the indirect age discrimination provisions are wider than the sorts of aims that can 
justify measures that engage the direct age discrimination provisions. A theory of age 
discrimination may go some way to revealing why we should treat direct and indirect age 
discrimination differently in identifying legitimate aims. 
There is also a lack of a theoretical underpinning in the finding that costs alone should 
not justify age-differential treatment. In Cross, the EAT held that cost savings cannot justify 
measures that engage the indirect age discrimination provisions unless cost savings  are 
combined with some other aim that can be said to be legitimate.
113
 The Court of Appeal in 
Woodcock held that costs alone cannot justify measures that engage the direct age 
discrimination provisions.
114
 However, cost savings combined with a legitimate aim, the 
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Court held, is an acceptable consideration in determining proportionality. A theory of age 
discrimination might explain why costs alone cannot justify age-differential treatment and 
explain the role costs should play in the proportionality assessment. This is currently unclear 
in the case law.  
A further problematic aspect of the case law is the treatment of the final stage of 
proportionality that requires that measures do not impose burdens or cause harms to other 
legitimate interests that outweigh the objectives achieved. The Supreme Court in Homer 
recognised that ‘both the Age Regulations and the Equality Act recognise that difficult 
balances have to be struck between the competing interests of different age groups.’ Much of 
the case law, however, lacks clear transparent reasoning about the balance of competing 
interests.  
For example, the ET reasoning in Seldon concerning the proportionality of a law 
firm's retirement age (reasoning upheld in later appeals) did little to evaluate the competing 
interests at stake in the case. The ET held the partner’s consent to the partnership agreement 
and the fact that the partner had time to financially prepare for the retirement were relevant 
factors to weigh in the balance of whether the retirement age was proportionate. The ET 
concluded that these factors lessened the harmful impact on the complainant and, therefore, 
on balance, the retirement age was proportionate. The ET, however, did not evaluate how and 
why retirement ages are harmful to the interests of individuals. The ET did not openly 
evaluate the weight of the claimant’s interest in being free from the age stereotyping that 
underpinned the retirement age, including being free from the stereotype that older workers 
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need capability assessments because older people are less capable. The ET also failed to 
evaluate the weight of the claimant’s interest in being able to continue in socially productive 
work.   
The lack of recognition of the burdens placed on the claimant was particularly 
problematic in Seldon because the retirement age was unlikely to do much to advance public 
policy objectives. The ET and EAT acknowledged that a large number of partners choose 
leave the firm before they reach the retirement age and that the firm has the option of 
agreeing to keep on partners who reach the retirement age.. Therefore, the retirement age was 
likely to have only a limited effect on creating inter-generational fairness by creating 
promotion opportunities for younger workers.   
The lack of openness about competing interests in the final stage of the 
proportionality test is also clear in the Lockwood case. The ET claimed ‘the respondents had 
established cogent business aims, and proportionate means of implementing them, which 
outweighed the discriminatory effect of the measures.’ This was upheld by the EAT and 
Court of Appeal. The ET did not explain, however, why the benefits of the scheme 
outweighed the discriminatory effect. In particular, the ET did not evaluate the weight of the 
claimant's interest in being free from the stereotyping present in the redundancy scheme and 
did not explain which principles were at stake. For example, the ET did not explain why the 
benefit of the scheme cushioning older workers from the effects of unemployment outweighs 
any harm caused to the claimant by the stereotyping present in the scheme. Constructing a 
theory of discrimination can help to explain why the redundancy scheme in Lockwood would 
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harm the interests of younger workers and this would help to weigh this interest against the 
objective pursued by the scheme. 
 
Conclusion  
To determine the legality of measures that engage the direct and indirect age discrimination 
provisions of the Equality Act 2010, we must investigate whether the treatment fits into a 
specifically prescribed exception or whether it is a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim. The proportionality test requires an assessment of the competing interests of 
those adversely affected by the treatment against any interests promoted by the treatment. 
This assessment, I have argued, requires moral reasoning to engage with theoretical questions 
about the principles that determine when less favourable treatment on the grounds of age and 
measures that disadvantage particular age groups are justified or unjustified. I have further 
argued that a theory of age discrimination can assist in undertaking this proportionality test 
with regard to the competing principles that are at stake in an age discrimination claim.     
An open assessment of the competing principles at stake in any age discrimination 
claim has been largely missing from many of the leading UK age discrimination cases. The 
courts and tribunals have failed to explain why particular aims are legitimate for the purposes 
of justifying unequal treatment. The courts and tribunals have also failed to provide principles 
for determining whether a measure is proportionate. The result is that the rationale for these 
decisions is often unclear. This points towards the need for guidance on the principles that 
should determine the legality of measures that engage the direct and indirect age 
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discrimination provisions. My thesis aims to provide this guidance by outlining and 
defending a theory of age discrimination that should assist in determining the justifiability 
and therefore legality of treatment that engages the direct and indirect discrimination 
provisions. In Chapters 3 to 5, I examine and offer principles that can form a comprehensive 
theory of age discrimination. These principles determine whether a measure in an age 
discrimination claim pursues a legitimate aim and whether the measure has an acceptable 
balance between competing interests. In Chapter 7, I return to the cases discussed in this 
Chapter to demonstrate the positive difference a theory of age discrimination can make to the 
legal reasoning in age discrimination cases. 
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3 
Equality Principles   
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that determining the legality of treatment that engages the 
direct and indirect age discrimination provisions requires determining whether the impugned 
treatment pursues a legitimate aim, is necessary to achieve that aim and does not impose 
burdens or cause harms to other legitimate interests that outweigh the objectives achieved. 
This proportionality test, I argued, requires courts and tribunals (and anyone else seeking to 
determine the lawfulness of treatment subject to the proportionality test) to engage with and 
choose between competing moral interests and principles that work to distinguish justified 
from unjustified age-differential treatment. 
 This chapter starts the process of identifying these principles by identifying equality 
norms that may assist in distinguishing justified from unjustified age-differential treatment 
and therefore form part of a theory of discrimination. Age discrimination is a means by which 
inequality is produced. It concerns treating people ‘less favourably’ than others and putting 
people at a disadvantage.
115
 As argued by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, ‘[c]onceptually, 
discrimination is tied to inequality. It is impossible to discriminate against someone unless 
there is some dimension in which the discriminator treats the discriminatee worse than those 
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 As I have explained in Chapter 2, age discrimination is a comparative concept. The definition of direct 
discrimination requires that an act put an individual in a worse position than a person of a different age. The 
definition of indirect discrimination requires a policy, criterion or practice put an individual at a particular 
disadvantage in comparison to people of a different age. 
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against whom she does not discriminate.’
116
 It follows that a plausible theory of age 
discrimination, which this thesis is concerned with creating, must address what is wrong with 
inequality in order to have a complete account of when and why age discrimination.
117
 
Further to the process of creating a theory of age discrimination, this chapter identifies 
principles for explaining the wrongness of inequality. I argue that the principles of equality of 
opportunity, which requires an equal distribution of benefits and burdens except insofar as 
individuals are responsible for their condition of being worse off, and social equality, which 
requires conditions in which people are able to interact as equals, provides an account of the 
wrongness of inequality. In Chapter 4, I verify whether these principles explain the 
wrongness of discrimination, and Chapter 5 examines whether the principles can work to 
distinguish justified from unjustified treatment that engages the age discrimination 
provisions. 
As I explained in Chapter 1, I adopt a version of the reflective equilibrium method 
where I consider not just my own intuitions in searching for appropriate moral principles but 
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 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, 'Discrimination and Equality' in Andrei Marmor (ed), Routledge Companion to 
Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012) 569. 
117
 However, many thinkers deny that equality explains the wrong of discrimination. For example, Tarunabh 
Khaitan in A Theory of Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press 2015) argued that anti-discrimination laws 
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Gardner in 'On the Ground of Her Sex(uality)' (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 167 argued that 
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prescription that likes should be treated alike. But once such a non-equality principle is introduced, then we do 
not need any equality norm to explain why differential treatment is wrong. For a criticism of this argument, see 
Kent Greenawalt, ‘How Empty is the Idea of Equality?’ (1983) 83.5 Columbia Law Review 1167.  
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also the intuitions and beliefs of a range of people who have experience with age 
discrimination issues. Further to this, in this chapter I consider a range of academic views on 
the wrongness of inequality, including the thinkers supporting luck egalitarianism, such as 
Ronald Dworkin and Jerry Cohen, but also thinkers such as David Miller and Elizabeth 
Anderson who argue inequality is wrong when it undermines equality of status between 
people.  
I reject the principle of equality of outcome (the idea that equality requires citizens 
have the same level of resources, welfare etc.) on the grounds that it requires citizens to have 
the equal level of resources regardless of the outcomes of individual choices. Equality of 
opportunity, I argue, coheres better with our intuitions about personal responsibility than 
equality of outcome and is supported by a plausible background theory of personal 
responsibility that holds that we are responsible for actions when we are capable of being 
responsive to reasons for acting. 
Equality of opportunity, however, is consistent with large inequalities in social status 
to the extent that some social groups may be in a position of dominance over others. I argue 
that we should revise an equality of opportunity account of equality to incorporate the social 
equality principle, which holds that inequality is wrong when it leads to social conditions that 
deny the ability of individuals to be full and equal participants in modern democratic 
society.
118
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 David Miller and Elizabeth Anderson have defended versions of social equality or democratic principle 
equality. David Miller, ‘What Kind of Equality Should the Left Pursue’ in Jane Franklin (ed), Equality (Institute 
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Finally, I argue that we should understand equality as the aim to secure access to the 
constitutive components of a flourishing life. Rather than selecting one value to equalise, I 
argue that egalitarians ought to be concerned with creating equal opportunity to experience a 
range of intrinsic goods, including welfare, autonomy, health and education.  
 
3.1 A Starting Point for Understanding Equality 
In pre-modern times it was typical to rank human worth according to wealth, power and 
social class. The modern idea of equality instead asserts that all humans have an equal and 
objectively high moral status. This derives from the Kantian idea that the capacity for self-
governance and autonomous choice is determinative of the equal status and value of human 
beings.
119
 According to this idea, humans have an equal incomparable dignity, and to respect 
this dignity, we should always treat people with equal concern and respect.
120
 Discrimination 
and other forms of unequal treatment can undermine this ideal. This version of equality is 
widely accepted, and the discussions of equality tends to concern how this idea should inform 
the way we treat people.
121
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 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor tr ed Cambridge University Press 
1998). 
120
 Dworkin has argued that moral equality requires treating people as equals. This principle recognises that we 
can treat people differently if different circumstances require this, but to treat people as equals, Dworkin argues, 
means that we should always show equal concern and respect in our treatment of others. Ronald Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977) 370. 
121
 The belief in the equal moral worth of persons is not universal. Uwe Steinhoff in ‘Do All Persons Have 
Equal Moral Worth?: On 'Basic Equality' and Equal Respect and Concern’ (OUP 2015) ch 8  has argued that 
there is no universal duty ‘of equal respect and concern’ or equal worth of persons. 
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I now consider the sorts of actions and conditions that can wrongfully undermine this 
moral equality. I consider strict equality of outcome and conclude that it fails to support our 
moral beliefs about equality. I defend two equality principles – equality of opportunity and 
social equality – that explain when and why inequality is wrong. 
 
3.2 Strict Equality of Outcome  
Strict equality of outcome requires that people hold an equal level of goods, whether that be 
welfare, resources or some other values. The problems with strict equality of outcome are 
familiar. To achieve equality of outcome would be to violate personal responsibility. We 
would have to distribute resources from people who are prudent – and therefore have 
accumulated more resources than others – to people who are wasteful. This wrongly shields 
the reckless and irresponsible from the consequences of their choices, and, in doing so, 
rewards free riders who can unfairly exploit the prudence of others. For example, if one 
person spends their time gambling rather than working whereas another saves and invests 
their income, it is not wrong for the latter person to end up with more resources.  
Another problem is that equality of outcome does not respect individual preferences. 
One person may be content with a moderate income if their job provides for a work-life 
balance, another person may want to work long hours to achieve higher income while another 
person may be content with a low income if it means pursuing their passion for creating art. 
Forcing equality of outcome would have to neutralise the choice to pursue different forms of 
life.  
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To create equal outcomes it would be necessary to constantly interfere with voluntary 
choices. For example, a large number of people may be happy to pay money to witness the 
skill of a sports star and this will inevitably result in the sports star holding a larger pool of 
resources than many others. But to create equality of outcomes, we would have to prevent or 
at least interfere with these voluntary choices to ensure that the sports star does not hold more 
resources than others.
122
 This invasion of liberty in pursuit of equality is too severe.
123
  
Strict equality of outcomes is also likely to lead to an inefficient economy since it 
offers the same outcomes for productive and unproductive behaviour thereby removing 
incentives to avoid waste. We would need a huge bureaucracy to measure outcomes and to 
redistribute to ensure equal holdings for different individuals.
124
 This inefficiency will lead to 
lower prosperity, which in turn would lead to lower welfare for society as a whole.  
An account of equality that fits better with our intuitions would account for personal 
responsibility, welfare and liberty by ensuring that people are responsible for certain 
inequalities resulting from their decisions. Further to providing such an account of equality, I 
now consider the equality of opportunity principle.
125
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 This is Robert Nozick’s famous Wilt Chamberlain argument. It demonstrates that equality of outcome would 
disrupt the patterns that result from free choices. Respecting liberty, Nozick argues, means we have to accept 
inequality of outcome. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books 1974) 160-161. 
123
 For a detailed libertarian criticism of the pursuit of equality of outcome, see Friedrich Hayek, The 
Constitution of Liberty (Routledge 1960). 
124
 Equality of outcome would require extensive government central planning. Central planning has a host of 
undesirable consequences, including the fact that it usually requires authoritarian government. See Friedrich 
Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge 2014). 
125
 Note, however, that some thinkers argue that we should not consider equality of opportunity in isolation 
from assessing equality of outcome. For example, Anne Phillips in ‘Defending Equality of Outcome’ (2004) 
12.1 Journal of Political Philosophy 1 argued that we should collapse the distinction between equality of 
 
84 
 
 
3.3 Equality of Opportunity 
Equality of opportunity holds that inequalities are acceptable if they result from personal 
choices; inequalities are unacceptable when it results from factors outside our control. For 
example, it is not wrong for the person who chooses to go on multiple holidays a year to end 
up with fewer resources than the person who chooses to invest their disposable income, but it 
is wrong for one person to be much wealthier than another simply because they were born 
into a wealthy family. This is the luck egalitarian version of the equality of opportunity 
principle, which holds that it is wrong for a person to be worse off to the extent that they are 
not directly responsible for their condition of being worse off.
126
 It follows from this that we 
should try giving people initial equality of opportunity and then let people choose how and 
when to exercise these opportunities.  
The sorts of things we are not responsible for include the circumstances a person finds 
themselves in, including our genetics, our ethnicity and our upbringing.
127
 To create equality 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
outcome and equality of opportunity when we compare different social groups. She argued that ‘[i]t makes sense 
to start from the expectation that all groups would normally be distributed in roughly equal proportions along all 
measures of social activity: to expect, therefore, an equality of outcome, and to take any divergence from this as 
a reasonably safe indication that opportunities are not yet equal.’ To take equality opportunity seriously, she 
argues, we should ‘regard equality of outcome as the template against which to measure equal opportunity 
claims.’ This argument, while sensitive to outcome, still takes equality of opportunity as its foundational 
equality principle.  
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of opportunity, we should redistribute to ensure an equal starting point in life. An example 
might be education: some children have an unfair start in life because they have better 
teachers and more supportive parents than others. This early form of socialisation will place 
these people at a strong advantage to access higher paying employment. Equality of 
opportunity requires ensuring that each child has an equal chance of accessing the higher 
paying and rewarding work, and this requires taking measures to ensure educational benefits 
are roughly equal for each child. This requires higher spending for children from socially 
disadvantaged families to level the playing field. 
Luck egalitarians, such as Ronald Dworkin, have called the negative consequences 
that result from unchosen circumstances brute luck whereas inequalities that result from 
choice is called option luck.
128
 Only the latter type of inequality, they have argued, is 
acceptable.
129
 Dworkin’s version of equality of opportunity requires initial equal division of 
resources, but after this initial division, the result of free choices should be borne by 
individuals. In contrast, we should compensate brute luck misfortune in full. For example, if a 
person invests in the stock market and loses money, then we should not compensate this loss 
since it is a voluntary gamble. However, the costs caused by genetic disability should not be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Edition), Edward Zalta (ed) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/equal-opportunity/> accessed 
on 10 May 2017.   
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 Dworkin had distanced himself from the luck egalitarian label but his theory of equality is in support of the 
central tenets of the doctrine. 
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borne by the individual since they cannot be held responsible for the disability. 
The equality of opportunity principle accounts for our intuitions about personal 
responsibility. As Arneson has argued, ‘[i]n myriad institutional contexts we hold people 
responsible for the good or bad outcomes of their choices by attaching negative and positive 
sanctions, punishments and rewards, to them.’
130
 Adults are capable of autonomous choices if 
they are not under duress or suffering serious mental illness and are morally responsible for 
their choices. A failure to do this leads to a moral hazard where ‘one person makes the 
decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go 
badly.’
131
  
Equality of opportunity also fits with our intuition that it is wrong for the state to 
interfere with the outcomes of our choices. In the discussion of equality of outcome, I argued 
that the problem with the doctrine is that it would require constant redistributions from the 
consequences of choices to artificially maintain an equal outcome. This is an unacceptable 
intrusion into liberty. Equality of opportunity addresses this problem by accepting that 
individuals should be free to choose how to exercise their opportunities. The resulting 
inequality is acceptable.  
Equality of opportunity promotes independence, self-reliance and, therefore, self-
respect. A failure to ensure people are responsible for the consequences of their choices 
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means that people will become ‘dependent on others, where being dependent on others means 
continually looking to others to meet one's basic needs.’
132
 And this means people will not 
shape their life but require others to shape it.  
But why exactly is inequality of opportunity wrong? The best answer is that it coheres 
with our beliefs about fairness.
133
 Brute luck consequences should be equalised because 
people are not morally responsible for these circumstances, and it is unfair for people to be 
worse off than others due to factors outside their reasonable control. Since every person is 
entitled to equal concern and respect, we ought to avoid granting or permitting better 
conditions to particular people on an arbitrary basis such as brute luck consequences. It 
follows that the value of equality requires a presumption in favour of equal access to goods 
unless option luck causes inequality.  
However, sometimes we should not hold individuals responsible for the consequences 
that result from their choices. For example, a person may choose to travel to work by car 
knowing that there is a very small chance that a storm may arise leading to a car accident. 
The driver has made a choice to take on this risk, but it is inappropriate to hold the driver 
fully responsible for the damage caused by the storm since the risk resulting from a choice is 
very small. It is reasonable for a person to take this risk and unreasonable to hold that the 
individual must cover all the costs of any negative consequences. The effects of bad luck that 
individuals cannot reasonably avoid should constitute brute luck and be subject to 
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compensation.
134
  
To determine when a risk cannot be reasonably avoided we should consider the 
likelihood that a disadvantage will arise, the extent of the disadvantage, the likely benefits 
from taking a risk and the availability of other options that may reduce the risk. The person 
who chooses to drive despite a risk of a storm cannot reasonably avoid that risk if we assume 
the chance of the storm occurring is very low and the benefit to be gained from driving is 
very high (e.g. the need to travel to work) and other forms of transport are unavailable.  
Importantly, there is not always a clear division between brute luck and option luck. 
The consequences of choices may be the result of both option luck and brute luck. For 
example:   
 
 [c]onsider a case where I can choose between two alternatives. One involves a 75% 
chance of having one's crop destroyed by cold weather. The other one involves a 70% 
chance of having one's crop destroyed by flooding. In one sense, obviously, either risk 
is avoidable. Yet, if one were to go for the first alternative, and if one's crops were 
destroyed by cold weather, it would seem odd to say that the full extent to which one 
becomes worse off as a result of that choice is a matter of bad option luck. After all, 
the chances of becoming just as badly off via a different causal route, had I chosen the 
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other alternative, were almost as great. So it seems we should often think of a given 
piece of luck as a mixture of brute luck and option luck where the exact mixture 
depends on the extent to which one could influence the expected value of the outcome 
of one's choice. In the present case, I could only marginally influence the expected 
value of the outcome. Hence the disadvantages resulting from my choice should be 
seen as mostly a matter of bad brute luck.
135
   
 
A key consideration in determining brute luck, then, is the extent we can reasonably influence 
the likelihood of an outcome occurring. The greater the extent we cannot influence an 
outcome, the greater degree we should attribute the consequences of the choice to brute luck.  
 Another important consideration for the equality of opportunity principle is that while 
inequality is wrong when caused by brute luck, there are circumstances where we should not 
remove this type of inequality. For example, blind people suffer disadvantages due to 
disability but creating equality of opportunity by blinding everyone else is obviously 
unacceptable. As Temkin has argued, equality is one moral consideration among many and 
should give way to other principles when equality has unacceptable consequences.
136
 We 
should therefore avoid using equality of opportunity to justify levelling down.   
 And there are circumstances where people should not incur the full costs of their 
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decisions. For example, it is wrong to put the full costs on people who choose to undertake 
tasks that have big costs but great benefits to society and represent duties that society should 
fulfil.
137
 An example is childcare and care for disabled people. When people assume these 
tasks, it will naturally release other people from the burdens of the duty. It is unfair to place 
the entire burden on those who have taken direct action in fulfilling the duties. For example, 
when an individual has made the decision to quit their job to look after a disabled relative, 
fairness requires ensuring that the burden and costs of the care is not borne solely by the 
individual. Fairness requires that the burden of childcare – which includes workplace and 
income disadvantage – should not be borne solely by the primary carer.   
  
  
3.4 Choice and Moral Responsibility 
One may object to equality of opportunity on the grounds that a person's ‘choices’ are really 
indistinguishable from a person's circumstance and therefore must also qualify as brute luck 
that should be equalised.
138
 On this account, people do not choose who they are, but they are 
determined by their environment and shaped by socialisation. Traits that we associate with 
option luck, such as effort, ambition and prudence, are the result of socialisation by 
upbringing and environment. It follows from this argument that equality of opportunity is 
incorrect in identifying the wrong of inequality as being inequality resulting from forces apart 
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from our choices. Our choices, so this argument goes, are also brute luck for which we are 
not responsible.
139
 If this is true, then it is senseless to hold anyone morally responsible for 
any action.  
 The standard reply is the position of compatibilism that acknowledges that everything 
we do is fixed in advance but that this determinism is consistent with free choice and 
responsibility.
140
 If we follow this account, we need to acknowledge the undoubted truth that 
inequality caused by effort, ambition and prudence are, at least partly, the result of 
socialisation by upbringing and environment, but we must argue that the most plausible 
background theory of personal responsibility holds that socialisation and cultural structures 
can coexist with genuine choice and therefore personal responsibility. In support of this, I 
defend the background theory that people can be held responsible when they are reason-
responsive.
141
 We can define reason responsiveness as the capacity for individuals to reflect 
on different options and to select between these options.
142
  
Our attitudes correspond to the reason responsiveness version of personal 
responsibility. Emotions such as gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings 
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are all predicated on holding people responsible for their choices and tend to be displayed to 
people who are capable of responding to reasons.
143
 For example, we usually resent a person 
who has killed another, but we are unlikely to have this attitude if we learn that person was 
suffering from a mental illness and they were acting under the influence of hallucinations. 
The person suffering from the mental illness is incapable of doing otherwise because their 
rationality has been impaired to the extent that they cannot consider and act upon a range of 
reasons. For a similar reason, we will not condemn a person who has lied to us because they 
were under duress. Duress pressures and coerces people into taking a particular course of 
action and deprives people of the chance to act upon an appropriate range of reasons. As 
such, we can say they are incapable of doing otherwise and therefore we will not hold them 
responsible for their actions.    
We accept that people who are unresponsive to appropriate rational considerations do 
not act under free will. But people who are responsive to some range of rational 
considerations are morally responsible for the decisions they make. Responsiveness to 
reasons requires a set of alternatives and information about these alternatives.
144
   
We can test whether a person is reason responsive by considering whether they would 
have acted differently if the reasons to act were different. For example, the person who has 
lied to us because of selfishness would act differently if they were offered a considerable 
financial reward for telling the truth. We would therefore hold this person responsible for 
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their actions because they were capable of acting differently by responding to reasons. In 
contrast, the mentally ill person and the person under duress, assuming that the illness and 
duress rendered these individuals incapable of valuing financial reward in those 
circumstances, would not change their behaviour if offered a reward and they were therefore 
not capable of acting differently.   
 This reason responsiveness theory of personal responsibility supports the position that 
inequality can be appropriate when it is the result of holding people appropriately responsible 
for their choices. However, an individual may make choices from a background of unchosen 
circumstances that influences their choice. For example, making choices from a position of 
poverty is likely to influence how we decide what to do. And since people do not choose 
these circumstances, they cannot be held responsible for them. The result is that the outcomes 
of our choices can be mixture of both option luck and the brute luck that influences how we 
respond to reasons for action. Equality of opportunity, to be plausible, must then 
accommodate adequately the impact of socialisation and reflect the impact this has on our 
responsibility for making decisions. Inequality resulting from choices can only be justified to 
the extent it is unconnected to unequal bad brute luck circumstances. 
There are a number of different ways theorists have identified the extent decisions are 
made from choice for which individuals should be held responsible and the extent decisions 
are made from a background of unfortunate circumstances which they should not be held 
responsible. Roemer’s Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility is probably the best attempt to 
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account for unchosen circumstances such as socialisation.
145
 Roemer’s theory holds that 
people are responsible if they are responsive to reasons while holding that it is not justifiable 
for decision-makers to bear the full costs of a decision that is related to circumstances that 
they have not chosen. There are degrees of responsibility for the outcomes of our choices and 
this depends on the control we have over these choices and their outcomes.  
To evaluate the wrongness of inequality, then, we must look at all the factors that 
caused the individual to choose a course of action and to evaluate which of these factors are 
in the control of the individual, and therefore option luck, and which of these factors are 
outside the control of the individual, and therefore brute luck. Then we determine the 
proportion of option luck and brute luck. The extent to which inequality is wrong is the extent 
to which factors outside the individual’s control caused the outcome.
146
   
 To demonstrate this theory, we can look at one of Roemer’s examples of a smoker 
who has contracted lung cancer. To determine the extent of the smoker’s responsibility for 
the illness, we need to consider the range of circumstances that influenced that person’s 
decision to take up smoking. This can include parental influence, schooling and 
socioeconomic status. We can then assign people into groups who have similar backgrounds 
and influences. We can judge people in these groups as having equivalent levels of 
responsibility for taking up smoking. For example, people in a higher socioeconomic class 
who did not have parents who were smokers will have greater responsibility for taking up 
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smoking than people in lower socioeconomic classes who had parents who were smokers.   
We can also think how Roemer’s theory applies to talent, which is a significant cause 
of inequality. Genetics, supportive parents and teachers influence talent. This means the 
results of talent are partly the result of undeserved circumstances and therefore inequality 
from talent with no redistribution is wrong.
147
 However, we are at least partly responsible for 
the results of exercising and developing our talents because exercising and developing our 
talents is a choice that falls into the option luck category. We should therefore accept reward 
for exercising talent, but we should also ensure the resulting distribution reflects the fact that 
some people have more talent to exercise than others. In other words, we must recognise that 
people make decisions from circumstances where there are unequal conditions to exploit  
opportunities.
148
   
For example, consider a person with a supportive family who exerts himself to 
develop his talents and, as a result, becomes wealthy. Another person raised by negligent 
parents, suffers from a lack of confidence, and, therefore, remains poor. Choice has 
influenced the outcomes. The first person made a decision to exert himself while the second 
person did not. However, unchosen circumstances influenced the choice to exert or not to 
exert. Due to brute luck differences (such as family background), the individuals do not face 
an equivalent range of options to choose from. The inequality in this example is therefore 
partly the result of brute luck and partly the result of option luck. The distributive 
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consequences ought to reward the productive person, but it is wrong for the first person to 
have all of the positive consequences of exercising their talents while the second person 
suffers entirely from not exercising talents. Equality of opportunity requires we redistribute to 
disadvantaged people to reflect the fact that their position is, to a considerable extent, the 
result of bad brute luck. Equality of opportunity requires redistributing wealth to ensure that 
people who have benefitted from advantageous conditions contribute to assisting people who 
have acted against a background of disadvantage.  
 
3.5 Problems with Equality of Opportunity 
The critics of equality of opportunity argue that implementation of the principle would 
require state agencies making invasive moral assessments into whether individuals’ have 
made the best use of their opportunities. For example: 
   
 [I]n order to lay a claim to some important benefit, people are forced to obey other 
people’s judgments of what uses they should have made of their opportunities, rather 
than following their own judgments. Such a system requires the state to make grossly 
intrusive, moralizing judgments of individual’s choices. Equality of fortune thus 
interferes with citizens’ privacy and liberty. Furthermore, as Arneson and Roemer 
make clear, such judgments require the state to determine how much responsibility 
each citizen was capable of exercising in each case. But it is disrespectful for the state 
to pass judgment on how much people are responsible for their expensive tastes or 
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their imprudent choices.
149
 
 
Further:   
 
[E]quality of fortune succeeds not in establishing a society of equals, but only in 
reproducing the stigmatizing regime of the Poor Laws, in which citizens lay claim to 
aid from the state only on condition that they accept inferior status. Poor Law thinking 
pervades the reasoning of luck egalitarians. This is most evident in their distinction 
between the deserving and the undeserving disadvantaged.
150
 
 
Imagine I find myself unemployed despite a long search for employment. To qualify for 
employment benefits under the luck egalitarian version of equality of opportunity, I would 
have to demonstrate to the government that I am incompetent at finding employment through 
no fault or choice of my own. This forces me to reveal something shameful about myself.  
Equality of opportunity places fairness in priority to other principles, including 
respect. Securing complete equality of opportunity would lead to widespread violations of the 
respect principle by imposing shameful revelations. Wolff has argued that a decent society 
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does not impose shameful revelations on any of its members.
151
  
Anderson has also argued that the attempt to eradicate brute luck inequalities can 
stigmatise people by expressing a contemptuous pity towards them.
152
 For example, we know 
that physically attractive people have advantages in society. It follows that equality of 
opportunity requires, as a matter of fairness, that attractive people compensate less attractive 
people for their unfortunate aesthetics. This action, however, is disrespectful and humiliating.   
The force of these criticisms, however, does not mean that we must abandon the 
fairness requirements of equality of opportunity. Abandoning equality of opportunity will 
result in failing to hold people responsible for their choices. Anderson’s line of criticism is 
only persuasive as an argument to abandon equality of opportunity if we view the principle as 
a ‘strong equalisandum claim, which is the sort that an uncompromising egalitarian asserts, 
[that] says that people should be as equal as possible in the dimension it specifies.’
153
 
However, we do not need to understand equality principles as strong equalisandum claims 
that are a complete theory of morality. Instead, we can retain equality of opportunity in 
conjunction with other important values. Equality of opportunity should be viewed as a 
‘qualified or weak equalisandum claim’ that posits that people should be ‘as equal as possible 
in some dimension but subject to whatever limitations need to be imposed in deference to 
other values.’
154
 For example, equality of opportunity in exclusion of other principles may 
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specify that we should make moralising judgments to distinguish the deserving from 
undeserving poor. However, when seen as a weak equalisandum claim, we can trade-off the 
equality of opportunity demand of distinguishing the deserving from undeserving with the 
respect principle requiring that we do not make moralising judgments about people.  
Certain moralistic judgments can help maintain fairness while also creating the 
problem of stigmatising persons. For example, the failure to monitor the responsibility of 
benefit claimants in their unemployment status will provide conditions where people can 
claim a taxpayer funded benefit without the effort of finding employment. But monitoring the 
claimant's behaviour can be stigmatising by passing judgment on the individual’s capabilities 
in finding employment. We should strike a balance between these competing values. The 
process of distributing benefits should not be overly intrusive on individuals’ private life. 
Equality of opportunity, on this approach, can be subject to limitations in deference to other 
values. Since my approach to equality of opportunity is a weak equality proposal, then 
Anderson’s objections will not require abandoning the principle. 
Another criticism of equality of opportunity is that the refusal to compensate bad 
option luck can lead to refusing help to those who become destitute through their own 
choices.
155
 The argument is that equality of opportunity is overly harsh. Again, there is no 
reason why this argument should require us to abandon equality of opportunity. Instead, as 
part of a pluralist framework, we should supplement equality of opportunity with other 
values. Equality of opportunity should incorporate a threshold of wealth below which we do 
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not permit people to fall regardless of how culpable they are for their destitution.
156
 A 
sufficiency principle can require a threshold of resources or welfare that people should have 
whatever their personal conduct. But beyond this threshold, the equality of opportunity 
principle should hold people responsible for losses from actions that can be properly be 
attached to individual choice.   
 
3.6 Social Equality   
Equality of opportunity cannot be the full picture for understanding the wrong of inequality. 
Perfect equality of opportunity will still leave us with inequality that we intuitively deem 
unacceptable. For example, imagine an arrangement that the top 100 hardest workers should 
have 90 per cent of the world’s wealth. If we assume this is in conditions where people have 
an equal initial starting point, this is compatible with equality of opportunity. Also, imagine 
using a lottery to assign people into a particular caste in society. In both these examples, there 
is an initial equality of opportunity, but the resulting option luck leads to what we would 
consider wrongful inequality.
157
 What is wrong in both these examples is that the inequality 
leads to real or potential domination of one group of people over others. Equality of 
opportunity is therefore consistent with the creation of hierarchies where some are 
subordinated and marginalised.  
 If we are to fully respect the moral equality of people, we must ensure that people are 
                                                          
156
 Paula Casal argued in favour of this approach in ‘Why sufficiency is not enough’ (2007) 117.2 Ethics 296.   
157
 Peter Vallentyne, ‘Brute luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities’ (2002) 112.3 Ethics 529. 
 
101 
 
not treated as having inferior moral status and are not excluded from the valuable things that 
society has to offer. Equality of opportunity does not guarantee people having equality of 
status and does not guarantee people participating in society.  
It is clear, then, that equality of opportunity cannot be a complete theory accounting 
for our intuitions about all types of wrongful inequality. We need to identify a principle that 
can explain why, for example, oppression and subordination are wrong. To do this we can 
look beyond considerations of distribution and look toward inequalities that relate to how 
people regard one another. This is the social basis of equality that equality of opportunity 
overlooks.
158
 Social equality, unlike equality of opportunity, does not directly concern any 
specific distribution. Instead, it concerns a particular ideal that people should be able to 
regard one another as equals. 
As David Miller has stated: 
 
[Social equality] does not require that people should be equal in power, prestige or 
wealth, nor, absurdly, that they should score the same on natural dimensions such as 
strength or intelligence. What matters is how such differences are regarded, and in 
particular whether they serve to construct a social hierarchy in which A can 
unequivocally be ranked as B’s superior. Where there is social equality, people feel 
that each member of the community enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that 
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overrides their unequal ratings along particular dimensions.
159
 
 
While there is widespread acceptance of certain differences of rank, power and status, 
including the power of employers over employees and teachers over students, there are 
certain types of hierarchical relationship that threatens a community founded on equal 
concern and respect. Slavery, aristocracy and caste systems, for example, are arrangements 
that make it impossible for citizens to live together as equals. Social equality requires 
developing a community that has proper forms of relationships among people. Any form of 
social hierarchies that convey a ranking of human beings is wrongful inequality on this 
account. This includes any forms of relationships where some can dominate, oppress or 
exploit others.  
Oppressive relationships do not just emerge between one person oppressing another 
but can be cultural. This form of oppression relates to a societal practice where large numbers 
of people over a number of generations have together engaged in actions that subordinate less 
powerful groups. Beliefs, values, attitudes and assumptions in a society can reflect and 
maintain relations of dominance and subordination that have resulted from conditioning and 
socialisation.
160
 This has occurred most obviously with regard to race and sex but, as I 
explain in Chapter 5, it has also applied to age groups. 
This form of oppression becomes a form of socialisation that makes the oppression 
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very difficult to dislodge. For example, stereotypes about the inferiority of particular social 
groups can be passed on through generations, and the acceptance of widespread 
discrimination can lead to feelings that the subordinate status of particular social groups is 
natural and expected. As Susan Sherwin notes, individuals can internalise these beliefs.
161
 It 
is the aim of social equality to break down these relationships of dominance and 
subordination.  
In addition, social equality requires we should maintain social conditions that enable 
each individual to be a full and equal participant in modern democratic society.
162
 This means 
that we should aim to ensure that each individual has self-determination and does not have to 
regard themselves or others as inferior.  
Social equality requires that each person in a diverse society has the opportunity to 
have their views considered on an equal basis. Excessive hierarchies in authority can create 
conditions in which oppression and marginalisation can thrive. According to Young, 
‘[o]ppression refers to structural phenomena that immobilize or diminish a group,’ where 
group is defined as ‘...a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by 
cultural forms, practices, or way of life.’
163
 In essence, social equality is in opposition to 
disadvantages suffered due to membership of socially salient groups based on characteristics 
such as gender, ethnicity, religion and sexual preference. Since group affinity is a major 
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component of individual identity, to subordinate or discriminate because of social-group 
membership is to cast some groups as inferior, and this in turn can create patterns of 
oppression, which threatens a society of equals by reinforcing a sense of superiority among 
the fortunate, and undermining the self-respect of the unfortunate.   
According to Anderson, a society of equals requires people to participate in fair 
systems of cooperation.
164
 Since our economy is a cooperative, joint production, then the 
productivity of a worker in a specific role depends not only on their own efforts, but also on 
other people performing their roles. It follows, Anderson argues, that every distribution in our 
economy should be capable of being justified to each person cooperating in a society. Social 
equality in this way is a requirement of reciprocity because obligations arise when people 
benefit from projects that result from the contributions of a group of people.’
165
 Those who 
benefit from collective projects ought to contribute to ensuring that all other people 
contributing to the product have an adequate outcome distribution. As a matter of fairness, 
reciprocity requires that the wealthy recognise the contribution of others by ensuring that 
low-income workers have access to goods necessary for a flourishing life, including 
healthcare, housing and education. These goods are essential for people participating in 
society's institutions as equals. To deny a section of society access to basic education would 
create conditions in which the educated can dominate power in democratic institutions 
leading to marginalisation of others.   
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Social equality requires effective societal participation, and this requires effective 
participation in the labour market and an adequate standard of living. We cannot, for 
example, participate as equals in the labour market without access to food, medical treatment 
and sufficient education levels. A failure to provide these goods is to permit the creation of a 
socially excluded underclass. Higher-status social classes will have the option to dominate 
and marginalise the unfortunate.   
Social equality aims to guarantee sufficient baseline conditions in order that people 
can function and participate in society as equals. This baseline should not be lost. Equality of 
opportunity, in contrast, does not recognise a baseline but adopts the position that people can 
lose resources because of personal irresponsibility. However, when people have enough 
resources to participate in society as equals, we need the principle of equality of opportunity 
to determine the fairness of distribution beyond the threshold. This sufficiency-constrained 
equality of opportunity incorporates our duties of common humanity with duties to promote 
personal responsibility.   
  
3.7 Equality of What?   
The ‘equality of what’ debate has focused on determining which particular condition of 
inequality should be of moral concern – whether, for example, inequality of welfare, 
resources or capabilities – and explaining why we care about unequal distribution of some 
things but not others. The concept of equality itself cannot tell us what is important to 
equalise. As Joseph Raz has argued: 
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...we only have reason to care about inequalities in the distribution of goods and ills 
that is of what is value or disvalue for independent reasons. There is no reason to care 
about inequalities in the distribution of sand, unless there is some other reason to wish 
to have or avoid sand.
166
 
 
Equality theory has suggested a range of different things that are subject to equality 
principles.
167
 The most plausible reason why equality theorists have struggled to find the 
thing worthy of equalising is that it is implausible that there is only one value of intrinsic 
worth we should attempt to equalise. There may be no value on its own that we are required 
to equalise, but there may be a number of values. Each argument for selecting one value to 
equalise seems to have persuasive features by recognising the importance we attach to these 
values. However, prioritising one of these values to the total exclusion of other values has 
unattractive consequences. I demonstrate this by using a series of thought experiments.   
Access to welfare is a commonly cited value. John Stuart Mill famously argued ‘that 
happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only 
desirable as means to that end.’
168
 If the experience of happiness (or welfare) is the only 
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intrinsic end then we must try to maximise it across people. Amartya Sen uses the following 
example to show the unattractive consequences of this welfarist approach:   
 
[I]f person A as a cripple gets half the utility that the pleasure-wizard person B does 
from any given level of income, then in the pure distribution problem between A and 
B the utilitarian would end up giving the pleasure-wizard B more income than the 
cripple A. The cripple would then be doubly worse off: both since he gets less utility 
from the same level of income, and since he will also get less income. Utilitarianism 
must lead to this thanks to its single-minded concern with maximizing the utility sum. 
The pleasure-wizard’s superior efficiency in producing utility would pull income 
away from the less efficient cripple.
169
 
 
The distribution of income in Sen's example is unfair because it treats person B's projects as 
more worthy of concern than person A's projects. The fact that person B's projects generate 
more utility does not, however, make them more worthy of concern. Welfare is not the only 
value to judge the worth of a person's life.  
In a thought experiment designed to refute welfarism, Nozick asks us to imagine that 
we have the choice to plug ourselves into a machine that can give us whatever desirable or 
pleasurable experiences we want. If welfare is the only intrinsic value then we ought to plug 
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ourselves into the machine without hesitation. But there are reasons to live in a real life rather 
than an experience machine, namely ‘[w]e want to make a difference in the world’ and ‘it is 
only because we first want to do the actions that we want the experiences of doing them.’
170
 
Applied to Sen's example, person A may not derive much pleasure from their projects, but 
they can still derive value from using their income as a way of contributing something 
meaningful to the world. This non-welfare value is no less worthy than the welfare generated 
by person B.   
Another commonly cited problem with equalising welfare is that it will require 
subsidising people to indulge their expensive tastes. This will mean giving more resources to 
some people simply because they need more resources in order to generate sufficient levels of 
welfare. For example, if person A is unable to walk but is happier than person B who can 
only be satisfied if he consumes expensive wines, we will then have to prioritise paying for 
expensive wines for person B before paying for a wheelchair for person A. This certainly 
seems unjust given that providing the wheelchair seems more urgent.  
The problem of expensive tastes has led some egalitarians to emphasise prioritising 
equality of resources over equality of welfare. Dworkin, for example, has argued that we 
ought to give person A a wheelchair because they are inadequately resourced.
171
 This 
approach aims to give people equal resources regardless of the fact that some may experience 
greater welfare than others from these resources. Sen's capability approach can explain the 
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problem of resource deprivation as failing to provide that person with an adequate set of 
capabilities necessary to live a flourishing life.   
But equality of resources and equality of capabilities do not seem to provide a value 
that must be prioritised over other values. Gerald Cohen asks us to imagine someone who can 
move their arms more easily than other people can but that movement leads to pain later in 
their life.
172
 We would want to cure this pain even though this will lead to this person gaining 
more resources than others. Medicine that would cure the pain would not compensate for 
lower resources or diminished capabilities. The fact that the individual can move their arms 
more freely than others suggest they have greater capabilities. The medicine is effective for 
compensating for the diminished welfare of the individual and this is a good reason to 
distribute more resources to the person experiencing pain.   
Cohen has argued persuasively that Dworkin is wrong to have argued that expensive 
tastes render attempts to equalise welfare unpalatable. If expensive tastes have been 
deliberately cultivated then this falls into the category of chosen circumstances – the costs of 
which the individual should cover. We should not subsidise expensive wines for people who 
have spent the bulk of their savings cultivating a taste in fine wines. But it is not unjust to 
fund ‘tastes’ that result not from option luck but brute luck. People should not be worse off in 
terms of welfare because of the brute luck disadvantage of requiring more resources in order 
to generate a sufficient level of welfare. A strict focus on equality of resources or capabilities 
will unfairly leave some worse off than others in terms of welfare when the individual is not 
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at fault for that inequality. 
Cohen provides the following example:   
 
People vary in the amount of discomfort which given low temperatures cause them, 
and, consequently, in the volume of resources which they need to alleviate their 
discomfort. Some people need costly heavy sweaters and a great deal of fuel to 
achieve an average level of thermal well-being. With respect to warmth, they have 
what Dworkin calls expensive tastes: they need unusually large doses of resources to 
achieve an ordinary level of welfare. They are losers under Dworkin's equality of 
resources, because […] it sets itself against compensation for expensive tastes.
173
    
 
It is unfair to refuse extra help for those who experience greater discomfort in cold weather 
when individuals do not choose this disability. It would be a form of involuntary 
disadvantage that the individual is not responsible for. Contrary to Dworkin's resources 
approach, we must acknowledge that ‘people can be unlucky not only in their unchosen 
resource endowments but also in their unchosen liabilities to pain and suffering and in their 
unchosen expensive preferences.’
174
   
In summary, each argument for selecting a value to equalise, whether that is 
resources, capabilities or welfare, has good reasons for support but if we select one of these 
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values to the exclusion of the others, this seems to have unacceptable consequences. It 
follows that the best approach is to strive for a pluralism of values, including access to 
welfare, resources and capabilities.  
  
Conclusion   
I have outlined two theories of equality: equality of opportunity that requires that people do 
not experience disadvantage when they cannot be held responsible for that disadvantage; and 
social equality that requires conditions where people are able to interact as equals. We must 
temper the drive for equality by recognising the value of personal responsibility. To create 
conditions where people can live meaningful and autonomous lives, we need to ensure that 
people bear at least part of the costs of their choices, and we must tolerate at least some of the 
inequality that naturally follows from these choices.   
Given that there are good reasons for valuing equality of resources, capabilities and 
welfare (but we are unable to directly place one value above another), we can conclude that it 
is prima facie wrong when there is an unequal distribution of welfare, resources or 
capabilities, except when the inequality arises in a way for which the person who ends up 
with less should properly be held responsible.  
This chapter has provided a rough guide to principles of equality, which has gained 
some desiderata for egalitarian principles, including principles of equality of opportunity and 
social equality. This creates the opportunity for the next stage of constructing the theory of 
age discrimination, which is to identify the principles that can explain the wrongness of 
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discrimination. Further to this, in the next chapter, I assess the extent to which equality of 
opportunity and social equality can explain the wrongness of discrimination, and I examine 
whether any non-equality principles can also explain the wrongness of discrimination.  
  
 
113 
 
4   
The Wrongs of Discrimination 
 
In the previous chapter, I identify the principles that explain when and why inequality is 
wrong, including the principle of equality of opportunity, which explains that it is wrong for 
someone to be worse off than others due to circumstances outside their control, and the 
principle of social equality, which explains that inequality is wrong when it creates conditions 
where people are unable to interact as equals. Since discrimination is a means by which 
inequality is produced, these equality principles can form a groundwork theory for 
determining when and why discrimination is wrong and therefore form part of a theory of age 
discrimination.
175
  
It is not enough, however, to identify equality principles to have a complete theory of 
discrimination. We must also examine whether non-equality principles can illuminate the 
concept. Indeed, many scholars argue that non-equality principles provide the best foundation 
for explaining the point of discrimination laws.
176
 This chapter argues that both equality and 
non-equality principles contribute to explaining the wrongness of discrimination. I argue that 
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we must identify a range of principles, including the principles of equality of opportunity, 
social equality, autonomy and respect, in order to acknowledge the ‘messy plurality’ of moral 
concerns that discrimination law addresses.
177
  
In Chapter 5, I verify the extent each of the principles identified in this chapter can 
explain when and why age-differential treatment is wrong. This then forms a theory of age 
discrimination that can assist in distinguishing justified from unjustified unequal treatment on 
the grounds of age and therefore guide age discrimination law.  
In forming a groundwork theory of discrimination, this chapter concerns the legal 
concept of discrimination in the discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010.
178
  The 
colloquial meaning of discrimination is direct and motivated by prejudice. The legal concept, 
in contrast, includes actions and structures that cause disadvantages without any fault on the 
part of the decision-maker. 
As a brief note on the method for this chapter, I apply reflective equilibrium by 
considering not just my own intuitions in searching for appropriate moral principles but also 
the intuitions and beliefs of a range of people with experience working towards 
understanding the concept of discrimination. Further to this, I assess particular theorists’ 
understanding of the wrong of discrimination and then determine whether these beliefs 
cohere with our intuitions about wrongful discrimination and consider revising the principles 
when they do not cohere with our intuitions. For example, I argue that equality of opportunity 
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and social equality fail to explain some forms of discrimination that are better explained by 
non-equality principles.  
 
4.1 Rejecting Unitary Theories of Discrimination 
Unitary theories of discrimination identify a single core principle that should explain all 
forms of discrimination.
179
 The attractiveness of these theories is their simplicity. If there is a 
single moral principle that identifies the wrong of discrimination, then, in determining 
whether impugned treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim and 
lawful under the Equality Act 2010, we would assess whether the impugned treatment 
violates the central unifying moral principle. The task for applying age discrimination law 
would be to determine the outcome that maximises this moral principle. For example, 
imagine an employer justifies mandatory retirement on the grounds that this ensures that 
people have an equal opportunity to access employment and promotion opportunities. 
Equality of opportunity would justify this policy where the retirement age would apply 
equally to each employee. 
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 However, for unitary theories of discrimination to be successful, they must rely on a 
core moral principle that has plausible explanations of a range of different types of 
discrimination, including direct and indirect discrimination, race and sex discrimination 
etc.
180
 While unitary theories of discrimination have persuasive features in explaining 
discrimination (as I demonstrate in this chapter), they also have unattractive implications 
when applied against particular instances of discrimination. Unitary theories of age 
discrimination are invariably under-inclusive. I demonstrate this by working through a 
number of principles that can explain the wrong of discrimination, and I conclude that a 
pluralist approach to discrimination is a better approach for capturing all the wrongs of 
discrimination.  
Pluralist accounts of discrimination that recognise that discrimination wrongs people 
for a number of different overlapping reasons will be the best way we can capture the 
multiple wrongs of discrimination and therefore the best way to guide the application of 
discrimination law.
181
  
Value pluralism in the context of discrimination law should be unsurprising. We 
cannot expect that one idea can encapsulate every wrong of discrimination when the legal 
definition of discrimination has such a wide scope, ranging from direct and indirect 
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discrimination and spanning across very different protected characteristics.
182
  
The difficulty of trying to grapple with different conflicting principles might explain 
why so many thinkers have attempted to create unitary theories of discrimination. However, 
this difficulty is an inescapable feature of moral decision-making, whether at a personal level 
or at a societal level. In our personal lives we often have to choose between the principle of 
honesty and the need to tell 'white lies' to avoid hurting people's feelings. At a societal level, 
we need to decide on an appropriate balance between equality, autonomy, prosperity, 
security, welfare and many other values that do not always align perfectly. There is inevitable 
complexity in moral decision-making. Any attempt to simplify decision-making by deciding 
on one moral principle will lead to important moral principles being overlooked. It is better to 
have a complex but true moral theory than an over-simplified untrue moral theory. 
 
4.2 Explaining the Wrong of Discrimination  
4.21 Equality of opportunity 
In Chapter 3, I provided a general defence of this principle as an explanation for when and 
why inequality is wrong. I now verify the extent to which this principle can explain the 
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wrongness of discrimination. Shlomi Segal has argued that ‘discrimination is bad as 
such...because and only because it undermines equality of opportunity.’
183
 All forms of 
wrongful discrimination, he has argued, are wrong because they cause inequality of 
opportunity.
184
  
Equality of opportunity seems to account for many of our intuitions about 
discrimination. A major reason why we find discrimination wrong is we recognise that it is 
unfair to impose a comparative disadvantage on the grounds of a characteristic that the 
individual is powerless to change. Many of the protected characteristics in the Equality Act 
2010 such as race, sex and nationality, are traits that people are powerless to change.   
 The equality of opportunity principle also explains the indirect discrimination 
provisions of the Equality Act 2010. An action engages the indirect discrimination provisions 
when it has the effect of causing disadvantage to people who share a particular protected 
characteristic. This is exactly the sort of action the equality of opportunity principle rules out. 
Further, equality of opportunity, like the definition of indirect discrimination, locates the 
wrong of discrimination not in any fault or intentions of a discriminator but in the effect that a 
policy, criterion or practice has on people.    
 However, the equality of opportunity principle fails to explain a number of examples 
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of discrimination that seem intuitively wrong. Consider an example introduced by Deborah 
Hellman of a lecturer who separates their students so that black students move to one side of 
the lecture hall and white students move to the other side.
185
 The action, despite not causing 
disadvantage, seems to be wrong because it demeans the black students. It does this, Hellman 
argues, because of the cultural history of segregation being used to mark people with racial 
inferiority.  
Another example that challenges the equality of opportunity account of discrimination 
is the example of the prison policy in South Africa during Apartheid that required black 
prisoners to wear shorts and white prisoners to wear long trousers. Hellman has argued that 
this policy actually does not disadvantage black prisoners (in fact it advantaged black 
prisoners because shorts provided greater comfort in the hot South African climate) yet we 
would consider the policy treated black prisoners less favourably because it represented an 
attempt to demean them.
186
   
Furthermore, consider the US case Palmer v Thompson.
187
 Following legislation 
requiring desegregation, the city of Jackson decided that rather than desegregate the city’s 
swimming pools, it would close all the pools. The mayor of Jackson did not want white 
people and black people swimming together. This is undoubtable wrongful treatment, but the 
policy does not create inequality of opportunity. Instead, the insulting message it sends to the 
black community explains the wrongness of the policy.  
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Sophia Moreau provides another example that equality of opportunity fails to explain. 
She presented a hypothetical of a community with restaurants that each refuses entry to 
people of different religious groups.
188
 Moreau added that there are an equal number of 
restaurants catering to each religious group in the community thus ensuring that people of 
different religions have an equal opportunity to access restaurants. Despite not creating 
disadvantage, this treatment seems wrong and we need to identify a principle other than 
equality of opportunity to explain why this treatment is wrong.  
Segall, in defending the equality of opportunity theory of discrimination, 
acknowledged that the above examples are morally wrong but denied that they undermine the 
equality of opportunity theory. In his view, they are not forms of discrimination and therefore 
do not need to be explained by equality of opportunity.
189
 However, the examples almost 
certainly engage the legal definition of direct discrimination in the Equality Act 2010 and 
therefore form part of the legal concept of discrimination that must be accounted for. The 
restaurants turning people away on the grounds of religion is less favourable treatment on the 
grounds of religion and engages the direct discrimination provisions. Closing all the city’s 
swimming pools is a more contentious example because on its face closing the pools seems to 
treat people equally. But the action does constitute less favourable treatment towards black 
people because the policy was a direct insult towards black people. Likewise, the example of 
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a lecturer dividing students by race and the clothes policy in South African prisons are also 
actions that treat black people less favourably by humiliating them. Each of the above 
examples is discrimination and therefore a complete theory of discrimination must provide 
principles to explain them.  
Equality of opportunity also fails to account for why we consider some forms of 
unequal treatment to be more repugnant than other forms. For example, there seems 
something fundamentally different, and more offensive, to discriminate on the basis of race 
than to discriminate on the grounds of other immutable traits such as eye colour. But equality 
of opportunity fails to distinguish these forms of discrimination.  
To account for our intuition that race discrimination is particularly repugnant we 
would have to draw on principles other than equality of opportunity. For example, our 
repugnance towards race discrimination may have its roots in the fact that there has been a 
historical practice of discriminating against members of certain racial groups that has 
reinforced oppressive social relations. If we are to account for these intuitions, we must look 
not just to the effect that the treatment has on people but also look to the message contained 
in the act to identify what is wrong with discrimination. The limitation of the equality of 
opportunity theory of discrimination is that ‘does not seem to capture what is distinctively 
wrong with discrimination.’
190
 
In reply to this argument, Segall has argued that the equality of opportunity principle 
can explain why we consider race discrimination as being more repugnant than eye colour 
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discrimination: 
 
 ...discrimination would typically cause a greater disadvantage (in terms of respect) 
when it is directed at members of salient groups [such as racial groups] compared to 
when it is directed at members of ad hoc groups (such as ‘the untalented’, ‘people 
who are not family members of mine’ and ‘people whose surname contains seven 
letters’). In other words, disadvantageous hiring on the basis of salient group 
membership [such as race] presents a much greater undermining of equality of 
opportunity with regard to a particular good, namely access to self-respect, compared 
to discrimination on the basis of non-salient traits [such as eye colour].
191
 
 
The problem with Segall’s reply is that it fails to explain why we intuitively believe that 
paradigm examples of discrimination, such as denying someone a job because they are black, 
are of a different quality altogether from discrimination for traits such as eye colour. For 
example, our reactions to eye colour discrimination is likely to be that we think that it is 
stupid or silly but not an attack on moral worth, whereas our reaction to race discrimination is 
likely to be a deep repugnance. To explain these intuitions we would do better to draw on 
principles other than equality of opportunity.  
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4.22 Social equality   
In Chapter 3, I provided a general defence of this principle, which requires conditions that 
ensure people can interact as equals. I now verify the extent to which this principle can 
explain the wrongness of discrimination. Discrimination can clearly offend social equality 
because it can entrench power inequalities result of people not having sufficient social or 
political influence. This undermines the aims of social equality to eliminate hierarchies of 
social status.
192
 For example, race discrimination has had the effect of restricting access to 
power, wealth and political influence by erroneously ascribing the biological status of 
distinctness and otherness to groups of people.
193
  
Some jurisdictions have used the social equality principle as a means of identifying 
wrongful discrimination. A famous example is United States v Carolene Products 
Company.
194
 The US Supreme Court, in a famous footnote, held that the courts should offer a 
heightened scrutiny of laws that disadvantage 'discrete and insular minorities.' The Court 
justified this approach on the grounds that these socially excluded groups are vulnerable to 
subordination from the political process and therefore ensuring equal protection of the law 
between citizens requires protecting vulnerable groups through heightened scrutiny of the 
legal process.   
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  The social equality principle explains many paradigm cases of discrimination. For 
example, social equality holds that denying someone a job because of race is wrong because 
it undermines the applicant’s status as an equal to their employer.
195
 The employer here is at 
fault because ‘[h]e would rather retain some personal benefit (be it the satisfaction of a taste 
for discrimination or the realization of dollars-and-cents profits) than avoid contributing to a 
subordinating system.’
196
 
Social equality, unlike equality of opportunity, is successful in explaining why we 
intuitively consider race discrimination different, and more offensive, than discrimination on 
the grounds of eye colour or other ad hoc traits. It explains that race discrimination is worse 
than eye-colour discrimination because race discrimination has worked to undermine equality 
of status by creating and reinforcing patterns of inequality and exclusion that perpetuate the 
‘subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group.’
197
 Eye colour discrimination, in 
contrast, has not (to date) undermined the moral or social status of people.  
Social equality finds that indirect discrimination can be wrong because structures may 
perpetuate the social domination of certain groups even if no individual deliberately tried to 
harm those subject to disadvantages.
198
 In this way, social equality is not concerned with 
finding fault but instead is concerned with the effects measures have on excluded social 
groups by continuing patterns of social subordination. Social equality explains the wrongs of 
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indirect discrimination since structural barriers which can contribute to creating oppressive 
relations will amount to unlawful indirect discrimination should it be found that the measures 
are not proportionate to a legitimate aim. And the legal definition of discrimination does not 
require finding any fault on the part of the discriminator.  
Social equality as an explanation of discrimination, however, is limited by its 
presupposing that the wrongfulness of discrimination is located in its effects on social groups. 
Certainly, discrimination can have bad effects, but the wrongness of direct forms of 
discrimination lies, at least partly in what brings about the effects.
199
 For example, it is 
usually explained that laws that limit marriage to opposite-sex couples is wrong because in 
refusing gay people the right to recognise their relationships as ‘marriages,’ it sends the 
message that same-sex couples are inferior to heterosexual couples.
200
 Therefore, in locating 
the wrong of discrimination, we also need to look not just at its effects but also at the 
message conveyed by the discriminator (I examine this in the respect account of 
discrimination in section 4.25).  
Another limitation of social equality is that there are examples of wrongful 
discrimination which do not perpetuate oppressive social relations. We would consider it 
wrong if a member of a disadvantaged group discriminated against a privileged group for an 
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important opportunity, for example, a black employer rejected a job applicant for being 
white. Despite this being unlikely to reinforce dominance of privileged groups, we still 
consider this treatment wrong. A better explanation for this type of discrimination is the 
respect account i.e. that we consider this form of discrimination wrong because it takes on the 
meaning of an insult.   
It is clear from this chapter so far that the equality principles defended in Chapter 3 
cannot provide a complete explanation of the wrongness of discrimination. I now go on to 
consider the extent to which non-equality principles can explain the wrongness of 
discrimination. 
 
 4.23 Irrelevance   
A commonly identified non-equality principle for explaining the wrong of discrimination is 
that treating someone disadvantageously because of her race, sex or religion is to wrongfully 
act on an arbitrary trait.
201
 Selecting one person over another for a job because they are white 
and the other applicant is black is wrong because skin colour is irrelevant to the hiring 
decision. Harry Frankfurt is a defender of this view and a critic of equality accounts of 
discrimination. He has argued that ‘failing to respect somebody is a matter of ignoring the 
relevance of some aspect of his nature or rationality. … Pertinent features of how things are 
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with him are treated as though they had no reality.’
202
 Thus, he concludes, the alternative to 
discrimination ‘is not equality. It is relevance.’   
However, we should reject the relevance principle as an account of discrimination. 
There are many cases of wrongful discrimination that we cannot explain by relevance. For 
example, a pregnant woman taking maternity leave is likely to reduce that person's 
productivity compared to men and an employer may use this as a reason to discriminate on 
the grounds of pregnancy by claiming that pregnancy is relevant when maximising profits in 
a business. Despite pregnancy being a relevant trait, this is still wrongful discrimination 
because it forces women to incur a disproportionate burden of reproduction, and this will lead 
to reduced opportunities for women in the workforce. Gardner also offers the example of race 
being a relevant reason (albeit immoral) to refuse entry to black people to a pub if customers 
will desert the pub when black people come in.
203
  
The relevance account of discrimination also suffers from the problem of failing to 
account for our intuition that there is a moral difference between discrimination on the 
ground of race and discrimination on the grounds of eye colour or other ad hoc groups. Both 
race discrimination and eye colour discrimination are based on irrelevant considerations, but 
the racist employer elicits greater condemnation. A successful theory of discrimination 
should be able to explain the moral difference between the practice of eye colour 
discrimination and race discrimination and explain why the latter is far more objectionable.   
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4.24 Autonomy  
John Gardner has argued that discrimination wrongs people when the discriminator 
diminishes the discriminatee’s opportunities for autonomous agency.
204
 Gardner defines 
autonomy as ‘the ideal of a life substantially lived through the successive valuable choices of 
the person who lives it, where valuable choices are choices from among an adequate range of 
valuable options.’
205
  
Gardner has argued that discrimination violates autonomy when the discrimination is 
related to immutable characteristics and fundamental choices.
206
 Discrimination because of 
immutable traits, such as race and sex, violates autonomy because it results in restricting the 
choices of the victim of discrimination:  
  
Because these choices are based on our immutable status, our own choices can make 
no difference to them. And where the discrimination is endemic enough, we are left 
with too few valuable options to choose among and we are deprived of valuable 
choice over large swathes of our own lives.
207
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Gardner has explained that discrimination on the ground of fundamental choices (such as 
religion) violates autonomy by attaching costs to an individual choosing between available 
valuable options. In this way, discrimination has the effect of foreclosing some meaningful 
choices. For Gardner, discrimination law offers people the opportunity to make their own 
valuable choices, rather than have their lives dictated to by others.
208
    
 Gardner has also argued that indirect discrimination violates autonomy because it 
exacerbates the low autonomy levels of groups who have been subject to widespread 
discrimination in the past. The indirect discrimination provisions enhance autonomy by 
removing disadvantages that attach to people’s immutable traits and fundamental choices.  
Discrimination can also reduce autonomy when victims of discrimination internalise 
the damaging stereotypes that motivate discrimination. For example, the stereotype that 
women are less intellectually capable than men persisted over centuries and resulted in 
women becoming socialised into a subordinate position. Because of the stereotype, women 
were typically less educated than men and were less likely to pursue intellectual activities that 
would develop their autonomy. And the acceptance of this as a natural gender difference 
reduced the opportunities of women to make contributions in intellectual fields.  
 In a similar account to Gardner, Sophia Moreau has argued that discrimination 
is wrong because it attaches costs to people’s choices.
209
 For Moreau, ‘people should not be 
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constrained by the social costs of being one race rather than another when they deliberate 
about such questions as what job to take or where to live.’
210
 On this account, discrimination 
law protects people’s freedom to go about their lives with their choices being insulated from 
traits that are morally irrelevant, such as race and sex. An important limitation of the 
autonomy account of the wrongness of discrimination, however, is that – in common with the 
other accounts of discrimination that locate the wrong of discrimination in its effects on 
people – it fails to account for our intuition that a major feature of why we object to 
discrimination lies in the insult or demeaning treatment of a person. For example, our 
objection to racist treatment is at least partly rooted not just in the autonomy harms it has on 
the victims but also in the fact that the racist treatment is a communication that a person has a 
degraded moral status. 
Another limitation is that, in common with the irrelevance account and equality of 
opportunity account of discrimination, it is unclear how it makes a distinction between race 
discrimination and discrimination on other ad hoc groups, such as eye colour discrimination. 
Eye colour and race are traits that we believe people should not have to factor into their 
deliberations and therefore are both wrong for the same reason in Moreau’s account. But we 
intuitively recognise there is something quite different and more offensive about race 
discrimination that Moreau’s autonomy account fails to grasp. We recognise that race 
discrimination expresses disrespect for the moral worth of the individual in a way that eye 
colour discrimination does not. Race discrimination has taken on the social meaning of an 
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attack on a key aspect of a person’s identity. Eye colour, in contrast, has not been an example 
of a trait that has been used to denigrate, oppress and demean people and therefore eye colour 
discrimination is not invested with the meaning of a denial of the equal worth of a person.  
   
4.25 Discrimination as disrespect   
As I have argued above, to account for our intuitions about the wrong of discrimination, we 
must also find the wrong of many forms of discrimination in the fault of the discriminator’s 
action. The respect account of discrimination attempts to do this by finding that 
discrimination is wrong when it conveys disrespectful messages. In contrast to social 
equality, the respect account is concerned with the mistreatment of individuals rather than 
social groups. The respect account relates to the Kantian principle that certain acts are 
intrinsically wrong because those acts pursue ‘impermissible ends.’
211
 The impermissible 
ends can include judgments of prejudice and hostility that sends the message that a person 
has lower social worth and usefulness, including acts of racism, sexism and ageism. All 
individuals are due respect because of what Kant calls the unconditional and incomparable 
value of humanity. 
The respect account has a number of subtly different accounts of discrimination. One 
version locates the wrong of discrimination in the thought process of the discriminator; 
another version locates the wrong in the loss of self-respect of the victim of discrimination; 
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and another locates the wrong in the ‘social meaning’ of the act of discrimination. I assess 
each of these accounts and their strengths and weaknesses as explanations of 
discrimination.
212
  
The first account of the respect principle is that discrimination is wrong when a 
discriminator is motivated by prejudice.
213
 Prejudice occurs when a person acts on the belief 
that another person deserves less respect than others because of their social-group 
membership. For example, the belief that black people can be treated less well because black 
people are inferior.
214
 Prejudice covers a range of different attitudes, including animus, 
dislike and indifference.
215
  
This respect principle is a subjective account because it locates the wrong of 
discrimination in the thought process of the discriminator. For example, Richard Arneson 
identifies the wrong of discrimination as occurring when ‘an agent treats a person identified 
as being of a certain type differently than she otherwise would have done from unwarranted 
                                                          
212
 The Supreme Court of Canada in Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] 1 SCR 
49 adopted a combination of these respect accounts for distinguishing justified from unjustified differential 
treatment. The Court held that wrongful discrimination is ‘where the differential treatment reflects the 
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or otherwise has the effect of 
perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable, or less worthy of recognition or value as a 
human being or as a member of Canadian society.’ This approach has been subsequently overruled in R v Kapp 
[2008] 2 SCR 483, 2008 SCC 41. 
213
 John Ely in Democracy and Distrust, (Harvard University Press 1980) defended this account by holding that 
discriminatory acts are those that are motivated by prejudice. Similarly, Matt Cavanagh (n 184) 166 identified 
wrongful discrimination as treating people ‘with unwarranted contempt.’  
214
 ‘Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or 
expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that 
group.’ Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Addison Wesley 1954) 9. 
215
 Andrew Altman, ‘Discrimination’ (Winter 2016 Edition) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/discrimination/> accessed 8th May 2017, section 4.1.   
 
133 
 
prejudice or animus against persons of that type.’
216
  
 This account captures our abhorrence to racist and sexist treatment and explains why 
we consider these actions much more offensive than discrimination on the grounds of ad hoc 
groups such as eye colour. Race or sex discrimination can reflect a judgment of lower moral 
status and this is morally worse than discrimination based on ad hoc groups such as eye 
colour that would not tend to reflect a judgment of lower moral worth. The equality of 
opportunity, autonomy and social equality accounts of discrimination fail to fully account for 
our outrage at racist, sexist and ageist treatment that humiliates and dehumanises people.  
However, not all wrongful discrimination is motivated by prejudice towards particular 
groups. It is possible for someone to wrongly discriminate even though they have no beliefs 
about the moral worth of the people they are discriminating against. Consider ‘rational’ 
discrimination. Imagine if the community as a whole had preferences for white lawyers. A 
law firm declines to employ black people because a black person will find it harder to gain 
clients due to the racist attitudes in the community. The employer does not share the 
widespread racism in the community but considers this community racism in rejecting black 
job applicants because the employer seeks to maximise profits. Despite the ‘rationality’ of the 
employer's decision, this action still violates the principle of respect because the employer 
acquiesces in the racist preferences of the community. As Owen Fiss has argued, ‘rational 
discrimination’ can be as disrespectful and demeaning as animus-based discrimination 
because ‘to the victim of the employment decision the appearance of the conduct is identical, 
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whether the use of race is efficiency-related or not.’
217
 In using the racism of their customers 
as a reason to discriminate, the employer is affirming that racism by acting on the 
community's demeaning attitudes.
218
 To give credence to these attitudes is to disrespect and 
insult the black job applicant. This example demonstrates that we need to incorporate into the 
respect account actions that acquiesce in the prejudice of third parties.  
Another limitation of the prejudice account is that it fails to explain examples of 
disrespectful and wrongful discrimination that are not motivated by prejudice, for example, 
the lecturer who instructs black students to move to one side of the lecture hall and white 
students to move to the other side of the lecture hall because the lecturer likes the aesthetic it 
produced rather than being motivated by any form of prejudice. Despite benign motives, we 
would still view this as offensive conduct. Hellman has argued that the reason why the 
lecturer’s actions are wrong is that it demeans the students regardless of the motives of the 
lecturer.
219
 Classifying people into race groups is demeaning because of the cultural history 
of expressing inferiority by race classification.  
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Another version of the respect account of discrimination is the theory that 
discrimination is wrong because it undermines the victim’s self-respect. As Rawls has 
argued, disrespectful treatment is likely to undermine the self-respect of people subject to the 
action since how other people treat us affects our self-esteem. And, for Rawls, self-respect is 
‘perhaps the most important primary good.’
220
 Discrimination can lead to injuring people’s 
dignity by humiliating the victims. Further, once racism, sexism and other forms of prejudice 
become endemic in society, then the false ideas about the diminished moral and social worth 
of victims of discrimination can be internalised and shape how people think about themselves 
leading to diminished self-respect.
221
 Being a victim of discrimination can lead to a sense of 
shame about one's social identity leading to a personal sense of feeling inferior.
222
   
However, as Segall notes, this account of discrimination fails to account for wrongful 
discrimination of which the victim is unaware. Think of an employer secretly paying higher 
salaries to male employees. Women employees ‘are unlikely to experience a reduction of 
self-respect and yet we probably think that they are nevertheless discriminated against.’
223
 
Hellman has defended a different respect account of discrimination that locates the 
wrong of discrimination in the ‘social meaning’ of the discriminator’s actions rather than the 
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thought process of the discriminator or the impact discrimination has on individuals or 
groups. Hellman has argued that to demean is wrongful ‘whether or not the person affected 
feels demeaned, stigmatized, or harmed.’
224
 Discrimination demeans, on this account, when 
the action conveys the message that the victims of discrimination have a diminished moral 
and social worth. The message can demean because actions, like words, can take on a 
particular meaning regardless of the motivation of the actor. Social meaning can be 
determined by ‘the context and culture’ which invests certain classifications and distinctions 
with the meaning that certain people lack moral worth or are socially useless. Wrongful 
discrimination occurs, on this account, when classifying people by a trait that has been 
invested with the meaning of an offensive insult.  
A similar account is Iliola Solanke's argument that discrimination is wrong when it 
stigmatises people.
225
 Stigma is a social construct to shame or humiliate people. 
Discrimination stigmatises by communicating the message that particular social groups have 
a diminished moral or social worth. For example, people are stigmatised by discrimination 
when a discriminatee possesses a trait (e.g. skin colour, nationality, sex etc.) that has taken on 
the societal meaning of an undesirable difference. On this account, discrimination wrongs 
people by reinforcing the negative social meaning of possessing particular traits. Stigma can 
also emerge from negative stereotypes and prejudice that reinforces the social subordinate 
position of particular social groups.  
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This explains why we react to race discrimination with repugnance but we do not 
react this way to discrimination on the grounds of certain ad hoc traits, such as eye colour. 
Hellman’s respect account explains why discrimination law has selected the protected 
grounds such as race, sex, gender, religion, political belief etc. These forms of unequal 
treatment have, in many contexts, taken on the meaning of a demeaning insult and it has 
become stigmatising to classify people based on these traits. The law must prohibit employers 
and providers of goods and services from acting on certain classifications because the very 
act of using these classifications risks demeaning people. Eye colour discrimination might be 
stupid but it is not demeaning in the way that race discrimination is.
226
 
Hellman’s account is also able to explain why discrimination is wrong when it is 
directed at dominant social groups, such as men and white people, than the social equality 
principle. This is because subordinate groups can disrespect and demean members of a 
dominant group by discriminating against them. For example, we would consider it wrong for 
a discriminator to reject male nursing applicants when the discriminator made the decision on 
the grounds that they consider that men have less empathy than women. This discrimination 
is wrong primarily because it sends insulting messages to men. The respect account holds that 
the fact that men tend to have greater social and political influence does not prevent this 
discrimination from being wrong. 
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Hellman’s respect account of discrimination also succeeds in explaining why 
discrimination laws permit forms of positive action.
227
 Positive action typically represents an 
attempt to redistribute resources or opportunities to disadvantaged groups. On the respect 
account, positive action is justified because, even though it treats people unequally on the 
grounds of a protected characteristic, it does not always communicate demeaning messages 
about particular people.
228
  
Hellman’s account also explains why we recognise many forms of wrongful 
discrimination that are not motivated by animus. Demeaning discrimination can occur when 
people act on unconscious biases from stereotypes. People stereotype (consciously or 
unconsciously) by identifying particular social groups and attaching particular characteristics 
to these groups in the form of expected behaviours.
229
 These assumed characteristics can 
include ideas that confirm the diminished moral and social worth of members of these social 
groups. For example, stereotyping can demean by being founded on assumptions that certain 
racial groups are, say, less intelligent and capable.
230
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Stereotypes are often used to legitimise existing social arrangements which in turn 
justifies keeping certain groups ‘in their place’ with corresponding demeaning attitudes 
towards these disfavoured groups. For example, people may correctly perceive certain ethnic 
groups as occupying lower social strata. They may conclude from this that the explanation for 
these groups occupying the lower social strata is that these groups are unintelligent, lazy etc. 
And from these stereotypes they conclude that it is justified to discriminate against these 
groups. In doing this, the discriminator is denying a benefit based on an assumption of the 
lesser social worth of certain individuals and, in doing this, is treating those individuals with 
disrespect.    
Hellman’s account, however, has a harder time explaining why the legal concept of 
discrimination does not protect some forms of demeaning discrimination, such as 
discrimination on the grounds of weight, appearances or height.
231
 Denying a person a job on 
the grounds of weight is likely to be demeaning, offensive and hurtful in a similar way to a 
denying a job based on sex, yet it is not a protected characteristic in discrimination law in the 
UK or most jurisdictions.
232
 It is unlikely we can explain this omission on the grounds that 
weight discrimination is less widespread than sex discrimination. There is a great deal of 
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evidence that weight discrimination is prevalent and harmful.
233
  
The respect account does not seem to be a complete account of the wrong of 
discrimination because denial of moral or social worth is not a necessary condition for 
explaining the wrongfulness of discrimination. Some forms of discrimination are wrong even 
though the discrimination does not convey any disrespect. For example: 
 
[c]onsider employers who refuse to employ a certain racial group, explicitly on the 
ground that they consider them to be too good for the unskilled jobs they have to 
offer. Even though there are jobs going, they would sooner leave them vacant. Given 
the rationale offered, it seems clear that this is not disrespectful, but the effects could 
be catastrophic for the group concerned. Suppose, for instance, that these views 
reflect the employers’ upbringings at a time when this group was predominantly 
employed as artisans, in trades that have now disappeared. This group will now be 
destitute as a result of the employers’ actions, which they will not alter, being very set 
in their views of the dignity of the group, even when made aware of the 
consequences. The absence of disrespect does not seem sufficient to prevent this from 
being a case of unjust discrimination.
234
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We can better explain the wrongness of this form of discrimination by the equality of 
opportunity principle since the treatment causes substantial disadvantage to the racial group. 
 A further limitation of the respect account of discrimination is that it fails to 
adequately account for the indirect discrimination provisions.
235
 The respect principle cannot 
explain the wrongness of some forms of indirect discrimination. Consider an employer that 
requires job applicants pass a test to be considered for a particular role. The employer hires a 
candidate that passes the test and rejects candidates who failed the test. After a statistical 
analysis, it is revealed that younger employers passed the test in significantly higher numbers 
than older applicants. In using the test in application procedures, the employer did not have a 
preference for younger applicants and did not foresee that it would disadvantage older age 
groups. Assuming that the employer cannot demonstrate the test is a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim, the test is indirectly discriminatory against older employees. 
However, the policy was not motivated by prejudice or stereotypes and does not send the 
message that older employees have a diminished moral or social worth. A respect account of 
discrimination does not, therefore, explain this discrimination. As Segall notes, ‘[s]uch cases 
show that some action may constitute wrongful discrimination even if there was no 
discriminatory intent and even if there was no loss of respect, either manifested or 
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incurred.'
236
  
Further, the respect conception of the wrongness of discrimination cannot adequately 
deal with the full extent of inequality and disadvantage in society. Much inequality is not 
caused directly by demeaning treatment of people but by deep systematic patterns of 
exclusion that work to ensure that people remain disadvantaged. We need the social equality 
account in order to ensure discrimination law is concerned not just with demeaning treatment 
but also with eliminating indirectly discriminatory treatment that works to sustain 
disadvantage and subordination of particular social groups. Discrimination law does not 
merely protect people from humiliating and insulting treatment; it can also aim at a 
transformation of society to ensure that disadvantaged groups can overcome barriers. 
 
Conclusion   
This chapter, by identifying the principles that explain the wrong of discrimination, has 
provided the opportunity to construct a theory of age discrimination that can guide age 
discrimination law. I have argued that each explanation for the wrongness of discrimination is 
incomplete because it brings up false negatives. In other words, there are examples of 
wrongful discrimination that each principle fails to account for. This does not mean that we 
cannot theorise about the wrongness of discrimination. Each account is important to our 
explanation because they each offer plausible reasons for the wrongness of some common 
forms of discrimination. The fact that we cannot find a single complete explanation means 
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that it is more appropriate to acknowledge that there are many different reasons for 
considering discrimination wrong. In building a moral framework for applying age 
discrimination law, we must consider the range of principles outlined in this chapter to 
determine whether an instance of age discrimination wrongs people.    
It follows that we should adopt a pluralist account of discrimination consisting of 
equality of opportunity, social equality, autonomy and respect. These principles resist 
expression in terms of a unifying value, but the principles are each necessary to capture a full 
understanding of the wrongs of discrimination, and it is important to take this plural account 
in understanding and applying discrimination law to capture the complexity and richness of 
discrimination as a concept. A failure to do so will ensure that we overlook certain moral 
principles with the potential result of failing to achieve justice when applying discrimination 
law.  
Requiring that age discrimination law should take into account all four principles will 
clearly lead to debate about the priorities between these underlying concerns when they clash. 
For example, social equality can be in tension with the respect account of discrimination. 
Social equality may permit positive action in favour of a disadvantaged group, such as lower 
grade-entry requirements to university for black students, to promote integration of 
disadvantaged racial groups. However, many argue that it is inherently demeaning to people 
to classify them on the grounds of race.   
How should Courts approach this value pluralism and decide among these different 
conceptions of the wrong of inequality and discrimination? To reiterate from Chapter 1, the 
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conclusion reached in any case-specific scenario will have to be a matter of judgment. The 
conclusion should not be inferred from any particular belief, but from looking at the sum total 
of the principles that would be infringed by the impugned measure, related to the sum total of 
the principles that would be advanced. A judge must choose and, in so choosing, certain 
principles of my moral framework are promoted or vindicated while others are subordinated 
or sacrificed. Courts and tribunals must consider the most just outcome of a case, provide the 
reasons in support of it, and consider whether these reasons are more convincing than the 
reasons that support an alternative decision. 
Further to forming a theory of age discrimination, the next chapter verifies whether 
the principles in this chapter that explain the paradigm cases of discrimination can also 
explain age discrimination. I also consider whether we need to introduce any new principles 
to explain age discrimination. 
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5   
Forming a Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination   
 
In Chapter 4, I argued in favour of adopting a framework of principles to determine the 
wrong of discrimination, including the principle of equality of opportunity (the idea that 
inequality is wrong when it makes people worse off on grounds that someone cannot be held 
responsible for), social equality (the position that it is wrong when conditions produce 
hierarchies of status), respect (prohibiting expressions of insults or messages that certain 
people are worthy of lesser concern and respect) and autonomy (prohibiting actions that 
unfairly diminish a person's opportunities for autonomous agency). These principles form a 
groundwork theory of discrimination. In this chapter, I examine whether and how these 
principles can identify unjustified unequal treatment on the grounds of age and treatment that 
is disadvantageous to particular age groups. This then forms a pluralist theory of age 
discrimination that should guide the direct and indirect age discrimination provisions of the 
Equality Act 2010. 
The uniqueness of age as a phenomenon reveals the importance of verifying which of 
the anti-discrimination principles identified in the previous chapter are capable of explaining 
age discrimination. We must first explain in detail the meaning of age and then evaluate how 
the unique features of age can inform when and why age-differential treatment is wrong. 
Further to this, I argue that a background theory of age and ageing reveals a number of 
potential benefits that age distinctions may have that can work to justify this treatment. I then 
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apply the principles outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 to issues of age and ageing to determine 
when and why unequal treatment on the grounds of age and treatment that is disadvantageous 
to particular age groups is wrong and how these principles can also work to justify the 
treatment.  
I test the plausibility of this pluralist theory of age discrimination in Chapters 6 and 7 
by comparing and contrasting the theory against the views and beliefs identified in important 
sources, including the views of UK governments responsible for introducing age 
discrimination laws and the views expressed in court judgments. In Chapter 8, I test the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination against the UK method of healthcare rationing. 
Throughout this process, I remain open to revising the theory if it reveals weaknesses in my 
approach. 
I apply the reflective equilibrium method in this chapter to form a theory of age 
discrimination. Reflective equilibrium requires identifying moral principles that support our 
moral beliefs about age discrimination and ensuring that these beliefs cohere with a 
background theory of age and ageing. In advancing a background theory of the meaning of 
age and ageing, I explain that age is both a biological and sociological concept connected to 
the passing of time. Physical, emotional and intellectual changes occur as one ages and, 
therefore, age can be a proxy for these traits. By using age as a reliable proxy, we can 
maximise efficiency in pursuing many social goods.
237
 For example, compulsory education 
for children up to sixteen years of age is likely to maximise learning because that covers the 
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age when people are most capable of learning certain skills. Health resources directed to age 
groups who are vulnerable to particular health problems is a more efficient use of resources 
than an age-neutral policy. The nature of age distinctions as promoting efficiency goes some 
way to supporting our belief that some forms of age distinctions are justifiable. 
I explain that the background theory of age and ageing reveals that age distinctions 
can force people to sequence and order their lives chronologically. For example, structuring 
people’s lives to be involved with education in youth, productive work in adulthood and 
retirement in older age. This encourages, and sometimes forces, people to undertake tasks at a 
time of life when there is the greatest benefit to the individual and society. Further to the 
requirement of reflective equilibrium that moral beliefs should cohere with background 
theories, I revise my theory of discrimination to incorporate the efficiency principle that can 
explain why and when age distinctions are justified. 
The background theory of age and ageing also reveals that age distinctions promote 
equality of opportunity when age distinctions form stable policies over time that are likely to 
be experienced by people at some point in their lives. This can justify age distinctions and 
should be part of a theory of age discrimination. However, our intuitions reveal that age 
distinctions can be wrong even if they secure equality over people’s complete lives. We must 
return to the principles outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 to explain that age distinctions can be 
wrong even if efficient or compatible with equality of opportunity. Age-differential treatment 
can be wrong when based on negative stereotypes and prejudice about an oppressed age 
group, by allowing dominant groups to profit by the oppression of disadvantaged groups and 
 
148 
 
by reducing the autonomy of age groups.   
To determine when age-differential treatment is justifiable, we must determine if the 
promotion of moral principles, including efficiency, equality of opportunity, social equality, 
autonomy and respect, outweigh the costs to any potential violations of these principles. 
    
5.1 A Background Theory of Age and Ageing   
We can understand age as a biological phenomenon and as a social phenomenon. I explain 
these different meanings of age and later examine how they reveal both the benefits of age-
differential treatment and its harms.  
 
5.11 Age as a biological process   
People occupying different points in the life cycle have different physical features and 
functioning which is caused by the ageing process. Age-related changes that are beneficial to 
securing autonomy are 'developments' while age-related changes that are detrimental and 
relate to deterioration constitute 'ageing.'
238
 Through the process of development, people gain 
the physical and mental attributes that are necessary to maintain independence. Development 
includes growth in height and weight, development of coordination, balance etc, and 
development of the capacity for logic, communication, memory and certain emotional 
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developments such as the capacity for empathy and compassion.
239
 Illness and disease may 
disrupt or eliminate some of these developments, but all people experience a development of 
at least some of these traits and capabilities.   
Developments tend to occur at particular ages. At about the age of four years old, for 
example, children generally develop the capacity to recognise emotions in others and the 
capacity to understand how others are feeling.
240
 Major physical and mental changes occur 
during adolescent years, which includes changes in body shape, achieving fertility, greater 
aerobic power reserves and blood pressure changes.
241
   
Ageing is a different process to development. It relates to decline and, eventually, loss 
of autonomy.
242
 Ageing has the effect that people become more susceptible to the things that 
will lead to death.
243
 It is a universal process experienced by everyone except those who die 
young.   
Features of ageing includes declines in physical strength, hearing and fertility and loss 
of hair pigment, skin wrinkling, height, working memory and vision. While ageing brings 
about declines, it also provides the benefits of experience. In far advanced age, however, the 
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declines associated with ageing are more likely to outweigh the benefits of experience gained 
from older age.
244
  
The effect of ageing also varies according to different capabilities. Athletes, for 
example, tend to 'retire' before reaching middle age (indicating that physical strength and 
stamina deteriorate rapidly in adulthood), while judges are usually competent into old age 
(indicating intellect can persist into old age).   
 
5.12 Age in the social structure   
Age is more than a biological process; it is also a major component of the social structure 
linked to the assignment of status, social roles and responsibilities.
245
 Age-related roles have 
emerged ensuring that the meaning of age has become a social construct.
246
 According to 
gerontology, 'ageing and old age are socially constructed within educational, family, legal, 
welfare and healthcare institutions.'
247
 
Age roles have arisen from the structures of society and have changed according to 
societal developments. Pre-modern societies did not have a sharp distinction between age 
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groups divided by chronological age. For example, in pre-industrial Britain, society did not 
identify old age so much with chronological age but with the fact of a person being dependent 
on others.
248
 People 40 years of age, for example, were considered old if they were no longer 
able to undertake manual labour. And society did not view childhood as being a distinct stage 
of life. Instead, children were just small adults who had to do manual work.
249
 This attitude 
reflected the economic necessity of children supporting the economy.    
The emergence of industrialisation and formal education in Britain brought about a 
greater connection between chronological age and social roles. Age stratification provided 'an 
effective division of labour...establishing a social mechanism for maintaining the economy, 
the educational system, the family system, and the military, political and religious 
systems.'
250
 Age-related structures also divided people’s lives into different social roles with 
'age groups' being treated as distinct stages of the life cycle. Society assigned young people to 
education, adults to productive labour and elderly people to retirement.  
With the affluence resulting from industrialisation, it became possible to stop child 
labour, and this resulted in the emergence of the modern concept of childhood with children 
being understood as occupying a separate stage of life.
251
 This followed with symbols of 
childhood, such as the emergence of children’s clothing, children’s games and a valuation of 
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childhood innocence.
252
 The introduction of age-regimented education has reinforced the 
modern idea of childhood as a period of learning. 
Today in Britain, the idea of distinct age groups is firmly in place and age 
stratification has become pervasive with the classification by age becoming a hugely 
significant part of people’s identity. For example, age classification determines when we are 
'supposed to enter school, leave school, marry, drink, vote, smoke, get called up for military 
duty in a real column, draw a retirement pension, and a great deal else in between the 
registered birth and the registered death.'
253
 This structuring of society means age is now used 
as a proxy for a wide range of characteristics, including 'intellectual and emotional maturity 
(e.g. minimum ages for entering school), readiness to assume adult responsibilities (e.g. 
minimum ages for voting, drinking, driving and marriage), physical strength or speed of 
response (e.g. maximum ages for policemen, bus drivers, or air-line pilots), economic 
productivity (e.g. age of retirement), and various types of debility (e.g. ages for eligibility for 
medical services and social services).'
254
 
The emergence of the welfare state has further contributed to the cultural division of 
age groups. Governments have deliberately created policies combined to create, enhance or 
maintain economic dependency in old age.
255
 These policies have associated late 
chronological age with retirement from productive work. Given the high status our culture 
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attaches to productive work, this has led to the association between old age and low social 
status.   
Age-norms define appropriate the time in people’s lives for major events and 
achieving, such as leaving home, marrying and having children and retirement.
256
 Age norms 
exert pressure on people by casting non-conforming behaviour as deviant. This occurs when 
behaviour does not match our culturally defined age-roles. For example, our society 
stigmatises teenage mothers and women who reach the age of 50 but have not married, and 
stigmatises certain types of relationships, for example, the stigma attached to marriage 
between a young husband and older wife or work relationships where the boss is younger 
than the workers.
257
   
Certain forms of emotional expression are considered appropriate to particular age 
groups. For example, while a baby can cry, to do so later in life may lead to criticism for 
immaturity. And young people are not supposed to be despondent as they have 'their whole 
life ahead of them.'
258
  
This pervasiveness of age norms influences people's self-evaluation. As Reinharz has 
argued, '[b]ecause age is embedded in a society's system of social control, it is internalized 
and applied by socialized individuals to themselves.'
259
 For example, an older person, 
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socialised in the idea that older people are to withdraw from society, may feel bound to retire, 
and this in turn can negatively influence the person’s self-esteem. 
Part of the explanation for the pervasiveness of age-norms is that a person's age is 
usually apparent from physical features and can be determined after face-to-face 
interactions.
260
 We can easily judge a person against an age norm because we can determine 
an approximate age simply by looking at someone.  
Given the pervasiveness of age-based structures in our society, we can ask what this 
background theory of the meaning of age has for understanding the acceptability or otherwise 
of age-differential treatment.    
  
5.2 The Efficiency Value of Age-based Social Organisation   
What the above discussion reveals is that age can be a proxy for certain attributes and 
abilities, whether biologically or socially constructed.
261
 Intellectual skills and physical 
changes develop over time and this development can be approximate to certain points on 
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people’s life cycle, which means we can use age as a proxy for these traits.
262
 For example, 
the National Institute for Care and Health Excellence recommend that there should be 
restricted access to in vitro fertilisation for women over 43 for the reason that it is unlikely to 
be successful for these women. Age here is used as a (relatively) reliable proxy for the 
possibility of the procedure resulting in pregnancy.
263
 Another example is criminal 
responsibility. England and Wales has a criminal age of responsibility set at 10 years of age 
because children below this age are unlikely to have the capacity to understand what they had 
done wrong and why.
264
 While some children under 10 years of age have the mental 
capabilities to be responsible for crimes, a large proportion do not.  
Using age as a proxy here is efficient because age is a more objective and 
measureable target than the thing age is a proxy for. Without an age proxy for criminal 
responsibility, we would have to assess the mental capacities of each child under 10 
suspected of a crime. It is more efficient to assume that all children under 10 have no criminal 
responsibility since we know that most children at this age lack this trait. Further, it is less 
costly to assume women over 43 years of age are unlikely to benefit from in vitro fertilisation 
than it is to assess each woman’s likelihood of benefitting from the treatment. To spend 
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resources on assessing each woman would mean fewer resources to spend on healthcare 
generally. Another example of efficient age proxies is assuming that people under 16 do not 
have the emotional maturity to marry and have children.  
The reliability of age as a proxy in these cases promotes social goods, such as 
improving stable families, health benefits and criminal justice. But the reliability of age 
proxies depends on which ages we consider. As Gosseries notes,  
 
...the reliability of age as a proxy is certainly strong at very early and very advanced 
ages (e.g., the working ability of those below 14, the emotional maturity of those 
below 16, the driving ability of those below 25, the physical strength of those above 
50, the health condition of those above 85). In contrast, when comparing people 
within the middle range (e.g., a 35 and a 45 years old), many other factors often play a 
more significant role and intra-age-group variability then often becomes stronger than 
interage-groups variability.
265
  
 
Age distinctions are also useful in other ways. As I have explained in section 5.12, society 
has become age-regimented with different roles assigned to different age groups. We expect 
children to be in education, adults in work and older people retired. This age-based structure 
ensures that we organise the chronological order of people’s life activities to ensure they gain 
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skills before having them put to practice. For example, we force children to start learning 
early in their lives because it is efficient that they learn skills necessary for work life before 
engaging in employment.
266
 
 
5.3 Incorporating Efficiency into the Pluralist Theory of Age 
Discrimination 
The efficiency of using age proxies and sequencing people’s lives by age explains why we 
consider many age-based social structures justified, including age distinctions limiting the 
ability of young people to work in the labour market, restricting driving to people over 17, 
having an age of consent at 16, film classifications by age and alcohol restrictions by age. A 
theory of age discrimination should therefore incorporate this efficiency principle.  
 However, efficiency cannot justify all forms of discrimination. For example, an 
employer may justify not hiring women because women are more likely to need time to 
spend out of the labour market. Even if this policy is efficient, it is still morally unjustified 
because it violates a number of the principles, including undermining equality of opportunity 
and social equality between men and women. Further, the fact that something can be a 
reliable proxy does not necessarily justify its use as a proxy. For example, sex can be a very 
reliable proxy but often its use as a proxy is unjustified. In a sexist society where women are 
often confined to the domestic sphere, sex might be a reliable proxy for under-developed 
workplace skills. Despite the reliability of the proxy, it would be unjustified for employers to 
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refuse to hire women when that reinforces the subordinate position of women. It follows that 
we cannot assume age-differential treatment is justified simply because it is efficient or 
because age is a reliable proxy for certain traits.  
Age-differential treatment can be wrong for a number of reasons, including for 
violating equality of opportunity, social equality, autonomy and respect. Age-differential 
treatment can wrong people by being based on negative stereotypes about an oppressed age 
group, by being based on prejudice, allowing dominant groups to profit by the oppression of 
disadvantaged groups and by reducing the autonomy of certain age groups.  
  
5.4 Age Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity 
Equality of opportunity requires an equal distribution of benefits and burdens except when 
inequality arises in a way for which the person who ends up with less should be held 
responsible. In Chapter 4, I argued that this principle offers part of the reason why 
discrimination is wrong since many paradigm cases of discrimination cause disadvantages to 
people based on traits that they cannot or should not be held responsible for. Race 
discrimination, for example, denies people opportunities on the grounds of a trait people are 
powerless to change. We might, therefore, posit equality of opportunity as providing an 
explanation for why age discrimination is wrong. 
 However, equality of opportunity can actually justify age distinctions due to the 
nature of age. Age, like race, is a trait people cannot control because at any one time a person 
is a particular age. However, age is different to traits such as race (and many of the other 
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protected characteristics in the Equality Act 2010) because age is changeable and we each 
take turns experiencing different age groups. The nature of age means that people may 
experience the different advantages and disadvantages associated with different age groups. 
And this means that age-differential treatment can be compatible with equality of opportunity 
measured over a complete life.
267
 For example, while a young person is likely to have less 
wealth than a middle-aged person, they will likely gain the benefits of middle age as they 
move into that age group. Or imagine 'a health care policy that rations life-preserving care 
made available to the very old in order to reduce the extent to which expensive medical 
technology extends the lifespans of very old people with reduced quality of life' and 
prioritising 'health care policies toward saving the lives of very young people threatened with 
premature death.'
268
 These policies are consistent with equality of opportunity when we 
measure access to resources over people’s complete lives (assuming that all individuals lived 
to the same old age).
269
 This means that if we measure distributive equality over a complete 
life – from birth to death – then we can justify age-differential treatment if it is likely to 
secure equal resources or welfare distributed over a complete life.
270
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But is this the most plausible account of equality of opportunity? We could, instead, 
interpret the principle of equality of opportunity as requiring equal opportunities at any 
moment in time. This version of equality of opportunity, however, has unattractive features 
and is much less plausible as a moral principle than the complete-life version. It would have 
the unattractive implication that it would be wrong to distribute a benefit at one time while 
failing to simultaneously give the same benefit to other people at the same time. We consider 
inequalities at particular moments to be acceptable. For example, parents giving birthday gifts 
on each child’s birthday is acceptable even though it means one child will have a gift when 
the other child will have to wait till their birthday on a different date to get a gift. There also 
does not seem anything wrong with giving people the opportunity to drive at 17 years of age 
when this will mean people who are 16 years of age do not yet have the opportunity to drive.  
The justification for the complete-life version of equality of opportunity is that each 
individual receives benefits and bears burdens at different life stages. We can compensate 
detriments at one time of life with gains at another time of life. Therefore, when determining 
if there is wrongful inequality of opportunity, we should add up the benefits and burdens in 
each life and make a comparison.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
distinctions. Lord Walker justified this position on the grounds that age is different: 'Every human being starts 
life as a tiny infant, and none of us can do anything to stop the passage of the years' [80]. Younger people will 
eventually benefit from a provision which favours older employees and older employees will already have 
benefitted from a provision which favours younger people. 
The major equality theorists adopt this complete-life version of equality of opportunity. Thomas Nagel 
in Equality and Priority (Oxford University Press 1991) 69, for example, argued that 'the subject of an 
egalitarian principle is not the distribution of particular rewards to individuals at some time, but the prospective 
quality of their lives as a whole, from birth to death. Ronald Dworkin in ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of 
Welfare’ (1981) 10 Philosophy and Public Affairs 283, 289 argued for assessing 'resources over an entire life,' 
rather than 'at particular points in time', and that '[o]ur final aim is that an equal share of resources should be 
devoted to the lives of each person.' 
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Age-differential treatment does not always secure complete equality of opportunity 
over people's complete lives. Age distinctions can affect people differently. For example, 
people who die young will have fewer opportunities to benefit from age distinctions than 
people who live until old age. Someone dying at 15 years of age, for example, will never 
have the opportunity to vote in a general election. And age distinctions will cause some 
inequality of opportunity it is changed or removed.
271
 For example, a mandatory retirement 
age may be altered or removed with the result that some will face the detriment of the policy, 
but the people who reach retirement age after the policy is revoked will never face that 
detriment. Even very stable policies like a voting age can be subject to change. 
 Nonetheless, age distinctions can contribute to equality by making opportunities more 
equal than they would be otherwise.
272
 For example, market conditions may result in a 
particular age cohort having a higher unemployment rate than an older cohort experienced at 
an equivalent age. A mandatory retirement age might aim to redistribute opportunities from 
older people who have already experienced favourable employment opportunities to younger 
people who, due to market conditions, have had fewer of these opportunities. This policy may 
aim to reduce inequalities in access to jobs across cohorts.
273
 
It is clear from this discussion that there are equality reasons as well as efficiency 
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reasons for finding age-differential treatment justified. We must therefore incorporate 
equality of opportunity into the theory of age discrimination as a principle that can potentially 
justify age-differential treatment. 
However, it is clear that age-differential treatment can still be wrong even if it 
promotes equality of opportunity. For example, policies that create severe disparity in 
resources and welfare between the young and the old can be compatible with equality of 
opportunity measured over people's complete lives but can still be wrong. These policies may 
redistribute wealth to the young leaving older people in poverty. What this example reveals is 
that age distinctions can be wrong by treating people badly at a particular moment in time. 
The fact that each individual may experience the same levels of poverty over their complete 
lives does not make the policy justified.
274
 We must therefore invoke other principles to 
explain why this type of age discrimination wrongs people. To explain why and when age 
discrimination is wrong, we must identify the principles that explain why and when it morally 
wrong to treat people less favourably on the grounds of age even if this means all people have 
equal opportunities over a complete life. In the next section, I argue that the social equality 
principle can provide an important grounding for explaining why and when age 
discrimination is wrong.  
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5.5 Age Discrimination and Social Equality   
As I have outlined in Chapter 4, social equality holds that discrimination is wrong when it 
creates conditions where people are unable to interact as equals. Age discrimination can 
clearly undermine social equality. As Neugarten notes, age is 'one of the bases for the 
ascription of status.'
275
 Unequal treatment on the grounds of age can undermine the social 
status of particular age groups by reinforcing age-based hierarchies of social status.  
 There are a number of examples of age-differential treatment that can undermine 
social equality. Mandatory retirement, for example, can lock older people out of work which 
may lead to social exclusion and marginalisation of older people. Our society links work to 
social status and therefore removing people from work can have the effect of assigning older 
people to a lower social status. As Sandra Fredman points out, '[d]eparture from the labour 
force frequently gives the impression that individuals are no longer active contributors to 
society.'
276
 The fact that a mandatory retirement age might promote equality of opportunity 
over people’s complete lives does not prevent the policy from wronging people by 
undermining their social status. Age discrimination can also harm the status of young people. 
The law discriminates against young people in many ways that reflects the lower esteem they 
are held in. For example, young adolescents are not allowed to vote, drive or drink alcohol. 
Due to the unique nature of age, social marginalisation caused by age-group status is likely to 
be restricted to part of the life cycle. People move into new age groups over time and will 
                                                          
275
 Bernice Neugarten, Joan Moore and John Lowe, ‘Age Norms, Age Constraints, and Adult Socialization' 
(1965) 70.6 American Journal of Sociology 710. 
276
 Sandra Fredman, 'What do we Mean by Age Equality' (2001) Paper to the IPPR Seminar on Age as an 
Equality Issue 30. 
 
164 
 
therefore gain (or lose) age-based opportunities over the life course.  
Social equality can justify some forms of age-differential treatment. For example, 
positive action in favour of disadvantaged age groups can be a means to achieve social 
equality, rather than a breach of the principle. Positive action, such as offering work training 
to young people or initiatives to help older people back into employment, can facilitate the 
participation of marginalised age groups.
277
 
It is clear that social equality should play an important role in a theory of age 
discrimination as it explains why age-differential treatment may be wrong even though it can 
be efficient and can promote equality of opportunity. 
   
5.6 Autonomy and Age Discrimination   
In Chapter 4, I argued that a major reason for the wrongness of discrimination is that it 
diminishes people’s opportunities for autonomous agency. This autonomy principle can also 
explain the wrongness of many forms of age discrimination. For example, a mandatory 
retirement age wrongs older workers by forcing them out of work. The policy therefore 
undermines older workers capacity to have control over their working lives.  
 Age discrimination can also undermine autonomy in the health sphere. For example, a 
doctor deciding that older patients do not have priority for certain drugs can lead to older 
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people missing out on treatment that can help them retain their independence at a time of life 
when older people face health challenges to their autonomy.  
 Another example is the barrier to older workers training for certain professions, such 
as medicine, which prevent older workers from having control over their lives. Laws 
restricting voting rights, driving and drinking alcohol significantly curtail young people’s 
autonomy.  
The age stereotyping that underpins and sustains age discrimination can also harm 
autonomy. In Chapter 4, I explained that stereotyping can lead to losses of autonomy when 
the messages of stereotyping become internalised and accepted as 'natural.' Our ability to 
exercise autonomy depends on how we are understood by others. For example, Caroline 
Dunn notes autonomy harms from the widespread set of negative perceptions of old age.
278
 In 
western society, the stereotyping of older people generally contains messages that they are in 
decline, lack productivity and are irrelevant and a burden to society. If these messages 
become internalised, then it is easy to imagine how older people are less likely to take action 
to, say, remain in the workforce or to develop further their capabilities to increase their 
agency.  
To be autonomous, people must view themselves as being the authors of their lives. If 
people internalise the message that older people are incompetent, then older people are likely 
to lose self-esteem potentially resulting in a lack of confidence to act with conviction when 
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making important life decisions.
279
 
  
5.7 Age Discrimination as Disrespect    
I have argued in Chapter 4 that a core reason for when and why discrimination is wrong is 
that it can send a disrespectful message that the victim of discrimination has a diminished 
moral or social worth. A discriminator can send such a demeaning message when they act on 
prejudice, dislike or hostility towards members of a particular social group or act upon 
stereotypes to deny people goods, and, in addition, people can be demeaned by discrimination 
even if the discriminator has no ill-will towards the victim of discrimination when that 
discriminator acts in a way that a reasonable person would interpret as sending a message that 
the victim of discrimination has a diminished moral or social worth.  
This respect principle is relevant to a theory of age discrimination that can distinguish 
justified from unjustified age-differential treatment. Some have argued that the respect 
principle does not work to explain age discrimination because age discrimination has not 
been a practice marked by prejudice, dislike and hostility. For example, Samuel Issacharoff 
and Erica Worth Harris have argued that age discrimination laws in the US, which protect 
older people from discrimination, do not protect any group that is socially reviled, penurious, 
or cut off from the mainstream of society and/or marked by the badge of social 
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opprobrium.
280
 However, while the degree of animus towards age groups has been perhaps 
less than that directed towards other groups, age discrimination often reveals attitudes that 
ascribe negative worth to particular groups. Both young and old have been subject to 
demeaning ideas about their worth as human beings. Age discrimination can demean older 
people by conveying that they are burdensome to society by taking up too many resources. 
The young, in contrast, are stereotyped as immature, unruly and violent. As Grimley Evans 
has highlighted, '[a]geist prejudice is deeply and widely pervasive in British society,' and '[i]t 
is treated as in some way "natural," even by many older people.'
281
 Empirical evidence 
demonstrates that age stereotypes – directed against the old and young – are widespread and 
harmful in a variety of contexts, including the workplace and healthcare settings.
282
  
Age stereotypes, however, are not always negative. For example, the idea that older 
people have 'wisdom' is a positive stereotype. Acting on positive stereotypes, however, can 
still wrong people because a positive stereotype can imply negative attitudes to others. For 
example, hiring an older person because they have greater wisdom implies that younger 
people are less likely to have this positive characteristic. In this way, acting on positive 
stereotypes still communicates disrespect.    
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As I have argued in Chapter 4, discrimination can undermine self-respect of the 
victims of discrimination when the negative messages conveyed by discrimination become 
internalised by the victim. There is considerable evidence that older people, for example, can 
internalise the negative messages of age discrimination leading to older people having 
negative ideas about their own age, which in turn can undermine self-respect.
283
  
Even 'efficient' age discrimination when an employer is motivated to maximise 
profits, rather than by prejudice or negative stereotypes, can demean people. For example, 
consider an employer who refuses to employ older lawyers because the wider community 
prefers representation from younger people. By acting on the prejudice of the community, the 
employer acquiesces in the demeaning attitudes of the community and shows indifference to 
the moral worth of older lawyers. The employer indirectly reinforces those negative 
judgments.    
Although it is clear that age discrimination can disrespect people, there are many 
instances of age classifications that we accept are non-demeaning. As I have argued in 
section 5.2, our society creates and sustains age-based structures with the goal of pursuing the 
efficient attainment of social goods.
284
 We recognise many age distinctions as beneficial 
rather than humiliating or insulting, including age-based schooling, work restrictions for 
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children, pension ages and many more examples. These forms of age-differential treatment 
can be respectful and justified partly because the treatment is not intended to maliciously lock 
people out of opportunities. For example, a voting age of 18 years of age is far less offensive 
than disenfranchising black people or women. It permits people to wait to have the 
opportunity to participate in democratic elections. In contrast, denying black people and 
women the right to vote conveys that these groups should not have the right to participate in 
an essential feature of the society in which they live. Age-differential treatment, then, can 
permit people to do the things that the treatment prohibits if they wait to reach the age that 
permits the activity. This feature of some forms of age-differential treatment mean that they 
are less likely to demean people than other types of differential treatment. 
To summarise the respect account, determining whether age-differential treatment is 
disrespectful and therefore wrong requires that we determine whether it is motivated by 
prejudice or stereotyping or can be interpreted to convey a message that certain age groups 
have a diminished moral or social worth.  
 
Conclusion   
The Equality Act 2010 requires distinguishing justified from unjustified treatment that 
engages the age discrimination provisions and holds that only the former are lawful (unless 
the treatment fits into a specifically prescribed exception). This chapter has established a 
pluralist theory of age discrimination to undertake this analysis. I have argued that age-
differential treatment can have numerous benefits, including promoting efficiency, equality of 
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opportunity and social equality, which can work to justify the treatment. However, it is still 
possible that these practices are unjustified if they contribute to oppressive social relations, 
are based on inaccurate or negative stereotyping and prejudice, and significantly interfere 
with the autonomy of individuals.     
 This pluralist theory of age discrimination creates the opportunity to determine the 
legality of treatment that engages the age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010  
In Chapter 7, I demonstrate how this theory can settle age discrimination claims by 
comparing and contrasting the theory of age discrimination outlined in this chapter with the 
approaches adopted by the UK courts in age discrimination claims. 
In applying the law, we should consider the extent impugned treatment promotes or 
violates each of the five principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination. The 
principles may pull in different directions, but determining the proportionality, and therefore 
legality, of treatment requires that we determine which among various arguments are most 
compelling to find the treatment justified or unjustified.     
To simplify the process of applying the pluralist theory of age discrimination, I now 
divide age-differential treatment into three categories. In considering the legality of treatment 
that engages the age discrimination provisions, we should consider which of the following 
categories it falls into.   
 
(1) Demeaning age discrimination   
Demeaning age discrimination conveys to people of a particular age group that they have a 
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degraded moral worth or lower social worth because of their age. Measures that communicate 
that a person has a lower moral worth include age distinctions that are motivated by 
prejudice, animosity, hostility and dislike. Measures that communicate that a person has 
lower social worth include treatment founded on harmful age stereotypes, such as stereotypes 
that certain age groups are useless, inflexible, less productive, senile etc. While it may be true 
that some age group members are less productive or are inflexible, subjecting people to 
stereotypical judgments that may not be accurate for the individual is wrong.  
 
(2) Efficient age-differential treatment   
As I have argued in section 5.2, age-differential treatment is often well suited to maximise the 
efficient pursuit of some social goods. For example, using age in the distribution of 
healthcare and education to maximise health and educational benefits is a good way to 
maximise welfare for society as a whole. This can work to justify age-differential treatment. 
Such policies can be unjustified, however, if they lead to conditions where people are unable 
to participate in society as equals or convey that the victim of the treatment has diminished a 
moral or social worth.   
  
(3) Age-differential treatment aimed at advancing equality and/or autonomy   
Age discrimination can aim to satisfy equality and autonomy principles and therefore reflect 
a desire to ensure fairness. Examples include age distinctions that aim to ensure that people 
have equal shares of benefits and burdens over their complete lives. This satisfies the 
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principle of the complete-life version of equality of opportunity that holds that inequality is 
only wrong if there are unequal benefits over people's complete lives and this inequality is 
not connected to personal responsibility for that inequality.  
Nonetheless, age discrimination that advances equality and/or autonomy principles 
may be unjustified should it violate other moral principles. For example, even if we secure 
equal welfare and resources over people’s complete lives, this can still harm the principle of 
social equality when it results in people being unable to participate in society as equals. For 
example, restricting benefits to older people denies older people access to things that provide 
for equal participation in society. If the complete-life account of equality of opportunity 
conflicts with social equality, autonomy or respect, judges should weigh-up the benefit and 
burdens of a policy by considering the extent to which it promotes one principle or violates 
another, and then make a decision on which principles should prevail.    
Age-differential treatment can also aim to advance the social equality principle. For 
example, positive action aims to promote social equality by integrating people from age 
groups that typically suffer from social exclusion or low levels of autonomy. It can also 
promote the respect principle by granting people the opportunity to overcome negative 
stereotypes. Positive age discrimination is particularly contentious because it can undermine 
the interests of other groups. For example, the young usually suffer much higher levels of 
unemployment than other age groups and positive age action in favour of the young can 
invite young people to overcome their disadvantages and reduce youth unemployment. The 
difficulty, however, is that favouring the young in this way may disadvantage older people 
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who also suffer from social exclusion. Positive age discrimination, therefore, promotes one 
age group over others. A judge must weigh-up the extent to which positive action advances 
the interests of one age group and the potential costs it has on any other age groups and then 
make a decision on whether it should be considered justified and therefore lawful.    
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6   
Legislative History of Age Discrimination Law and its 
Relevance to Interpreting and Applying the Equality Act 
2010    
 
I have now formed a pluralist theory of age discrimination that should guide the direct and 
indirect age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010. This theory should operate as 
a guide to distinguish justified from unjustified age-differential treatment and therefore assist 
in determining the proportionality and lawfulness of impugned treatment.  
My method, reflective equilibrium, requires that I review approaches to age 
discrimination from a range of sources to identify principles that should underpin age 
discrimination law. Further to this, I review academic opinions in Chapters 2 to 5 and judicial 
opinions in Chapter 7. This chapter reviews the legislative history of age discrimination law 
and considers whether judges should use these materials in applying age discrimination law. 
The legislative history I consider includes the following: documents by the European 
Commission outlining the need for EU member states to enact age discrimination laws; 
documents by the UK government departments on the rationales for introducing age 
discrimination laws in the UK; consultation documents on implementing the EU Directive 
banning age discrimination; the consultation document on the removal of fixed retirement 
ages; and Hansard statements relating to age discrimination law. These documents contain 
research and ideas from people with experience in approaching the problem of age 
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discrimination and may therefore have value as sources of knowledge on age 
discrimination.
285
  
I argue judges should not defer to the approaches to age discrimination in the 
legislative history. To defer to the legislative history as binding authority would be to treat 
the ideas in the documents as binding, and this is inappropriate because these ideas are not 
law and have not secured democratic backing in the parliamentary enactment process. 
Further, deferring to the consultation documents risks creating a misleading account of the 
point and value of age discrimination law because the consultation documents may not 
reliably represent the genuine rationales for this law. 
I then consider whether the pluralist theory of age discrimination should incorporate 
the approaches to age discrimination law identified in the legislative history. I argue that the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination should not do so. The consultation documents place an 
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inappropriate emphasis on efficiency as a rationale for age discrimination law. The efficiency 
account of the wrongness of age discrimination adopted in the documents is problematic 
because it can lead to the position that efficiency can always justify age-differential 
treatment. However, I argue efficiency should not be capable of justifying certain types of 
age-differential treatment. In particular, efficiency should not justify demeaning age-
differential treatment that reflects stereotypes, prejudice or communicates that particular age 
groups have a diminished moral and social worth. In light of this, I revise the pluralist theory 
of age discrimination to incorporate the principle that efficiency should not justify treatment 
that communicates that particular age groups have a diminished moral or social worth. 
I also argue that we should not revise the pluralist theory of age discrimination to 
adopt the approach to age discrimination in the Hansard statements on the ban on age 
discrimination. The Hansard statements indicate that age discrimination law should allow 
service providers to deny services to particular age groups if the service provider has had 
previous negative experiences with that age group. I argue that this approach would permit 
wrongful negative age stereotyping and prejudice in denying services. 
 
6.1 The Legality of Using Legislative History in Adjudication 
Legislative history includes any materials created in forming legislation. This includes 
consultation documents on the introduction of age discrimination law and Parliamentary 
debates published in Hansard. Before reviewing the legislative history, we must determine 
whether it is permitted for judges to use this legislative history in applying age discrimination 
 
177 
 
law.
286
  
For centuries, the courts refused to consider using Parliamentary statements as aids to 
statutory interpretation and application.
287
 However, there are now some exceptions to this 
exclusionary rule. In Pepper v Hart, the House of Lords held that ‘reference to Parliamentary 
material should be permitted as an aid to the construction of legislation which is ambiguous 
or obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity.’
288
 In Wilson v Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry, the House of Lords clarified that only statements made by a 
Minister or other promoter of legislation can be assessed by the court in determining the 
mischief legislation is aimed at correcting.
289
 In McDonnell v Congregation of Christian 
Brothers Trustee, the House of Lords held that ‘it is permissible to use Hansard to identify 
the mischief at which the statute is aimed.’
290
  
It follows that courts and tribunals can refer to Ministerial Parliamentary statements to 
determine the mischief that the age provisions of the Equality Act 2010 are aimed at 
correcting. The direct and indirect age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010 
require judges to determine whether an impugned measure is a ‘proportionate means of 
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achieving a legitimate aim.’ These provisions leave it unclear the principles and interests that 
are relevant to determining proportionality and therefore legality. The proportionality test 
also does not tell us anything about how to weigh different interests and principles. Assessing 
Ministerial statements in Hansard may clarify the rationales of the age provisions of the 
Equality Act 2010. In this chapter, I determine whether the courts or tribunals should defer to 
the understanding of age discrimination in these statements. 
The other major source of legislative history is the consultation documents on the 
introduction of age discrimination law. The courts have allowed the use of pre-legislative 
materials – such as consultation documents – to determine the purpose of legislation. For 
example, in Eastman Photographic Materials Co Ltd v Comptroller-General of Patents, 
Designs and Trademarks, the House of Lords held that it is appropriate for courts to study 
pre-legislative extra-parliamentary materials as a method of determining ‘the evil or defect’ 
which the legislation is intended to remedy.
291
 Further, in Pepper v Hart, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson observed that the courts are now accustomed to relying on White Papers and 
official government documents as aids in determining how to interpret and apply the law.
292
 
Judges are therefore not excluded from using government consultation documents to identify 
the principles that explain the rationales for age discrimination law as a guide to applying the 
law. 
In the next section, I explore what the consultation documents and Parliamentary 
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statements reveal about the government's rationales for age discrimination law.        
   
6.2 Legislative History of Age Discrimination Law  
The EU provided the initiative for introducing age discrimination law. In 1999, the European 
Commission produced a document outlining the need for legislation banning age 
discrimination.
293
 The document explained that EU member states must adapt to the ageing 
population in Europe and its impact on economic growth. The ageing population, the 
document explained, will have a number of potential consequences that EU member states 
must prepare for, including the relative decline of the working age populations, pressures on 
pension systems from a growing number of retired people and a growing need for healthcare. 
The document highlighted both economic and equality reasons for age discrimination 
laws. It explained that legislation banning age discrimination can be part of a strategy to 
address the consequences of an ageing population by enabling and motivating older people to 
remain in work and to be involved in social life. Banning age discrimination, the documents 
said, would also promote social inclusion of older people that would tap into the talent and 
experience of that age group.  
The EU passed the Employment Equality Framework Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000. This legislation required EU member states to implement domestic 
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legislation to make age discrimination unlawful (subject to exceptions).
294
 In response, the 
UK government started a consultation process on introducing age discrimination legislation. 
In December 2001, the government published a consultation document titled 'Towards 
Equality and Diversity.'
295
 The document had one chapter on implementing a ban on age 
discrimination. In justifying the creation of this ban, the document explained that legislation 
is needed to ‘have a real impact in removing unfair discrimination,’
296
 and laws designed to 
tackle unfair discrimination would go some way to preventing discrimination that cannot be 
achieved by merely relying on voluntary (non-legal) methods. The consultation further 
explained:       
 
[Age discrimination] leads to assumptions about younger and older workers that 
create and perpetuate inappropriate recruitment, selection, training, promotion and 
retirement practices. In tandem with developing legislation, we plan to increase 
promotional activities to change attitudes on age in the workplace and to challenge the 
unthinking prejudice that blights lives and is so costly to our economy.
297
     
 
The two primary rationales for age discrimination law outlined in the document were, firstly, 
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that legislation can promote economic efficiency and, secondly, that legislation can reduce 
age discrimination that harms people through age stereotyping. The latter principle mirrors 
the respect principle of the pluralist theory of age discrimination that holds that age 
discrimination is wrong when it demeans people through stereotyping and prejudice.  
The document places greater emphasis on the harmful effect of age discrimination on 
the economy than its harmful effect on individuals. Age discrimination, the document says, 
has a ‘negative impact on productivity and profits’ and ‘denies employers access to valuable 
knowledge, experience and skills.’
298
 The emphasis on the economy in the document is likely 
to reflect government attempts to convince a sceptical business community to accept age 
discrimination laws as being in businesses’ self-interest. It is unclear whether the government 
actually believed economic reasons are the best rationale for introducing age discrimination 
laws.   
In the consultation ‘Age Matters’ of July 2003, the government again took an 
economic approach to age discrimination.
299
 The document stated that ‘[l]egislation on age 
discrimination is likely to result in increased participation rates for older and younger 
workers’
300
 and ‘[t]his will lead to a wider pool of workers whose abilities and talents better 
match the requirements of employers when recruiting and developing their staff.’
301
 The 
document highlighted that ‘about £16 billion a year in lost GDP’ and ‘£3-5 billion in extra 
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benefits and lost taxes’ results from people over 50 years old leaving the workforce.
302
 The 
document also stated that age discrimination can ‘perpetuate inaccurate stereotypes.’
303
      
In 2005, the government drafted the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 to 
implement the Framework Directive. It produced a consultation draft on this legislation 
called ‘Equality and Diversity: Coming of Age.’
304
 This document argued that legislation 
banning age discrimination can help to generate business efficiency by ensuring people fulfil 
their work potential and therefore employers can ensure they are ‘delivering the best service 
to their customers.’
305
 The report went on:     
 
Over time, there will be overall net economic (not to mention social) benefits from the 
legislation, with potentially large effects on tax and national insurance receipts, and 
the long run potential of the economy. We believe that these benefits will arise 
principally due to increased employment rates and better matching of jobs to 
people.
306
     
 
The government had plans to create new equality legislation that would bring together the 
array of anti-discrimination legislation in one place. Further to this, the government 
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introduced the Equality Bill. The consultation on the Equality Bill, ‘Framework for Fairness’ 
put out in June 2007, recognised that many forms of age distinctions are justified and should 
not be unlawful.
307
 Legislation banning age discrimination, the document states, should not 
prohibit age distinctions that enable ‘services to be delivered more efficiently and 
effectively.’
308
 This reflects the efficiency principle of the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination that recognises that age-differential treatment can promote good 
consequences.  
The document also stated that age discrimination is wrong when it denies some older 
people ‘access to services the rest of the population take for granted, [and] receiving a 
different standard of treatment.’
309
 This reflects the social equality principle of the pluralist 
theory of age discrimination that requires conditions where different age groups have equal 
capacity for participation in social, economic and political life.  
The document also argued that age discrimination laws will help change 
discriminatory attitudes and behaviours which are responsible for ‘hampering wider 
government plans to improve health and social care and local council services such as 
transport for older people.’
310
 The document noted that age discrimination laws can challenge 
behaviour that treats older people with a lack of dignity in environments such as hospitals. 
This reflects the respect principle of the pluralist theory of age discrimination.     
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The government also referred to the respect principle as a reason to ban age 
discrimination in the consultation document ‘The Equality Act 2010: Banning Age 
Discrimination in Services’ of March 2011.
311
 The document called for legislation to put an 
‘end to old-fashioned stereotyping of people because of their age and recognising the 
valuable contribution people of all ages.’
312
 The document also identified the autonomy 
principle as a reason to ban age discrimination by stating that age discrimination prevents 
‘greater freedom, mobility and choice.’
313
     
The consultation on the removal of fixed retirement ages, called ‘Workforce 
Management Without a Fixed Retirement Age’ of January 2011,
314
 also revealed rationales 
for age discrimination laws. The document explained the rationale for removing fixed 
retirement ages as promoting business efficiency because ‘[o]lder employees can bring 
valuable experience and knowledge to a business’ and older people ‘can use their know-how 
to train and mentor less experienced colleagues, and may welcome the opportunity to work 
more flexibly to cover extended or unsocial business hours.’
315
      
We can find further insight into the rationales for age discrimination laws in the 
discussions of the exceptions to the ban on age discrimination. For example, in the 
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consultation ‘Equality and Diversity: Age Matters,’
316
 the Department of Trade and Industry 
provided the following examples of legitimate aims capable of justifying the use of age 
distinctions:     
  
● health, welfare, and safety – for example, the protection of younger workers;    
● facilitation of employment planning – for example, where a business has a 
number of people approaching retirement age at the same time;    
● the particular training requirements of the post in question – for example, air 
traffic controllers, who have to undergo 18 months theoretical and practical 
training at the College of Air Traffic Control, followed by further on the job 
training;  
● encouraging and rewarding loyalty; and    
● the need for a reasonable period of employment before retirement – for 
example, an employer who has exceptionally justified a retirement age of 65 
might decline to employ someone only a few months short of 65 if the need for, 
and the cost and length of, training meant that the applicant would not be 
sufficiently productive in that time.    
 
From this outline of legitimate aims, there is a recognition that age distinctions can produce 
positive social outcomes. Some of the listed legitimate aims are examples of promoting 
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business efficiency ('rewarding loyalty') but others relate to efficiently promoting social 
goods, including health, welfare and safety. This reveals that the government of the time 
believed age discrimination laws should not interfere with efficient measures.     
Further, the consultation document 'Making it Work' of January 2010 argues that as 
individuals’ circumstances are different, it can be justifiable to treat individuals of different 
ages differently.
317
 The document stated that ‘treating people differently based on their age is 
sometimes beneficial or otherwise justified, as people’s needs, expectations and 
circumstances change with their age.’
318
 Should a particular age group have a particular need, 
it is rational and justifiable to treat this age group differently to satisfy that need. Linking 
back to earlier arguments on  identifying the wrongness of age discrimination, we can 
understand that when age distinctions satisfy genuine age-based needs, these distinctions 
promote social goods while treating individuals fairly by taking into account their real 
circumstances in a way that is neither demeaning nor exclusionary.       
In summary, the consultation documents, in identifying the rationales for age 
discrimination laws, refer to the principles of the pluralist theory of discrimination as 
identifying wrongful age-differential treatment, including equality of opportunity, social 
equality, autonomy, respect and efficiency. The documents, however, are vague about the 
meaning of these principles, and there is a lack of consistency in identifying them – some 
documents strongly emphasise business efficiency while others have more emphasis on 
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fairness.  
Hansard also reveals principles underpinning age discrimination law. On the 12 June 
2012, Lynne Featherstone, the Minister for Equalities, made a ministerial statement in 
Parliament explaining the government's intentions to ban age discrimination in the provisions 
of services.
319
 In common with the rationales identified in the consultation documents, the 
Minister emphasised both economic and fairness rationales for the ban. The Minister stated 
that ‘[e]quality of opportunity is a core coalition objective’ and ‘[i]t is fundamental to 
building a strong economy and a strong society.’ 
 In the House of Lords debate on the introduction of the ban on age discrimination in 
the provision of services, Baroness Verma, the Lords Spokesperson for Equalities and 
Women's Issues, discussed some examples that, in her opinion, were likely to count as a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, including the example of 'a holiday 
cottage owner not wishing to rent to very young adults because their cottage had been 
damaged by such people in the past' and  'a car rental company that has had several of its cars 
written off by drivers aged under 25 or over 75' deciding 'not to rent cars to people in those 
age groups or perhaps to charge them a little more.'
320
 The service provider could justify this 
age-differential treatment, Baroness Verma said, by 'the need to reduce road accidents 
generally' and the need to run the 'business efficiently.' These statements recognise that 
efficiency should justify actions that would otherwise constitute age discrimination and that it 
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is justifiable to use age generalisations to justify this treatment. 
 
6.3 Using the Legislative History as Aids in Adjudication   
As I have argued in Chapter 2, the direct and indirect age discrimination provisions of the 
Equality Act 2010 require courts and tribunals to distinguish justified from unjustified age-
differential treatment as part of an assessment into whether an impugned measure is 
proportionate and therefore lawful. In making this judgment, a court or tribunal must identify 
moral principles that determine when and why age-differential treatment wrongs people and 
principles that can justify age-differential treatment. Judges may use their own judgment for 
identifying such principles or they can identify these principles in the legislative history to 
find rationales for the legislation.     
The strongest argument for using the legislative history is that this can reveal the 
rationales for age discrimination law and therefore inform judges of the sorts of 
considerations for identifying unlawful discrimination. The legislative history can help the 
courts and tribunals further the purpose of age discrimination law.  
The legislative history can also offer guidance in undertaking the proportionality test 
by highlighting the principles that determine when aims are legitimate and offering guidance 
on balancing the principles in the final proportionality assessment. The Equality Act 2010 
offers no guidance on the principles relevant to undertaking the proportionality test. Many 
argue this is a threat to the rule of law because the proportionality test fails to offer an 
adequate level of certainty and predictability in adjudication. For example, Stavros 
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Tsakyrakis has argued that proportionality is ‘a characteristically impressionistic assessment 
of the relative weights of competing considerations, which does not lend itself to a rational 
reconstruction of the argumentative path that has led to a particular decision.’
321
 Judges 
deferring to the principles highlighted in the legislative history will help avoid judgments 
based purely on judges’ subjective moral ideas and can make decisions more predictable by 
making it clear the principles the courts are relying on to decide cases.  
The legislative history can simplify the job of adjudicating. As should now be evident 
from this thesis, age discrimination is morally complex. Understanding all of the relevant 
issues in an age discrimination claim is a difficult task. A judge has limited time and 
resources to consider the advantages and disadvantages of different rulings. The legislative 
history can simplify the judge’s task by identifying the relevant moral principles in a claim.     
Despite these possible benefits, however, judges should not defer to the approach to 
age discrimination found in the legislative history at the expense of judges' own considered 
views. Deferring to the approaches in the legislative history would be to treat the documents 
as having a binding force. However, the legislative history is not law and should not bind 
judges. As Aileen Kavanagh has argued: 
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Law is not made in virtue of lawmakers discussing the matters to be legislated or 
hoping or aspiring to achieve certain aims. Nor is it determined by what the lawmaker 
would have directed, given a chance to do so. In order to be made into law, it must be 
endorsed by the law-making institutions on whose authority it is supposed to rest.
322
  
 
To treat the legislative history as binding authority would be to 'enforce intentions and ideas 
that do not have legal binding force' and, in doing so, 'subvert the rationale of the enactment 
process.'
323
 The enactment process has a democratic rationale. For a bill to become law, it 
must win the support of the majority of MPs. This gives the law its authority. Legislative 
history does not have this democratic backing and therefore lacks authority to bind judges.  
 A major purpose of the Parliamentary process of law making is to aim to find 
consensus on a particular issue that is being legislated. If judges defer to the ideas and 
intentions expressed in the legislative history of age discrimination law, then the courts and 
tribunals will be deferring to ideas that have not necessarily secured a consensus by the 
majority in Parliament.  
Furthermore, relying on the consultation documents risks creating a misleading 
account of the point and value of age discrimination law. The consultation documents may 
not represent the genuine rationales for introducing age discrimination law. The documents 
are directed at businesses, including retailers, insurance companies, financial services firms, 
                                                          
322
 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation’ (2002) 47 American 
Journal of Jurisprudence. 
323
 ibid 275. 
 
191 
 
banks etc. The explanations of the rationales of age discrimination law may represent 
attempts to persuade stakeholders of the beneficial nature of the legislation to businesses and 
charities. This may explain why the documents have greater emphasis on business reasons for 
introducing age discrimination laws than rationales about preventing harm to individuals. If 
judges defer to the consultation documents, there is a danger they will place over-emphasis 
on the interests of collective bodies at the expense of individuals.      
Another reason to avoid deferring to the legislative history is that the government may 
not have intended the consultation documents and the Hansard statements to represent a 
complete account of age discrimination. There is nothing in the documents to suggest that the 
principles discussed in the documents were the only relevant rationales for age discrimination 
law. While the governments responsible for introducing age discrimination law may envisage 
certain particular applications of the law, there may be approaches to age discrimination law 
that were overlooked in the documents. Further, the use of the general phrase ‘proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim’ in the Equality Act 2010 reveals a discretion for judges 
to adopt a wider range of approaches to age discrimination law than envisaged by the authors 
of the law or by the authors of the consultation documents.    
In summary, the legislative history of age discrimination law may be helpful in 
providing some principles and ideas that are relevant in applying age discrimination law, but 
it is important for courts and tribunals not to constrain their decision-making to defer to 
approaches outlined in the documents.      
In the next section, I evaluate the approach to age discrimination offered in the 
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legislative history and consider whether the pluralist theory of age discrimination ought to 
incorporate this approach.       
   
6.4 Evaluating the Approach to Age Discrimination Revealed in the 
Legislative History    
As I have explained in the introduction to this chapter, the legislative history contains 
research and ideas from people experienced in approaching the problem of age 
discrimination. It is worth considering whether we should revise the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination to accommodate the approach to age discrimination revealed in the legislative 
history. Further to this, I evaluate the following approaches revealed in the legislative history: 
the efficiency approach to age discrimination; the instrumentalist understanding of age 
discrimination rights; and the idea that age generalisations should be capable of justifying 
age-differential treatment. 
 
6.41 Efficiency as the rationale for age discrimination laws 
The Labour Administration was responsible for introducing age discrimination law in the 
UK, and the consultation documents reflect the ‘third way’ ideology of that government.
324
 
The third way set itself apart from other ideologies by holding that rights are complementary 
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to business efficiency leading to wider economic gains.
325
 It attempts to balance justice 
concerns with the aim to support entrepreneurship and economic growth.
326
 The attempt was 
a synthesis between justice and economic goals. Further to this, the documents claim that a 
ban on age discrimination will increase business efficiency and prosperity but also prevent 
conduct that harms the dignity of people. They argue that age discrimination laws are 
functional to the market by correcting the irrational under-utilisation of older people in the 
workforce and their talent. The documents claim that requiring employers not to take into 
account age will, in many cases, lead to more effective services that in turn will benefit the 
wider economy.   
The consultation documents consider age discrimination wrong because it wastes 
valuable resources among other reasons. We can frame this argument in utilitarian terms – 
‘the greater wealth created by a more efficient economy will, in turn, produce a greater sum 
of utility among members of the population.’
327
  
The pluralist theory of age discrimination also has an efficiency principle, but it works 
in a different way to the efficiency principle in the consultation documents. It explains that 
age-differential treatment can be particularly effective in promoting valuable social goods 
and this can justify age-differential treatment. The pluralist theory of age discrimination, 
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unlike the consultation documents, does not explain the wrongness of age-differential 
treatment as being rooted in inefficiency. In contrast, it explains the wrong of age 
discrimination as rooted in its harms to individuals, including autonomy harms, harms to 
equality of opportunity, and harms connected to disrespectful treatment. 
The danger with the efficiency rationale in the consultation documents is that if 
efficiency is the primary explanation for having age discrimination laws (as implied by the 
documents), then this would mean that even very demeaning age-differential treatment 
should be lawful so long as it is efficient. The efficiency rationale for age discrimination laws 
assumes we can use people as means to promote some collective goals. As such, it treats 
people as being of instrumental value.  
However, as Rawls argues in his rejection of utilitarianism, people are separate and no 
individual can experience the general welfare of the group.
328
 It is important, therefore, that 
we understand that human life is a thing that has value in itself and not simply instrumental 
value to promoting a good state of affairs.  
The problem with the efficiency rationale in the consultation documents is that it 
would lead to treating people’s interests as being vulnerable to contingencies of promoting 
economic gains, and therefore can justify sacrificing individual interests for the sake of such 
gains. The consequence for this approach is that it could be used to defend a range of unjust 
treatment. For example, it can justify dismissing older workers on efficiency grounds because 
older workers usually earn more than younger workers.  
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In contrast to the approach in the consultation documents, there ought to be justice 
and fairness limits on the pursuit of community goals like efficiency and wealth 
maximisation. We ought to treat people in accordance with their intrinsic value. This restricts 
the interests we can take into account in what we ought to do. As I have argued in Chapters 4 
and 5, the respect principle should govern our deliberations (and judges deciding cases), not 
just about what we may do, but also about the ends and interests that individuals and societies 
may legitimately pursue. It is wrong to subject people to humiliating treatment founded on 
oppressive ageist beliefs. This includes unequal treatment on the grounds of age that is 
motivated by negative judgments concerning the moral or social worth of older people. In 
these circumstances, gains in welfare (such as that which results from gains in efficiency) 
should not be capable of legally justifying age-differential treatment.      
The respect principle requires we challenge prejudice and stereotypes in order to 
maintain a just society. This means we should apply age discrimination laws to remove 
actions based on derogatory beliefs about the worth of individuals. It is essential to achieving 
this that judges hold that business efficiency does not justify acting on these beliefs. This is 
particularly important because many stereotypical beliefs and prejudices can seem natural to 
people. It is only when we challenge these practices and beliefs that we can transform society 
to tackle ageist treatment.   
 The pursuit of collective goals such as business efficiency and wealth maximisation 
should not treat individuals as if they have a degraded moral worth because of their age.  Age 
discrimination law should first aim to eliminate these forms of unjust treatment before 
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considerations of efficiency. Only after it has been established that unequal treatment is not 
demeaning and does not convey a diminished moral status to individuals can we move on to 
consider efficiency as being capable of justifying unequal treatment on the grounds of age. 
The pluralist theory of age discrimination should be revised to account for the intuition that 
efficiency should not justify age-differential treatment that is demeaning by communicating 
that particular age groups have a diminished moral or social worth.   
If it is established that age-differential treatment does not convey that an individual 
has a diminished or degraded moral status, then we can move on to consider efficiency as a 
factor capable of justifying unequal treatment on the grounds of age.
329
  
We can further criticise the consultation documents for identifying economic costs as 
a major explanation for why age discrimination is wrong. Most people would not consider 
discrimination wrong because it is bad for business. Instead, we can only account for our 
intuitions about the wrongness of certain forms of age discrimination if we account for the 
injustice it does to individuals through prejudice, stereotyping, autonomy and equality harms.  
The other major weakness of the approach of the consultation documents is that they 
state that a major value of age discrimination laws is increasing profits and economic growth. 
                                                          
329
 Efficiency should be capable of justifying measures that are age-neutral but disadvantage people of a 
particular chronological age (i.e. measures that engage the indirect discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 
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preference to save resources, although we recognise that sometimes the employer should be required to incur 
some reasonable costs to remove requirements that might disadvantage people of a particular chronological age.   
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This reflects a wealth maximisation principle.
330
 But wealth is only a value if it promotes 
other important moral values and therefore should not be thought of as a major rationale for 
age discrimination law.
331
 Wealth is a means to an end. It only has an instrumental value in 
granting conditions to experiences valuable things.
332
 Dworkin argues effectively in 
dismissing the idea that wealth maximisation is intrinsically valuable:   
 
Suppose ... that an individual faces a choice between a life that will make him happier 
(or more fulfilled, or more successful in his own lights, or whatever) and a life that 
will make him wealthier in money or the equivalent of money. It would be irrational 
of him to choose the latter. Nor-and this is the crux-does he lose or sacrifice anything 
of value in choosing the former. It is not that he should, on balance, prefer the former, 
recognizing that in the choice he sacrifices something of value in the latter. Money or 
its equivalent is useful so far as it enables someone to lead a more valuable, 
successful, happier, or more moral life. Anyone who counts it for more than that is a 
fetishist of little green paper.
333
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 For a defence of a wealth maximisation theory, see Richard Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal 
Theory’ (1979) 8.1 The Journal of Legal Studies 103. Posner argued that wealth maximisation is more attractive 
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Since wealth maximisation is an instrument of creating value, then it is not enough to point to 
increases in wealth itself as something justifying a ban on age discrimination. It is important 
to provide evidence that wealth creation causes an increase in important values, such as 
welfare or fairness. Any claim that wealth should trump the interests of individuals should 
demonstrate that this wealth advances an independent goal or value.    
Posner, in defending a wealth maximisation principle, has argued that judges should 
aim at maximising wealth because this will ‘produce an ethically attractive combination of 
happiness, of rights (of liberty), and of sharing with the less fortunate members of society.’
334
 
However, because we value liberty, equality and happiness as intrinsic goods, and only 
wealth as an instrumental good, it is better for judges to aim to promote the intrinsic goods of, 
say, liberty, equality and welfare, rather than directly advancing wealth as Posner suggests.      
   
6.42 Instrumentalist understanding of age discrimination rights     
Instrumental conceptions of rights describe rights as instruments for achieving particular 
community goals such as wealth maximisation and efficient distribution of goods and 
services. The consultation documents adopt this understanding by explaining the rationale for 
age discrimination rights as the promotion of economic efficiency by ensuring that people are 
selected for jobs based on merit rather than age.  This approach resembles a form of rule 
utilitarianism where respecting rights is justified because it (usually) leads to gains for the 
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community.
335
        
The weakness of this understanding of rights is that if the primary rationale for age 
discrimination rights is efficiency, we can override rights whenever efficiency demands and 
then individuals do not have any meaningful ‘right’ against discrimination at all. If we justify 
age discrimination rights because of efficiency, then it is implicit in this approach that we 
should set aside the interests of individuals when efficiency demands this.  
The pluralist theory of age discrimination should reject the economic approach to age 
discrimination rights adopted in the consultation documents because the economic approach 
fails to account for what we understand as essential features of what it means to have a right, 
which is that the right against discrimination forecloses certain ways of treating individuals 
that might otherwise be justified in the pursuit of the common good.
336
 This means that some 
interests of individuals should have greater weight than the pursuit of efficiency or wealth 
maximisation.      
 
6.43 Age generalisations justifying age-differential treatment 
The Hansard statements by Baroness Verma reveal the approach that age generalisations 
ought to be able to justify denying services to particular age groups. Verma stated that it is 
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justifiable for a service provider to deny services to particular age group if they have had bad 
experiences with that age group in the past. An example of this, she stated, was a holiday 
cottage owner denying young people the chance to stay in the property when the service 
provider had the property damaged by young people in the past. 
 This approach to age discrimination violates the respect principle by holding that it is 
objectively justified for service providers to make negative generalisations about particular 
age groups and to deny services on these generalisations. The holiday cottage owner denying 
young people a service is an example of negative stereotyping because it assumes young 
people cannot be trusted to avoid damaging the property. I have argued that negative 
stereotyping and prejudice should not justify age-differential treatment. It wrong to deny 
black people services because the service provider had bad experiences with black people in 
the past, and, similarly, it is wrong to deny services to particular age groups because of the 
assumption that these groups are troublesome. If courts and tribunals were to adopt the 
position adopted by Verma's Parliamentary statement, then the effectiveness of the Equality 
Act 2010 in tackling ageism will be reduced. It would mean service providers would be 
capable of justifying demeaning treatment. 
  
Conclusion     
The consultation documents reveal a dual approach to justifying age discrimination laws with 
arguments that the legislation will promote business efficiency and tackle unfair treatment of 
individuals. I have argued that it would be inappropriate for courts and tribunals to rely on the 
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rationales set out in these documents for deciding age discrimination cases. I have also 
argued that the government is mistaken in identifying efficiency as a plausible rationale for 
age discrimination laws. Age discrimination is a moral concern because, in certain cases, it 
can create inequality of opportunity, social exclusion and it can foster stigma and demean 
people.  
In light of evaluating the governments’ explanations of the rationales for age 
discrimination laws, I have argued that the pluralist theory of age discrimination should be 
revised to account for the intuition that the pursuit of efficiency should not justify age-
differential treatment that communicates demeaning messages.  
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7   
The Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination and Age 
Discrimination Claims  
 
The pluralist theory of age discrimination outlined so far should assist in identifying unlawful 
age discrimination. It consists of a framework of principles that can distinguish justified from 
unjustified age-differential treatment. These principles include efficiency, equality of 
opportunity, social equality, autonomy and respect. In the previous chapter, I revised the 
theory in light of our intuition that efficiency should not justify discrimination that 
communicates that particular age groups have a diminished moral or social worth.  
 This chapter demonstrates how the pluralist theory of age discrimination can 
successfully guide age discrimination disputes. Further to this, I explain how each of the 
principles of the theory can assist in undertaking the proportionality assessment of age 
discrimination law. I then compare and contrast this approach to the approach adopted in the 
UK case law. I return to the case law discussed in Chapter 2, including Seldon,
337
 
Lockwood,
338
 White,
339
 Homer
340
 and Woodcock.
341
 These cases were illustrative of a general 
problem of a lack of open and transparent reasoning on the competing principles and interests 
at stake in age discrimination claims. Seldon is the leading UK authority on direct age 
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discrimination and Homer is the leading UK authority on indirect age discrimination. White 
and Lockwood are examples of cases that have adopted the approach of these leading 
authorities. Woodcock concerned whether costs alone should be capable of justifying age-
differential treatment. 
By comparing and contrasting the pluralist theory of age discrimination to the 
reasoning in these cases, this chapter demonstrates that the theory can improve the openness 
and transparency of legal reasoning by articulating the principles and competing interests that 
are relevant to determining the legality of impugned treatment. In particular, I show that the 
theory provides much greater scrutiny of employer aims in comparison to the current UK 
case law's approach.  
In applying age discrimination law, I argue that courts and tribunals should also 
consider the institutional limitations of the judicial process, including the need for deference 
to the original decision-maker. The proportionality test of the Equality Act 2010 requires 
judges to consider whether the impugned measure is suitable to achieving a legitimate aim, 
necessary to achieving the aim and whether there is an appropriate balance between the aim 
and any discriminatory effects of the measure. Sometimes the original decision-maker is 
better placed to determine one or more of these considerations and it is therefore appropriate 
for courts and tribunals to accord weight to the original decision-maker’s assessment of these 
issues.
342
 Factors for determining whether the original decision-maker is in a better position 
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include where the court or tribunal have lower competence or expertise to address the issue 
than the original decision-maker or where the original decision-maker has democratic 
backing for their decision.
343
 
My method – reflective equilibrium – requires that I revise the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination if any ideas and approaches from the case law in this chapter reveal new 
considerations or ideas that a theory of age discrimination should incorporate. Reflective 
equilibrium recognises that new considerations can destabilise the theory, which requires 
adjusting the theory to recover stable equilibrium.
344
 However, the UK case law reveals a 
lack of moral reasoning in deciding the age discrimination claims, including a failure to 
explain why particular aims are legitimate and a failure to offer principles for establishing the 
proportionality of impugned treatment. Therefore, the UK case law does not destabilise the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination. This chapter works as a demonstration of the value of 
the pluralist theory of age discrimination constructed from the reflective equilibrium method. 
 
7.1 A Preliminary Account of how the Pluralist Theory of Age 
Discrimination Can Assist Age Discrimination Claims 
In Chapter 2, I outlined the structure of age discrimination law in detail. I briefly return to 
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this structure to provide a foundation for explaining how the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination can assist in applying age discrimination law. 
We can divide the process of identifying unlawful age discrimination into four stages. 
The first stage is to determine whether the impugned treatment engages the direct or indirect 
age discrimination provisions. If the treatment does engage these provisions, then we must 
assess whether the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim or fits 
into a specifically prescribed exception. In the second stage, we must determine whether the 
treatment is suitable for achieving a legitimate aim.
345
 If it is not suitable, the treatment is 
unlawful.
346
 If the treatment promotes a legitimate aim, then we move to the third stage to 
assess whether the treatment is necessary to achieve that aim. A measure will only be 
necessary if there are no alternative forms of treatment that can achieve the legitimate aim 
without the equivalent discriminatory impact. If the treatment is unnecessary, it is unlawful 
age discrimination. If it is necessary, however, then we move to the fourth stage, which 
requires an assessment into whether the impugned treatment is proportionate in the narrower 
sense: the treatment must not impose burdens or cause harms to other legitimate interests that 
outweigh the objectives achieved. If the treatment passes each of these stages and is 
proportionate, then it is lawful.  
                                                          
345
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apply to treatment that engages the direct age discrimination provisions. The Supreme Court in Homer (n 340) 
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346
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The five principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination should assist in each 
of these stages. I now detail how the principles assist in the four stages to provide an open 
and structured assessment of the interests at stake in age discrimination claims.  
 
Stage 1: Does the impugned treatment engage the direct or indirect age discrimination 
provisions? 
When a decision-maker treats an individual less favourably because of age, this treatment 
will engage the direct discrimination provisions.
347
 The pluralist theory of age discrimination 
can help identify when an individual is treated less favourably and therefore it can determine 
when measures engage the direct discrimination provisions.  
For example, denying an individual a job because of their age violates autonomy by 
reducing the job applicant's valuable options on the grounds of a trait that they are powerless 
to change. It also violates equality of opportunity by denying an opportunity that other age 
groups can access. And social equality is undermined if the treatment is directed at 
historically disadvantaged age groups (for example, older people) by reinforcing the 
dominant position of privileged age groups. In addition, the principle of respect identifies less 
favourable treatment as treatment that is offensive, insulting, based on prejudice or age 
stereotyping, or any conduct that communicates the discriminatee has a diminished moral or 
social worth.
348
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 Measures will engage the indirect discrimination provisions when a policy, criterion 
or practice is age-neutral but has the effect of disadvantaging particular age groups.
349
 The 
pluralist theory of age discrimination can determine if treatment disadvantages particular age 
groups and therefore can determine when impugned treatment engages the indirect 
discrimination provisions. For example, the equality of opportunity principle can identify 
treatment that engages the indirect discrimination provisions as age-neutral structures that 
deny particular age groups access to valuable resources. Autonomy identifies indirect 
discrimination as structures that work to foreclose the valuable choices of disadvantaged age 
groups. And social equality identifies indirect discrimination as structures that work to 
marginalise vulnerable age groups. 
 
Stage 2: Is the impugned treatment suitable for achieving a legitimate aim? 
The pluralist theory of age discrimination recognises that there are multiple different 
legitimate aims, including the pursuit of efficiency and the aim of promoting equality of 
opportunity, social equality and autonomy. Aims are legitimate when they promote one or 
more of the principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination unless they communicate 
demeaning messages. The original decision-maker should be able to select the aims the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
treatment. For example, the ET in Dove v Brown & Newirth Ltd [2016] UKET/3301905/2015 held that 
nicknaming someone 'gramps' amounted to less favourable treatment because these comments were 
disrespectful and hurtful. The ET in Nolan v CD Bramall Dealership Ltd t/a Evans Halshaw Motorhouse 
Worksop [2012] UKET/2601000/12 held that age-related 'banter,' including introducing an employee as the '104 
year old Service Team Leader' and changing that employee’s number plate from 'OAB' and to 'OAP,' was less 
favourable treatment on the grounds of age. In James v Gina Shoes Ltd
 
[2011] UKEAT/0384/11/DM, the EAT 
held that it was less favourable treatment to make remarks reflecting age stereotypes, including the remark 
directed at the complainant  'you can’t teach an old dog new tricks.'  
349
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impugned treatment was pursuing, but they must demonstrate that there is a rational 
connection between the age-differential treatment and the aims.
350
  
As an illustration of how the pluralist theory of age discrimination can assist at this 
stage, we can return to the three categories of age-differential treatment identified in Chapter 
5. The first category – demeaning age-differential treatment – includes age-differential 
treatment that pursues aims that reflect stereotypes, prejudice or aims that communicate that 
particular age groups have diminished moral and social worth.
351
 The respect principle 
operates as a deontological constraint. No one should suffer from communications that they 
have an inferior status because of their age. Even if age-differential treatment aims to 
promote ostensibly legitimate aims such as efficiency and equality, these aims should not be 
capable of justification if they communicate demeaning messages to particular age groups.
352
   
 The second category of age-differential treatment – efficient age-differential treatment 
– aims to maximise the attainment of social goods. For example, using age in the distribution 
of healthcare and education to maximise health and educational benefits is a good way to 
maximise welfare for society as a whole. Aims that promote efficiency in attaining social 
goods are legitimate unless these aims violate the respect principle by demeaning people. An 
                                                          
350
 Alexy calls this structural deference. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University 
Press 2009) 393. 
351
 Unfortunately, the UK courts have not treated all forms of age stereotyping as illegitimate. As I discuss 
below, the Supreme Court in Seldon accepted that it is legitimate for employers to dismiss older workers to 
avoid the need to involve older workers in incapacity or underperformance processes.  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that this aim was 'suspiciously like stereotyping' but decided they should follow the CJEU 
jurisprudence in holding this aim legitimate. With the exit of the UK from the EU, and therefore the UK courts 
no longer having to follow the findings of the CJEU, it is possible for the Supreme Court to overturn the 
precedent. 
352
 I make this argument in Chapter 6. 
 
209 
 
example of possible efficient age-differential treatment that is also demeaning would include 
an employer dismissing all staff over 60 years of age in order to reduce wage costs during a 
recession. This treatment may be efficient as a method of ensuring financial stability by 
removing employees who tend to command higher salaries; however, it is illegitimate 
because it sends the demeaning message that older workers are dispensable.  
 The third category of age-differential treatment – age-differential treatment aimed at 
advancing equality and/or autonomy principles – includes treatment that aims to ensure that 
people have equal shares of benefits and burdens over their complete lives and/or measures 
designed to benefit disadvantaged or marginalised age groups. Examples include aims to 
facilitate access to employment for young people or aims to share work fairly between the 
generations. These aims attempt to promote the principles of the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination and therefore should be legitimate unless, again, they contain demeaning 
messages about particular age groups.   
The suitability stage of the proportionality test requires an assessment into whether 
the impugned treatment is actually capable of promoting the legitimate aims. Sometimes it is 
appropriate to defer to the original decision-maker on this assessment. For example, 
deference is appropriate where there is considerable uncertainty about whether the impugned 
treatment actually promotes the legitimate aim. This form of deference is what Robert Alexy 
calls empirical epistemic deference.
353
 Courts and tribunals should offer empirical epistemic 
deference when there are difficulties finding evidence relating to parts of the proportionality 
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assessments. 
If it is established that a legitimate aim promotes one or more of the principles of the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination, then we move to the next stage of proportionality – the 
necessity test. If the measure conveys demeaning messages and/or does not promote the 
principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination, then the treatment is not rationally 
connected to a legitimate aim and therefore should be held to be unlawful age discrimination 
under section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 (for treatment engaging the direct discrimination 
claims) or section 19 of the Equality Act 2010 (for treatment engaging the indirect 
discrimination claims).  
 
Stage 3: Is the treatment necessary to achieve the legitimate aim? 
This stage of the proportionality assessment is an empirical enquiry. It requires assessing 
whether there are any alternative forms of treatment that can pursue the legitimate aims as 
effectively as the impugned measure but with a lower discriminatory impact. This is an 
empirical assessment because it is concerned with measuring the impact the treatment has on 
people and the gain to a public good it can achieve. Only measures that most efficiently 
pursue the legitimate aims can be proportionate and therefore lawful under this necessity test.  
 The pluralist theory of age discrimination plays a role here because it identifies the 
interests that the courts and tribunals should identify in assessing whether the impugned 
measure is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. For example, if a court or tribunal find that 
there are alternative methods that can promote the principles of efficiency, equality of 
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opportunity, social equality and/or autonomy more effectively than the impugned treatment 
and with a lower violation of these principles, then the impugned treatment is unnecessary 
and therefore unlawful. If, however, the court or tribunal calculate that the measure is 
necessary to achieve the legitimate aim, then we must move to stage 4, which requires 
determining whether the seriousness of the interference with the claimant’s interests is 
proportionate to the benefits gained in pursuit of the legitimate aim. 
It is appropriate for the courts and tribunals to acknowledge their institutional 
limitations by deciding not to substitute their views for that of the original decision-maker on 
the question of necessity when that decision-maker has superior expertise and information on 
which to determine the effectiveness of the impugned treatment in promoting the legitimate 
aim.
354
 As Jeffrey Jowell notes, '[t]here will be occasions where other bodies, whether 
Parliament, the executive or a non-departmental public body containing specialist expertise, 
will be better equipped to decide certain questions [than courts].'
355
   
For example, efficiency is a goal of healthcare rationing in the UK but this can 
disadvantage older age groups.
356
 A court would have difficulty assessing whether the current 
UK method of healthcare rationing – the Quality-Adjusted Life Year method – is necessary 
for maximising the legitimate aim of efficient healthcare allocation because courts lack the 
medical expertise to determine whether any alternative healthcare allocation method can be 
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more effective in health promotion. In contrast, the National Institute of Health and Care 
Excellence ('NICE'), which is responsible for offering guidance on rationing healthcare, is in 
a better position than the courts to decide how to distribute health resources because it is 
staffed by medical professionals. The courts should therefore defer to the expert group on 
their judgment on whether the method is necessary. 
In addition to public institutions, there can be good reasons for a court or tribunal to 
offer deference to businesses. For example, an employer may have inside knowledge about 
their own business that may put them in a better position than a court or tribunal to assess 
whether an age distinction is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. 
Further, judges may consider it appropriate to defer to the judgment of the original 
decision-maker where there is uncertainty about the realisation of particular circumstances. 
As King notes, judges 'may be unsure of the reliability of evidence, expert witness credibility 
or the likely effect of the judgment on patterns of behaviour.'
357
 For example, the question of 
whether a retirement age is necessary to create promotion opportunities within a firm depends 
upon the financial health of that firm at a future date and whether the retirement age is likely 
to prompt people in the firm to make the decision to create new promotion opportunities. 
Judges cannot make a reliable prediction on these issues. It is appropriate for judges to 
recognise their fallibility in making predictions by avoid imposing their predictions over that 
of the original decision-maker.  
This should not mean that the courts and tribunals offer no scrutiny in relation to the 
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question of necessity. There are circumstances where the original decision-maker may have 
expertise but they also have incentive to act selfishly to deny someone’s rights. For example, 
private employers typically aim to maximise profit, but this does not necessarily coincide 
with fair treatment of their employees.
358
 An employer may use age distinctions to 
marginalise particular age groups. For example, an employer may dismiss older workers and 
replace them with younger and cheaper workers. Courts and tribunals must therefore be 
particularly wary in deferring to private employers and must evaluate whether the employer 
is using their expertise to genuinely promote legitimate aims or is using the expertise as an 
excuse to act in a way which is not justifiable on grounds of necessity. 
The deference factors I have discussed in this chapter do not mean the courts should 
merely adopt a reasonableness test rather than the proportionality test. Wednesbury 
unreasonableness – the method for courts to determine the legality of administrative decision-
making in judicial review claims – rules out decisions that are so unreasonable that no 
reasonable person acting reasonably could have made them.
359
 In contrast, the necessity stage 
of the proportionality test is a form of merits review requiring the court or tribunal to strike 
down measures when the court or tribunal determine that there are other identified methods 
that could more effectively pursue legitimate aims. The reasonableness test permits measures 
in pursuit of a legitimate aim if the measure is not '[s]o outrageous in its defiance of logic or 
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to 
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be decided could have arrived at it.'
360
 Proportionality is different from this reasonableness 
review because courts and tribunals should only defer in the necessity stage of the 
proportionality test when the courts and tribunals do not have the knowledge (or do not have 
as much knowledge as the decision-maker) to calculate whether the impugned measure is the 
most effective way to pursue a legitimate aim.  
The courts and tribunals should not consider the deference factors entirely separately 
from the substantive principles. The level of deference should depend on the severity of a 
violation of the principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination. For example, if the 
court can calculate that a measure contributes to oppressive relations, expresses contempt, or 
violates autonomy, then there is a greater need to scrutinise the decision-maker’s treatment as 
being necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. This means that institutional questions about the 
extent to which judges should defer to the primary decision-maker depend in part on the 
extent of harm to an individual's interests. Where the extent of violation of interests is low, 
then institutional considerations and deference towards the primary decision-maker should 
play a more prominent role. But when there is a clear and substantial violation of an 
individual's equality interests, this may outweigh concerns about institutional limitations of 
the judicial process. In such situations, the balance may be in favour of judicial intervention 
and strong scrutiny of the measures on the substantive principles.   
 
                                                          
360
 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1983] UKHL 6 [1984] 3 All ER 935 [410]. 
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Stage 4: Is the seriousness of the interference with the claimant’s interests proportionate to 
the benefits gained in pursuit of the legitimate aim? 
To answer this, we must calculate the extent to which the measure violates one or more of the 
principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination and calculate the extent to which the 
measure advances any of these principles. The court or tribunal must find the measure 
unlawful if they consider the harm done to individuals outweighs the possible benefits of the 
impugned treatment.     
 However, deference should also come into consideration at this stage if a democratic 
process or a democratically elected body is responsible for the decision.
361
 The pluralist 
theory of age discrimination should not attempt to replace democratic decision-making.
362
 
Social-policy decisions concerning the appropriate balance between the public benefit of age-
differential treatment and its detrimental impact on individuals is more appropriately decided 
by people who are directly elected to make decisions on behalf of the public.
363
 
The people making decisions in democratic institutions, including the institutions of 
Parliament, government departments and local authorities, hold power with the consent of the 
public and the public can remove them from power if they disapprove of their decisions and 
                                                          
361
 For detailed discussions on the importance of deference to democratic decisions, see Brady (n 342) 72; 
Jeffrey Jowell, 'Judicial Deference and Human Rights: Question of Competence' in Paul Craig and Richard 
Rawlings (eds), Law and Administration in Europe: Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow (Oxford University 
Press, 2003) 80; J. Jowell, 'Judicial deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity?' [2003] P.L. 592. 
362
 See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 1999). 
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 The case law adopts this position. For example, Lord Hoffmann in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 AC 153 held that social policy should be decided by elected 
representatives because '[i]f people were to accept the consequences of such decisions, they must be made by 
persons whom the people have elected, and whom they can remove.' 
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policies. Courts and tribunals should therefore be reluctant to interfere with the decisions of 
these democratic institutions in balancing competing interests. There is more room for courts 
and tribunals to scrutinise the decisions of private employers given that the decisions of the 
employer usually does not have democratic backing (although see my discussion below on 
collective bargaining).  
The fact that a decision is made by a democratic institution, however, should not 
shield it entirely from scrutiny. The democratic process may disregard the interests of 
particular age groups and force through measures that discriminate against these groups. 
Groups with low voter turnout, such as young people, are particularly vulnerable to having 
their interests sidelined by democratic institutions. Courts and tribunals, therefore, should 
offer scrutiny of democratic institutions while also according weight to their decisions. This 
should be a contextual approach. The greater the degree a measure violates one or more of 
the principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination, the greater the need for the courts 
and tribunals to offer intense scrutiny of the impugned measure. Where there is a clear and 
serious violation of a moral principle, the courts and tribunals should require a strong 
argument by the defendant that there is an appropriate balance between community interests 
and the discriminatory effect of the impugned measure. 
Courts and tribunals should also consider offering deference in the final 
proportionality assessment when age discrimination claims concern polycentric issues.
364
 A 
polycentric issue is 'one that comprises a large and complicated web of interdependent 
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 See Lon Fuller’s argument in ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication' (1978-1979) 92 Harvard L Rev 353 
that polycentric disputes are unsuitable for adjudication.  
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relationships, such that a change to one factor produces an incalculable series of changes to 
other factors.'
365
 Resource allocation, such as changing the state pension age, is a classic 
polycentric issue because it directly affects spending in other areas of government affecting a 
wide range of people.
366
  
The adjudicative process has difficulty addressing polycentric issues because 
adjudication is typically focused on addressing the arguments presented by the parties’ 
representatives. Polycentric issues, however, affect an array of people not represented in the 
adjudication. This means that judges deciding on polycentric issues can lead to unintended 
consequences to these unrepresented groups.
367
 Democratic institutions, in contrast, can 
tackle the complexity of the issues by considering the wide range of consequences a decision 
may have. Further, the democratic institutions can do this with an electoral mandate. 
Age discrimination issues are often polycentric. For example, policies favouring 
particular age groups, such as the winter fuel allowance for older people, may have wide 
ramifications for a number of different groups that the courts will find difficult to address in 
adjudication. Removing the age-differential treatment, for example, by transferring the 
benefits to low income groups rather than to all people over 65 years of age, can lead to 
higher costs that result from having to means-test people for the benefits. This in turn can 
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366
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force cuts in other areas of state spending that can affect the income of large numbers of 
people in need. Only the state responsible for the budget is capable of calculating the 
consequences of removing age-linked benefits. 
The fact that an issue is polycentric, however, should not automatically disqualify it 
from adjudication. As King has demonstrated, polycentricity is pervasive.
368
 If courts and 
tribunals cannot intervene in polycentric issues at all then the effectiveness of discrimination 
law in tackling ageism will be drastically reduced. 
There are circumstances where justice clearly requires courts and tribunals to 
intervene in polycentric issues. For example, in the celebrated case Brown v Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court held that the policy of racial segregation in schools was 
unconstitutional because it violated the right to equal protection under the law.
369
 
Desegregating schools was a polycentric issue since it affected large groups of people beyond 
those represented in court, including schoolchildren across different states and to people 
affected by the de-segregation in other institutions, such as segregated public beaches, golf 
courses, buses and parks. Despite the complexity of the consequences to the ruling, justice 
required judicial intervention to put an end to racist policies in resource allocation.  
If there is a serious violation of the principles of the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination, then the courts can undertake an intense review of polycentric issues. To find 
an impugned measure lawful under this intense review, the defendant should offer a strong 
                                                          
368
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argument that they struck an appropriate balance between community goals and the interest 
of individuals adversely affected by the measure. If there is a high degree of polycentricity 
but only a low or moderate violation of the principles of the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination, then the courts should offer lower levels of scrutiny. 
Deference is also appropriate for age distinctions that result from collective 
bargaining between employees and their employer. Collective bargaining is a type of 
democratic decision-making because it reflects decisions with the backing of the majority of 
the members of the negotiating union. However, certain interests may be ignored or sidelined 
in the process. A union may force through measures that benefit the majority of their 
members but discriminate against older people. Deferring in these circumstances would be 
failing to protect a disadvantaged older group. Courts and tribunals must consider whether 
there is a clear abuse of the interests of particular age groups.  
Another factor that should determine whether deference is appropriate at this stage is 
whether the claimant agreed to the impugned measure. The principle of autonomy which 
forms one part of the pluralist theory of age discrimination means that people should have the 
ability to make decisions and exercise free will on negotiating terms. If a claimant has agreed 
to an age distinction then there is a reason for the courts and tribunals to respect their exercise 
of autonomy and assume that the impugned measure is proportionate. Contractual terms, 
however, often do not reflect equal bargaining power. Even if the measure is part of an 
employment contract, an employee might not have had a realistic option to refuse to accept 
the terms of a contract. Courts must be wary in applying deference and must consider 
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whether the parties to the agreement have equality of bargaining power.  
If a decision-maker imposes an age distinction unilaterally rather than through 
consent or collective bargaining, then this provides support for the court or tribunal to offer a 
higher degree of scrutiny to ensure the original decision-maker made a proper balance 
between competing interests at stake.  
If the deference factors do not apply at this stage of the proportionality test, then the 
court or tribunal should consider the extent the measure advances the principles of the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination (including equality of opportunity, social equality, 
autonomy and efficiency), and determine whether these advances exceed the harm to the 
claimant's interests.
370
 The court or tribunal should consider the measure unjustified and 
therefore unlawful age discrimination when they consider the harm to the applicant's equality 
and autonomy interests exceed the benefits of the measure advancing social equality, 
autonomy, equality of opportunity or efficiency.    
  
                                                          
370
 The respect principle will not be in play at this stage because disrespectful treatment should already be ruled 
out in stage 2.   
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7.2 Visual representation of the four stages of settling age discrimination 
claims 
 
 
Stage 1: Does the impugned treatment engage the direct or indirect 
discrimination provisions 
Was the claimant treated less favourably than another person because of their age or the 
age they are thought to have, or because they associate with someone of a particular age? 
(Equality Act s 13 – direct discrimination). 
 
or 
 
 Was the claimant disadvantaged by a policy, criterion or practice that applies to everyone 
but particularly disadvantages people who share a particular age? (Equality Act 2010 s 19 – 
indirect discrimination). 
 
            
                    Yes                                                                                No  
                                                                                                  
 
The measure falls under the direct or 
indirect discrimination provisions of 
the EA 2010. Move to stage 2. 
 
  
No claim available under the 
EA 2010. 
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Stage 2: Proportionality 
 
Is the impugned treatment suitable for achieving the legitimate aim (the ‘suitability’ test)? 
– Equality Act 2010 s 13(1) and s 19 (2)(d). 
 
                                                                
 
Does purported aim of the measure 
reflect age stereotyping, prejudice or 
convey the message that particular 
age groups have a diminished moral 
or social worth (the respect 
principle)?  
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim is illegitimate and 
therefore the measure is 
unjustified age discrimination. 
                         No  
         
 
Does the aim promote one of the following 
principles? 
 
Social integration of a disadvantage 
group (the social equality principle).  
Advancing the autonomy of 
members of a disadvantaged age 
group (autonomy principle). 
Distributing resources or 
opportunities equally (equality of 
opportunity principle). 
Efficiency (for direct discrimination 
claim only legitimate if it promotes 
public policy goals).   
  
 
 
        
 
 
 
No. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is no demonstrated 
legitimate aim and therefore 
the measure is unjustified age 
discrimination. 
 
 
 
 Yes    
The measure is suitable to achieving a legitimate aim. Move to stage 3. 
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Stage 3: Proportionality 
 
Is the measure necessary to achieve the legitimate aim (the ‘necessity’ test)? 
 
 
    
              
 
Is the original decision-maker 
in a better position than a court 
or tribunal to assess the 
necessity of the measure to 
achieving the legitimate aim?  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Yes
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider deferring 
to original decision-
maker's judgement.  
 
Move to stage 4. 
 
      No 
             
 
Are there other equally 
effective but less intrusive 
means to further the legitimate 
aim?  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The measure is 
unnecessary for achieving 
the legitimate aim and 
therefore is unjustified age 
discrimination. 
 
            
 
              No 
 
 
 
 
The measure is necessary for achieving the legitimate aim. 
Move to stage 4. 
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Stage 4: Proportionality 
 
Assessing whether the seriousness of the interference with the complainant’s interests are 
proportionate to the benefits gained in pursuit of the legitimate aim (‘proportionality in the 
narrow sense’). 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
Weigh the harm to the 
complainant’ interests. 
. 
  
Weigh the benefits of the 
measure. 
 
                                                                                                                
 
Does the measure perpetuate the 
oppression of age groups by, for 
example, diminishing their 
capacity to participate in social, 
economic and political life (the 
social equality principle)? 
 
Does the measure limit the 
complainant’s ability to make 
decisions and plan their life (the 
autonomy principle)? 
 
Is the measure likely to deny the 
complainant’s interest in equal 
distribution of opportunities over 
a complete life (the equality of 
opportunity principle)?  
 
  
Does the measure integrate 
members of a disadvantage 
group into social and 
productive life (the social 
equality principle)?  
 
Does the measure advance the 
autonomy of members of a 
disadvantaged age group (the 
autonomy principle)? 
 
Is the measure likely to 
distribute opportunities equally 
over people’s complete lives 
(the equality of opportunity 
principle)? 
 
Does the measure promote 
efficiency of a valuable 
undertaking? 
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Did the complainant consent to the 
treatment and/or was the treatment 
negotiated fairly through collective 
bargaining or another democratic 
process? 
 
 
Yes 
        
 
Consider deferring to the 
original decision-maker. 
The measure may be 
justified and therefore 
lawful. 
 
                               
                               No 
                    
                     
 
Has the original decision-maker demonstrated 
they considered the range of interests and weighed 
them against each other in forming the impugned 
measure, and, in addition, was the original 
decision-maker in a better or more appropriate 
position to weigh these interests than a court or 
tribunal? 
 
 
Yes 
       
 
 
Consider deferring to the 
original decision-maker. 
The measure may be 
justified and therefore 
lawful. 
 
 
                                   No                       
                 
                                 
 
 
 
If the harm to the complainant’s 
equality and autonomy interests 
exceeds that of the benefits of the 
measure advancing social equality, 
autonomy, equality of opportunity 
or efficiency, then the measure is 
unjustified age discrimination. 
 
  
If the benefits of the measure in advancing social 
equality, autonomy, equality of opportunity and 
efficiency exceed the harm to the applicant's 
interests, then the measure is justified. 
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7.3 Comparing and Contrasting the Approach of the Pluralist theory of 
Age Discrimination to the Approach Adopted by the UK Case Law  
In Chapter 2, I briefly outlined the facts and reasoning of a number of age discrimination 
cases that are illustrative of a general failure to undertake the proportionality test in a way 
that ensures there is an open and transparent assessment of the competing interests and 
principles at stake. I now explain the findings and reasoning of the cases in more detail and 
then compare this with the approach of the pluralist theory of age discrimination outlined in 
this chapter. I first discuss Seldon, which is the leading case for direct age discrimination, and 
explain how the pluralist theory of age discrimination would offer principles to explain the 
findings of the courts and tribunals and how the theory would differ from the reasoning in the 
case.   
 
7.31 Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes
371
   
Seldon concerned a mandatory retirement age.
372
 The claimant, a partner in a firm of 
solicitors, was compulsorily retired from his partnership at age 65 in accordance with the 
                                                          
371
 There is a complex history to this case. The claimant complained that he had been discriminated against on 
the grounds of age and there followed a hearing before the ET, judgment in which was given on 4 December 
2007 ET1100275/07; an appeal to the EAT [2009] IRLR 267, judgment in which was given on 19 December 
2008; in turn followed by an appeal to the Court of Appeal [2011] ICR 60, where judgment was given on 28 
July 2010; and then onto the Supreme Court [2012] UKSC 16, where judgment was given on 25 April 2012. 
The matter returned, following the Supreme Court hearing, to the ET. It gave its decision for reasons delivered 
on 14 May 2013. It was appealed again to the EAT [2014] UKEAT/0434/13/RN, judgment delivered on 13th 
May 2014. 
372
 In 2011, the government abolished the national default retirement age. However, employers may still adopt a 
retirement age if it is a proportionate means to achieving a legitimate aim and therefore falls under the exception 
of section 13(2).  
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retirement age contained in the partnership deed. The law firm argued that the retirement age 
was lawful because it was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. They argued 
that the retirement age supported the following legitimate aims: (1) ensuring the law firm’s 
associates have opportunities to reach partnership; (2) facilitating planning of the partnership 
by opening vacancies; and (3) limiting the need to undertake performance management 
reviews for older workers, thereby creating a congenial and supportive culture in the firm. 
The Supreme Court offered guidance on how to undertake the proportionality test for 
direct age discrimination claims and remitted the issue of the proportionality of the retirement 
age to the ET. As I explained in Chapter 2, the Court held that only social-policy aims are 
capable of justifying measures that engage the direct age discrimination provisions. Social-
policy aims include a wide variety of aims related to employment policy, the labour market or 
vocational training and can be divided into two categories. The first category of legitimate 
social-policy aims are aims that promote 'inter-generational fairness,' and this includes 
policies such as ‘facilitating access to employment for young people, sharing work fairly 
between the generations and enabling older people to remain in the workforce.’ 
373
 
The second category of legitimate aims relates to protecting 'dignity,' and this includes 
aims of avoiding placing older workers in incapacity or underperformance processes.
374
 
Increased monitoring and performance evaluation, the Court held, may lead to dismissals 
prior to the normal age of retirement, undermining the dignity of older workers.  
                                                          
373
 Seldon (n 337) [56]. 
374
 ibid [57]. 
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Lady Hale argued that social policy can justify age distinctions but cannot justify 
distinctions on other protected grounds, such as race and sex, because 'age is different… not 
‘binary’ in nature (man or woman, black or white, gay or straight) but a continuum which 
changes over time… younger people will eventually benefit from a provision which favours 
older employees, such as an incremental pay scale; but older employees will already have 
benefitted from a provision which favours younger people, such as a mandatory retirement 
age.'
375
 Lady Hale cited with approval R (Carson and Reynolds) v Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions
376
 which held that age distinctions are different from other forms of 
discrimination because classifying people by age is not 'intrinsically demeaning' in the way 
that race or sex classifications are.
377
  
The Supreme Court remitted the proportionality issue to the ET. The ET held that the 
retirement age was proportionate to achieving the legitimate aims of ensuring associates have 
opportunities to reach partnership and facilitating planning of the partnership by opening 
vacancies in the law firm. In finding the retirement age proportionate, the ET took into 
account the fact that the claimant signed the partnership agreement with equal bargaining 
power and at the time of signing did not question the retirement age. Further, the ET also 
took into account that, at the time, the government had introduced default a retirement age 
with the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, which permitted employers to 
                                                          
375
 [2012] UKSC 16, [2012] ICR 716 [4]. 
376
 [2005] UKHL 37, [2005] 4 All ER 545. 
377
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dismiss employees over 65 without a reason.
378
 At the time, the government considered 65 
was an appropriate retirement age for employees.  
The case was appealed again to the EAT. The appellant argued that the respondent 
law firm had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate the particular choice of 65 years 
of age was necessary to achieve the legitimate aims. The EAT held that the ET were correct 
in reaching its conclusion on the evidence before it. It was acceptable, the EAT argued, for 
the ET to have relied on 'assumptions and estimates as to how people will act or react, not in 
general labour force terms such as might be the subject of expert evidence, though in part 
those are appropriate, but in relation in particular to the personalities and practice with which 
a firm is concerned.'
379
 The EAT therefore deferred to the judgment of the witnesses for the 
law firm about 'what happened at that firm' and 'their own views as to the situation'
380
 and 
held the retirement age of 65 years of age was reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate 
aims.   
 
Applying the pluralist theory of age discrimination to Seldon  
The pluralist theory of age discrimination would challenge the Supreme Court's comments 
concerning the nature of age discrimination. The Court argued that age discrimination is a 
less critical ground for discrimination because older people once enjoyed the benefits and 
                                                          
378
 The government, in response to a public consultation, abolished the default retirement age in 2011. 
379
 [2014] UKEAT/0434/13/RN [30]. 
380
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burdens of being young and the young will experience the benefits and burdens of being 
older as long as they live long enough. This line of reasoning suggests securing equality of 
opportunity reduces the harm of age distinctions. 
 The problem with this reasoning, however, is that, as I have argued in Chapter 5, age 
distinctions do not necessarily contribute to equality of opportunity because age distinctions 
are unlikely to affect people in the same way. For example, it is unlikely that every worker in 
the law firm in Seldon will experience the retirement age. Some partners may leave the law 
firm before 65 years of age and may choose to work for an employer that does not have a 
retirement age. The retirement age, therefore, may affect the claimant while not affecting 
other workers in the law firm and may not secure equality of opportunity since many may not 
experience the detriment of the retirement age.  
Furthermore, contrary to the position of Lady Hale that 'age is different,' the pluralist 
theory of age discrimination holds that unequal treatment on the grounds of age is not 
fundamentally 'different' to other forms of discrimination. Unequal treatment on the grounds 
of age can be wrong for the same reasons that unequal treatment on the grounds of race and 
sex can be wrong. Namely, it can perpetuate oppressive relations, stereotype people, express 
animosity and substantially reduce the autonomy of people. As I have argued in Chapter 5, 
unequal treatment on the grounds of age can express that particular age groups have a lesser 
or degraded moral worth in much the same way that race discrimination or sex discrimination 
can convey demeaning messages. We should not, therefore, assume (like the Supreme Court) 
that age discrimination is a less critical ground for discrimination. 
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Moreover, Lady Hale's distinction between the nature of age and the nature of other 
protected characteristics such as sex being that the latter tend to be binary while age is a 
continuum is unsustainable. Gender/sex binary divisions are increasingly challenged. Many 
other protected characteristics are more malleable than once thought, including sexuality, 
with scholars arguing it can change over an individual’s lifetime.
381
 And some academics 
have even argued that it ought to be possible for people to change their race.
382
  
I now move on to outline how the pluralist theory of age discrimination assists in 
determining the proportionality and legality of the mandatory retirement age in Seldon. The 
first stage in this process is to determine whether the retirement age in Seldon engaged the 
direct or indirect age discrimination provisions. This is relatively simple. The treatment of the 
claimant engages the direct discrimination provisions because the retirement age had the 
effect of treating the claimant less favourably because of age by forcing them to retire. This 
treatment violates the principle of social equality by denying the claimant an opportunity to 
participate in society through productive work, thereby undermining the ability of the partner 
to equal participation in society with his younger peers.  
The second stage of applying the theory of age discrimination is to assess whether the 
treatment was appropriate for achieving a legitimate aim. The pluralist theory of age 
discrimination holds that retirement ages should only be permitted if they promote one or 
                                                          
381
 Margaret Rosario et al, ‘Sexual Identity Development Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths: 
Consistency and Change Over Time’ (2006) 43.1 Journal of Sex Research 46. 
382
 Rebecca Tuvel in ‘In Defense of Transracialism’ (2017) 32.2 Hypatia A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 263 
argued that ‘[s]ociety should accept such an individual’s decision to change race the same way it should accept 
an individual’s decision to change sex.’  
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more of the substantive principles identified in this thesis, including the principles of equality 
of opportunity, social equality, respect, autonomy and efficiency. Demeaning aims, however, 
are illegitimate. 
The Supreme Court held that it was legitimate for the law firm to remove older 
workers in order to avoid capability assessments. However, the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination finds this aim illegitimate because it violates the respect principle of the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination. This form of age-differential treatment would 
constitute demeaning age discrimination because it conveys negative and insulting 
assumptions about age. The law firm's aim of using a retirement age for 'avoiding unseemly 
debates about capacity' is a form of demeaning stereotyping because it reflects a message that 
older workers should be removed from employment because they may not be capable of 
doing their jobs effectively. There is no compelling empirical evidence to support the general 
claim that job performance declines with age.
383
 Even if we were to assume older people have 
declining capability at a general level, it still wrongs the claimant and is empirically unsound 
to make assumptions about their capability without assessing their actual capabilities as an 
individual. Furthermore, while capability assessments may cause embarrassment, they are 
less likely to be demeaning than dismissing workers on the assumption that older workers are 
bad workers. Contrary to the findings in Seldon, avoiding capability assessment should not be 
capable of justifying retirement ages.   
                                                          
383
 See Glenn McEvoy and Wayne Cascio, 'Cumulative Evidence of the Relationship Between Employee Age 
and Job Performance' (1989) 74:1 Journal of Applied Psychology 11; Thomas and Daniel Feldman, 'The 
Relationship of Age to Ten Dimensions of Job Performance' (2008) 93:2 Journal Applied Psychology 392. 
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The other group of aims identified by the Supreme Court, namely 'inter-generational 
fairness' aims, are legitimate according to the pluralist theory of age discrimination. In 
Chapter 2, I explained that the Supreme Court failed to assess whether these inter-
generational fairness aims have a sound theoretical basis for justifying unequal treatment on 
the grounds of age. The theory of age discrimination can fill this gap by explaining that inter-
generational fairness can promote the principles of social equality and equality of 
opportunity. Unlike the dignity aims in Seldon, inter-generational fairness does not violate the 
respect principle by stereotyping people. Instead, inter-generational fairness aims to distribute 
opportunities to particular age groups by balancing the legitimate interests of different age 
groups. For example, the law firm in Seldon argued that the retirement age aimed to create 
job and promotion opportunities for younger age groups. This aims to promote equality of 
opportunity by requiring access to income and work to be withheld from those who have held 
employment for a considerable time (older workers) and given to age groups who experience 
relatively high unemployment (young people). While, as I have explained above, the 
retirement in Seldon is unlikely to create complete equality of opportunity for each worker in 
the law firm because some workers might leave before facing the detriment of the retirement 
age, the law firm’s retirement age can work to create a wider equality of opportunity by 
granting opportunity to groups who may not have promotion opportunities if the older 
workers did not retire. 
By distributing jobs and promotion opportunities from older workers to younger 
groups, a retirement age gives young people a chance to gain experience and develop their 
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careers. And in doing so, it can aim for a fair share of work opportunities across 
generations.
384
 This argument assumes that older workers have had a 'fair innings' in their 
careers and young people have not yet had a fair innings. By the time people are elderly and 
reach the retirement age, they have had opportunities from the period of participation in 
work. It is fair to distribute resources to those who have not had the same chance to make 
such a contribution.  
Inter-generational fairness can also promote social equality by distributing 
opportunities to younger people who are disadvantaged because of lack of experience. Youth 
unemployment rates are much higher than unemployment in other age groups. The UK 
unemployment rate for 16-24 year olds was 13.1% for August-October 2016
385
 while the UK 
unemployment rate for people aged 16 and over was just 4.8%.
386
 Social equality holds that it 
is legitimate to take measures to encourage young people into employment to ensure these 
people have a chance to participate productively in society as equals with other age groups. 
The high youth unemployment rate leads to social exclusion undermining the ability of those 
age groups to participate in society as equals with other age groups. Inter-generational 
fairness measures can legitimately aim to correct this by aiming to create employment for 
                                                          
384
 Politicians have often appealed to this fairness argument: 'And I would like to speak to the elders, to those 
who have spent their lifetime working in this region, and well, I would like them to show the way, that life must 
change; when it is time to retire, leave the labour force in order to provide jobs for your sons and daughters. 
That is what I ask you. The Government makes it possible for you to retire at age 55. Then retire, with one’s 
head held high, proud of your worker’s life. This is what we are going to ask you… This is the ‘contrat de 
solidarité’ [an early retirement scheme available to the 55+ who quit their job]. That those who are the oldest, 
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Prime Minister in Lille, France (27 Sept. 1981) quoted in Gaullier, L’avenir à Reculons: Chômage et Retraite 
(Voir la collection 1982) 230. 
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younger people.  
However, for inter-generational fairness to constitute a legitimate aim, it should not 
convey that the interests of the young outweigh the old. As I have explained earlier in this 
chapter, demeaning age discrimination is unjustifiable. The retirement age can escape this 
finding if it is positive action in favour of disadvantaged young people.
387
 Some argue, 
however, that positive action is wrong because it requires transferring opportunities away 
from people who may otherwise be in a position on an individual merit assessment of 
ability.
388
 And some also argue that positive action is an illegitimate goal because it can 
reinforce stereotypes by conveying that 'certain groups are unable to achieve success without 
special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth.'
389
  
However, positive action can be legitimate when it does not have the effect of 
stigmatising older people or marking them as inferior. It can have the intent to undo 
hierarchies of status on the grounds of age.
390
 Positive action can be a means to remove the 
diminished standing of disadvantaged groups by integrating them into mainstream society. As 
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Elizabeth Anderson has argued, a failure to do this means a 'failure [to] fully to realize civil 
society – extensive social spaces in which citizens from all origins exchange ideas and 
cooperate on terms of equality – which is an indispensable social condition of democracy 
itself.'
391
 The positive action inherent in inter-generational fairness aims is an interest in 
social equality and therefore legitimate. 
Now that I have established that inter-generational fairness is a legitimate aim, I must 
evaluate whether the retirement age is rationally connected to this aim. Sandra Fredman has 
argued that retirement ages do not necessarily promote inter-generational fairness because 
retirement ages do not necessarily create more jobs and opportunities for young people at the 
macro level.
392
 This is because there are not a finite number of jobs where opportunities arise 
simply because people are forced from their jobs.  
However, Fredman also rightly notes that while jobs are not finite at a macro level, 
individual workplaces, including law firms, do offer a relatively fixed number of jobs.
393
 For 
individual law firms, a retirement age can facilitate hiring and promotion opportunities. If the 
claimant in Seldon did not retire then the law firm's financial constraints may prevent it from 
creating additional opportunities for younger workers. Therefore, a retirement age can be 
rationally connected to the aim of creating job and promotion opportunities within the law 
firm.  
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The third stage of assessing the legality of the retirement age requires determining 
whether the retirement age is necessary to achieve the legitimate aim. This is a question of 
evidence to demonstrate whether a measure is, in fact, proportionate to the aim pursued and 
whether any other methods are available to achieve the aims that are less harmful to the 
claimant’s interests. For example, we should consider whether a retirement age set at 70 years 
of age (which will have permitted the appellant to work for another 5 years) would be able to 
achieve the legitimate aims as effectively.   
I have explained above that deference at this stage is appropriate when the courts or 
tribunals do not have institutional competence to determine the necessity of the impugned 
treatment. In Seldon, the EAT rightly held that they were not well placed to assess whether 
the retirement age was necessary to create job and promotion opportunities within the firm. 
The EAT rightly noted that the possibility of job and promotion opportunities was dependant 
on knowledge of the personalities within the firm and their likely reactions to the retirement 
age rather than something that can be determined by expert reports. Deference to the law 
firm’s view on necessity, therefore, was appropriate.     
The fourth stage of assessing the legality of the retirement age requires determining 
whether the retirement age promotes the principles of the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination, including social equality and equality of opportunity, to the extent that 
justifies the seriousness of the interference with the claimant’s interest in being free from the 
burden of the retirement age.  
In Chapter 2, I explained that the ET and EAT did not engage in open reasoning on 
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the burdens placed on the claimant in assessing proportionality. The pluralist theory of age 
discrimination recognises that while retirement ages can promote social equality by granting 
work opportunities to younger people, this compromises the ideal of social equality from the 
perspective of older workers since it hinders the claimant’s capacity to participate in society 
through productive work. It treats the claimant as having had a 'fair innings' and that the 
claimant should retreat from productive society to make way for younger workers. 
Consequently, the retirement age weakens the ability of the claimant to belong to the social 
group of working people and to pursue his work and social life through his job. A fair balance 
must be struck between the interests of young people and older workers.  
The ET and EAT, however, were correct in finding the retirement age proportionate. 
The ET rightly held that there was a distinction between a retirement age unilaterally imposed 
on an employee and a partner who elects to enter into the partnership and agrees to be bound 
by a retirement age. The claimant in Seldon had an equal bargaining power and at the time of 
signing did not question the retirement age contained in the partnership agreement. This 
mitigates some of the deleterious effects of the retirement age by respecting the autonomy of 
the claimant, an important principle of the pluralist theory of age discrimination. In upholding 
the principle of autonomy, it was reasonable for the ET and EAT to find that the retirement 
age reflected the agreed mutual interests of the partners and younger workers. Furthermore, 
the claimant’s consent to the retirement age also mitigated the harm to social equality since 
the claimant was able to negotiate his employment terms as an equal in his role as a partner. 
The retirement age, therefore, was not oppressive.  
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In applying the pluralist theory of age discrimination, the courts and tribunals could 
quite appropriately come to the decision that the retirement age was proportionate and lawful. 
 
7.32 Lockwood v Department of Work and Pensions & Anor 
To reiterate the facts outlined in Chapter 2, the claimant began working at the Department for 
Work and Pensions ('DWP') at 18 years of age. She continued working at the DWP for eight 
years until she was 26 years old. The claimant then applied for redundancy and was accepted. 
The redundancy scheme entitled her to £10,849.04. However, the same scheme would have 
entitled her to significantly more money if she were over 30 years of age and had worked the 
same number of years at the DWP. The claimant argued this was direct age discrimination 
because it treated her less favourably because she was a young employee.  
The ET held that there were differences between the different age groups that meant 
that those below the age of 30 were not treated less favourably than those above the age of 
30.
394
 The ET held that even if they were wrong about this, the treatment was a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim. The ET relied on the assumption that older people need 
more redundancy pay because they are more likely to have families than young people and 
this meant that they have greater financial obligations and have a harder time traveling to find 
work. It was a legitimate aim, the ET and the EAT upheld, to financially cushion older 
workers who are in a more vulnerable position than younger workers.
395
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The ET also held that the measure was proportionate because the redundancy scheme 
was reasonably necessary to the aim of offering a financial cushion, and this legitimate aim 
outweighed the discriminatory effects of the scheme. The means were reasonably necessary 
because administrative workability required the use of clear bands so that everybody knew 
the pay they were entitled to. Levelling up younger workers’ pay would achieve equality but 
would be expensive. And levelling down older workers’ pay to match younger workers 
would not adequately provide a financial cushion for older workers.     
The EAT upheld the ET’s decision and the claimant appealed to the Court of 
Appeal.
396
 The Court of Appeal held that the redundancy scheme engaged the direct age 
discrimination provisions. The claimant’s comparator was an employee over 35 who had 
worked for the DWP for the same amount of time as the claimant. The comparator would 
receive at least twice what the claimant received and it followed that she was treated less 
favourably and was so treated because of her age. However, the Court of Appeal found that 
the DWP had adopted a proportionate means to achieve the legitimate aim of producing a 
financial cushion for older workers. The Court applied Seldon by finding that the aim of 
offering a financial cushion for older workers was a legitimate social-policy aim. This 
justified the redundancy scheme. 
 
Applying the pluralist theory of age discrimination to Lockwood 
The first stage is to determine whether the redundancy scheme engaged the direct age 
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discrimination provisions. The Court of Appeal was correct in finding that the policy engaged 
the direct age discrimination provisions. The claimant received less money than older 
workers received, and the reason for this was that she was younger. The DWP may have paid 
the claimant less because she would be in a position to find work more easily, but the reason 
the claimant was in this position was because of her age. Therefore, the reason for being 
treated less favourably was her age and so the treatment engaged the direct age discrimination 
provisions.  
The second stage of applying the pluralist theory of age discrimination is to determine 
whether the redundancy scheme promoted a legitimate aim. The suggested aim – paying 
higher redundancy to older workers because they were more vulnerable in the job market – 
reflects age stereotyping and is illegitimate according to the respect principle. The financial 
cushion for older workers is a form of age stereotyping because it reflects a generalisation 
that young people will react differently to unemployment when compared to older people. 
The ET reasoned that '[i]ndividuals in the younger categories and in their twenties can 
generally be expected to react more easily and more rapidly to the loss of their jobs and 
greater flexibility can, in general, be expected of them given their lesser family and financial 
obligations.'
397
 The ET referred to 'the average at date of marriage was 34 for women, and 38 
years for men' as an explanation for why greater financial assistance was needed for people in 
their 30s compared to people in their 20s.   
These generalisations, however, ignore people's individual circumstances. While 
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people under 30 years of age are less likely to be married with children, many people of this 
age have family and financial obligations comparable to or exceeding that of older work 
colleagues. Although younger, they may have dependent parents, disabled siblings, cousins 
etc as well as children, any of whom they may be supporting financially. They may face the 
difficulty of upending their family life by moving locations to find employment. By assuming 
that young people do not face the difficulties that people over 30 years of age face, the DWP 
were treating young people less favourably based on stereotypical assumptions about their 
private lives.  
The ET argued that it was acceptable to use generalisations because it was not 
practicable to assess severance payments on an individual basis. This argument was upheld 
by the EAT and Court of Appeal. This argument is that it is more efficient to make use of age 
generalisations than to investigate individual circumstances of each employee who has 
applied for redundancy. However, the pluralist theory of age discrimination holds that 
efficiency cannot justify age stereotyping. As I argued in Chapter 6, there are levels of 
sacrifice that should not be required of an individual, and this includes suffering treatment 
founded on ageist beliefs. The policy of the DWP conveys the message that young people 
deserve less financial assistance in time of unemployment and therefore do not deserve equal 
concern and respect to that of older workers. With the DWP offering no other aims for the 
scheme, the DWP’s redundancy scheme should constitute unjustified and therefore unlawful 
age discrimination. 
However, it is possible that the redundancy scheme could have been justified by an 
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argument that it supports inter-generational fairness aims by creating employment 
opportunities for young people (which I have established as legitimate in this chapter). For 
example, the DWP could have argued that higher redundancy payments for older workers can 
encourage older workers to leave who might otherwise not have done so, which will create 
available space for more junior employees. This aim is legitimate for the reasons outlined in 
the discussion of Seldon above – young people are often disadvantaged in the employment 
market because of lack of experience, and it is legitimate to give young people a chance to 
gain experience and develop their careers.   
A relevant consideration in determining whether the scheme was necessary to achieve 
the aim of inter-generational fairness is to consider that the aim could not be achieved as 
effectively if redundancy pay was equal for younger and older workers. Paying older workers 
more than younger workers is necessary to incentivise a greater proportion of older workers 
to vacate their places to leave room for younger workers. The alternative method of equal pay 
will not achieve this aim so effectively. The aim would therefore pass the necessity stage.  
Moving to the final stage, we need to assess whether the benefits of the redundancy 
scheme justifies the seriousness of the interference with the claimant’s interest. Lockwood is 
an example of a case where it would be appropriate for a court or tribunal to defer to the 
judgment of the people who negotiated the scheme. The scheme was an agreement between 
the trade union and the employer, and, in these circumstances, there is a democratic rationale 
for respecting the outcome of the process of negotiation in balancing competing legitimate 
interests. The ET acknowledged the significance of the collective bargaining as a reason to 
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find the redundancy scheme proportionate. However, even if union agreement to the scheme 
can bolster the argument of proportionality, the courts and tribunals must be alive to the risk 
of ageist stereotyping in motivating the scheme. The DWP based their aims for the scheme on 
age stereotyping and this should render the scheme unlawful. Because the DWP did not 
introduce the inter-generational aim of creating opportunities for young people, we are unable 
to assess the evidence of whether the scheme is likely to have the benefit of creating enough 
jobs for young people to justify its discriminatory effects on the claimant. Therefore, we 
cannot determine whether the scheme was proportionate to achieving this aim on this basis.  
 
7.33 White v Ministry of Justice
398
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed this case as an example of the ET using age stereotypes to justify a 
retirement age without explaining why age stereotyping is acceptable in this context. The 
Ministry of Justice operates a compulsory retirement age for judges in which judges must 
retire when they reach 70 years of age. The claimant, a circuit judge who was retired, 
complained that the policy was directly discriminatory.  
The ET applied Seldon in holding that the retirement age promoted the legitimate 
aims of inter-generational fairness by creating opportunities for younger people, preserving 
judges’ dignity by avoiding capability assessments and maintaining public confidence by 
ensuring that the public do not form the belief that judges are undergoing age-based 
intellectual decline. The ET held that 'there can be no doubt that the aims which the [Ministry 
                                                          
398
 [2014] ET/2201298/2013. 
 
245 
 
of Justice] is pursuing in having a retirement age of 70 are legitimate aims of social policy.'
399
  
The ET acknowledged that the retirement age of 70 must be proportionate when 
balancing the importance of the legitimate aims pursued by the Ministry of Justice and the 
extent of the discriminatory effect it could have upon the claimant and other judges. The ET 
held that the claimant failed to show any significant harm of a retirement age of 70 as 
opposed to his suggested age of 75. The majority of judges retire before the retirement age of 
70 years of age. The claimant's suggestion that judges should be dismissed after individual 
assessments, the ET held, would be damaging to the rule of law. The ET referred to an 
argument by the Lord Chancellor who noted that a retirement age avoids the impression that 
judges are being removed because of the nature of their decisions. The ET also cited a 
statement by the Minister of Justice who argued that a retirement age avoids any perception 
of unwarranted interference by the executive. The ET ruled that the retirement age of 70 was 
a proportionate means of achieving the aims.  
  
Applying the pluralist theory of age discrimination to White  
The first stage of applying the theory is straightforward. The claimant was retired when he 
did not wish to be and therefore was treated less favourably than other age groups. The 
retirement age engages the direct age discrimination provisions.   
Moving on to the second stage, we must identify whether the retirement age promotes 
a legitimate aim by advancing one or more of the principles of the pluralist theory of age 
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discrimination. As I have argued in the discussion of Seldon, it is a legitimate aim to use a 
retirement age to open vacancies that can be filled by younger workers. The nature of the 
tenure of judicial office ensures that the workforce is relatively inflexible. There are not the 
methods to remove judges that are available in the private sector workforces. A retirement 
age offers a degree of flexibility to open vacancies to talented younger people who may 
otherwise not have the opportunity.  The pluralist theory of age discrimination would accept 
this inter-generational fairness aim as legitimate because the retirement age promotes equality 
of opportunity and social equality by providing opportunities for younger people. 
There is uncertainty about whether a retirement age can promote job opportunities. 
The creation of job opportunities depends on the demand for judges at a future date. Courts 
and tribunals cannot reliably predict whether the retirement age will create more job 
opportunities. As I have argued in this chapter, it is appropriate for courts and tribunals to 
accept the connection between the legitimate aim and the impugned measure where there is 
considerable uncertainty over the connection. 
The pluralist theory of age discrimination would hold that preserving judges’ dignity 
through a retirement age is an illegitimate aim because it reflects the stereotype that older 
judges must be expelled by a retirement age because they are likely to be undergoing age-
based intellectual decline. The ET held that it was important to ensure that the public do not 
believe judges are undergoing this. While the public may believe that older judges have 
undergone intellectual decline, age stereotyping should not justify removing judges from their 
jobs. Age discrimination law should rule out prejudice and stereotypes.   
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Regarding the third stage of applying the pluralist theory of age discrimination, the 
ET could quite appropriately come to the decision that the retirement age of 70 was 
reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of creating opportunities for younger 
people. A retirement age set at 70 is more likely to achieve the goal of inter-generational 
fairness than a retirement age set at an older age or a policy of not having a retirement age. 
This is because it will prompt a higher turnover of judges leading to a greater possibility of 
opening job opportunities for younger people. 
In the final stage of the proportionality test, we must evaluate whether the possible 
benefits of the retirement age for judges are enough to justify its negative impact on 
individuals.
400
 The retirement age harms the autonomy principle by forcing judges out of 
socially productive work and therefore preventing judges from having control over their work 
lives. Further, the retirement age can harm social equality by denying older judges the 
opportunity to participate as equals with younger age groups. Despite these negatives, the 
claimant conceded that the retirement age has only a modest negative impact on autonomy 
because about two-thirds of judges choose to retire before their 69th birthday and roughly 
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only one in ten judges choose to retire on their 70th birthday.
401
 Very few judges, then, are 
forced out of work.  
There are also good reasons to defer to the defendant’s judgment on the balance 
between promoting job opportunities and harming the interests of older judges. The 
Government settled on a retirement age of 70 after consultations between the Lord 
Chancellor and senior members of the judiciary.
402
 Given the limited adverse impact the 
retirement age has on judges, it would have been inappropriate for the ET to substitute its 
view for that of the democratically elected government acting in response to a consultation 
with the senior members of the judiciary. 
 
7.34 Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire
403
 
In Chapter 2, I explained that Homer is the leading case on the application of the indirect age 
discrimination provisions. The Supreme Court held that, unlike for measures engaging the 
direct discrimination provisions, private aims, including a real need on the part of the 
employer's business, can justify treatment that engages the indirect age discrimination 
provisions.  
Examples of aims that can justify indirect age discrimination include rewarding 
loyalty and business efficiency. The Supreme Court did not offer an explanation for why 
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these sorts of aims can justify measures engaging the indirect age discrimination provisions 
when they cannot be used to justify measures that engage the direct age discrimination 
provisions. A theory of age discrimination may go some way to transparently revealing why 
direct and indirect age discrimination should be treated differently in this way.        
 
Applying the pluralist theory of age discrimination to Homer 
To determine whether the Supreme Court in Homer were correct to hold that private aims 
should be capable of justifying measures that engage the indirect discrimination provisions 
but not the direct discrimination provisions, we must evaluate whether the differences 
between direct and indirect discrimination warrant this different legal treatment. As I have 
established in Chapter 2, direct discrimination involves a decision-maker treating someone 
less favourably because of a protected characteristic. Indirect discrimination, in contrast, 
concerns a policy, criterion or practice that has the effect of disadvantaging groups of people 
with a protected characteristic and this treatment is disproportionate. The crucial difference 
between the two concepts is that indirect discrimination is focussed on the harmful effects of 
treatment whereas direct discrimination relates to a decision-maker targeting a person 
because of a protected characteristic. 
There is moral similarity between direct and indirect discrimination. As I have 
established in Chapter 4, indirect discrimination, like direct discrimination, can violate 
people's autonomy by foreclosing valuable options, violate social equality by reinforcing the 
subordination of vulnerable groups and violate equality of opportunity by disadvantaging 
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people. I have also argued that both direct and indirect discrimination can send a disrespectful 
message to the discriminatee that their interests are unimportant and do not warrant 
accommodation. 
 However, there is a moral difference in the contrasting features of direct and indirect 
discrimination. Targeting a person's protected characteristic for less favourable treatment can 
demean people by sending the message that people who possess the protected characteristic 
have a diminished moral or social worth. Direct discrimination, in this way, is often 
associated with racism, sexism, ageism and other egregious attitudes. Indirect discrimination, 
in contrast, does not target particular social groups for poor treatment; the disadvantaged 
caused by indirect discrimination is inadvertent. The deliberate targeting feature of direct 
discrimination means that it has the potential to offer greater expressive harms to the 
discriminatee.  
Age is a key part of a person's identity that has social meaning connected to age 
norms.
404
 As I have outlined in Chapter 5, age can be a criterion used to express animus and 
to stereotype people. Therefore, targeting age as a criterion for less favourable treatment has a 
much greater likelihood of being experienced as stigmatising and as an attack on personal 
identity than a decision that is age-neutral and is indirect discrimination. As Hellman has 
argued, it is often demeaning to use certain traits for classifying people when there has been a 
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history of using the trait to convey that people have a diminished moral or social worth.
405
  
Private interests should not be capable of justifying less favourable treatment on the 
grounds of age because private interests are consistent with selfish motives and therefore 
unlikely to prevent the stigmatising effects of treatment that engages the direct discrimination 
provisions. Age discrimination law, therefore, should have no interest in legitimising private 
subjective gains from treatment that is stigmatising.  
However, as explained in Chapter 5, age can be a useful category to promote a 
number of important social goals. We accept using age as a category in education, healthcare 
and many other areas as a means to maximise the benefit of particular social goods. We 
accept these age-based structures as useful and non-demeaning when they serve clear public-
policy goals rather than merely private interests, such as maximising profit. Public-policy 
aims should therefore be capable of justifying age distinctions if the decision-maker can 
demonstrate that it is proportionate to achieving important public-policy aims.  
The Court in Homer was correct to hold that a decision-maker can pursue private 
interests, including business efficiency, to justify indirect discrimination given that these 
measures are unlikely to be experienced as demeaning. Indirect discrimination claims make 
distributive claims to resources to ensure that there is a level-playing field. It ought to be 
legitimate for an employer to pursue private interests provided these promote one or more of 
the principles in the pluralist theory of age discrimination.   
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7.35 Woodcock v Cumbria Primary Care Trust
406
  
The North Cumbria Primary Care Trusts (PCT) made the claimant redundant and the 
claimant was unsuccessful in finding another position at the PCT. The PCT dismissed the 
claimant before the claimant reached 49 in order to avoid having to pay an enhanced early 
retirement pension. The claimant argued this was direct discrimination and it could not be 
justified by cost savings. 
The Court of Appeal held that costs alone cannot justify measures that engage the 
direct age discrimination provisions. Cost savings combined with a legitimate aim, however, 
can be considered in determining proportionality. The dismissal was legitimate because it 
was not only aimed at cost saving but also the aim of giving effect to a dismissal further to 
redundancy.  
 
Applying the pluralist theory of age discrimination to Woodcock 
We would consider it wrong to use cost savings alone as a reason to treat women, racial 
groups etc less favourably. For example, it is wrong and unlawful for an employer to refuse 
to hire a woman on the grounds that they may cost more to hire due to possibility of the 
applicant requiring career breaks to have children. This policy would place women at a 
severe disadvantage in the workplace and it would also stereotype women as requiring career 
breaks. Similarly, using cost-savings alone as a reason to disadvantage older people is wrong 
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because of its equality and autonomy harms.  
The Court in Woodcock was correct to find that costs alone should not be capable of 
justifying age-differential treatment. Treating people less favourably on the grounds of age 
solely in order to save costs can undermine a number of the principles of the pluralist theory 
of age discrimination. It can undermine social equality by casting older people out of work 
and therefore undermining their capacity to participate in society as equals with other age 
groups. It can also lead to autonomy costs by denying older people control over their working 
lives. And it can violate the respect principle by treating people as if they are disposable 
resources that can be thrown away after a certain time.  
Dismissing workers on costs alone can also violate the respect principle by 
stereotyping particular age groups. For example, an employer may attempt to justify 
dismissing older workers because they cost more, but not all older workers are more 
expensive. As Michael Harper argues, '[a]n employer’s rejection of a group of workers 
defined by age because the average member of the group will provide lower returns than the 
average worker outside the group means that all of the older workers in the age-defined group 
will be disadvantaged.'
407
 This unfairly generalises about age groups thereby ignoring 
people’s individual characteristics. 
Accepting costs alone as justifying age-differential treatment would undermine the 
effectiveness of age discrimination law in protecting people from harms to social equality, 
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autonomy and disrespectful and humiliating treatment.  
Another reason why costs alone should not constitute a legitimate aim is that costs 
savings does not itself vindicate any valuable principles. Cost savings can aim to maximise 
wealth, but as I have argued in Chapter 6, maximising wealth is not an intrinsically valuable 
goal because it is merely an instrument of creating value. Wealth maximisation is valuable 
only to the extent that it is ‘useful so far as it enables someone to lead a more valuable, 
successful, happier, or more moral life.’
408
 To justify age-differential treatment, a decision-
maker must demonstrate that they are promoting an important value in addition to cost 
savings. For example, a business in financial difficulties might legitimately argue that costs 
savings from refusing to hire older (more expensive) applicants ensures that the business is 
financially secure and efficient, which in turn has the valuable goal of protecting employment 
by ensuring the business does not face insolvency. The employer must also demonstrate that 
this age-differential treatment was necessary to achieve the aim, and that the benefits of the 
policy outweigh the harms to older employees.  
 
Conclusion 
Unequal treatment on the grounds of age can result in significant harms such as expressions 
of disrespect, stereotyping, prejudice, the creation of oppressive social relations, and 
significant violations of liberty and practical and utilitarian harms such as a poor use of talent 
and ability. In assessing whether the age-differential treatment is justified or not, we should 
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consider whether and to what extent the treatment causes these harms.     
In this chapter, I have reviewed a number of age discrimination cases and have sought 
to illustrate how the principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination can approach the 
issues in the cases. I have explained that much of the courts' reasoning, particularly with 
regard to identifying legitimate aims, fails to properly identify the harms done by age-
differential treatment. Applying my framework of principles better scrutinises these aims and 
offers a more comprehensive, coherent and open assessment of the key conflicting interests 
and principles at stake in the cases.    
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8 
Healthcare Rationing and the Pluralist Theory of Age 
Discrimination 
 
This thesis has now outlined and defended a pluralist theory of age discrimination. In the 
previous chapter, I demonstrated how this theory improves the transparency of legal 
reasoning in age discrimination cases. In this chapter, I test the theory against the method of 
healthcare rationing in the UK – the Quality-Adjusted Life-Year (‘QALY’). I consider a 
hypothetical judicial review claim against the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (‘NICE’) and their use of the QALY method to issue guidance on the cost 
effectiveness of treatments. I apply the pluralist theory of age discrimination to examine 
whether NICE's guidance can constitute unlawful age discrimination.
409
 The QALY method 
of health rationing aims to maximise health benefits for the UK population as a whole, but 
many argue NICE’s use of the QALY method is indirectly discriminatory against older 
people because older people are more likely to have a low QALY score and therefore are less 
likely to be granted access to treatment.
410
   
I argue that NICE’s use of the QALY method can engage the indirect age 
                                                          
409
 My analysis will focus on the lawfulness of NICE’s use of the QALY method, but other issues of age 
discrimination can arise in healthcare allocation. For example, claimants can bring judicial review claims 
against the Department of Health and health authorities if the decisions of these bodies disadvantage particular 
age groups. I will focus on NICE as a means to undertake a philosophical analysis. I am not attempting to 
provide a complete overview of age discrimination in UK healthcare. 
410
 The most prominent critic of QALY is John Harris. See John Harris, ‘It’s not NICE to Discriminate’ (2005) 
31.7 Journal of Medical Ethics 373. 
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discrimination provisions, but NICE will be able to justify using QALY on the grounds that 
the method is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
411
 In support of this 
argument, I use the principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination at different stages 
of the proportionality test and introduce considerations about the institutional limitations of 
courts to evaluate health allocation decisions. NICE have taken measures to ensure that the 
method does not disproportionately harm the interests of older people, including calculating 
QALY in a way that avoids denying treatments to particular age groups and considering age 
as a factor in equality impact assessments for every item of guidance. NICE have adopted 
democratic procedures to inform their decision-making and are accountable to Parliament and 
the Department of Health. It follows that it is appropriate to hold that NICE's use of QALY is 
proportionate and therefore lawful.  
The application of the pluralist theory of age discrimination against the QALY 
method in this chapter demonstrates the theory’s capacity to produce just outcomes and 
reasoning in real-life dilemmas and therefore demonstrates the value and plausibility of the 
theory as a guide to age discrimination law. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 8.1 explains NICE’s legal duty not 
to do anything that amounts to discrimination on the grounds of age; section 8.2 explains that 
the QALY method used by NICE can engage the discrimination provisions of the Equality 
Act 2010; and section 8.3 argues the QALY method can be justified as a proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim.   
                                                          
411
 NICE’s use of the method is lawful under Equality Act 2010 s 19(2)(d). 
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8.1 NICE’s Anti-discrimination Duties under the Equality Act 2010  
NICE’s role is ‘to improve outcomes for people using the NHS and other public health and 
social care services’ by ‘producing evidence-based guidance and advice for health, public 
health and social care practitioners…, [d]eveloping quality standards and performance 
metrics for those providing and commissioning health, public health and social care services’ 
and ‘[p]roviding a range of information services for commissioners, practitioners and 
managers across the spectrum of health and social care.’
412
 NICE provides ‘‘technology 
appraisals guidance’ that ‘assess the clinical and cost effectiveness of health technologies, 
such as new pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical products, but also include procedures, 
devices and diagnostic agents.’ And ‘[t]his is to ensure that all NHS patients have equitable 
access to the most clinically – and cost-effective treatments that are viable.’
413
 The NHS uses 
NICE’s guidance to determine the cost effectiveness of treatments.  
In issuing its guidance, NICE is performing a public function and is therefore under a 
duty under section 29(6) of the Equality Act 2010 to ensure its guidance does not constitute 
discrimination.
414
 It follows that NICE’s guidance must be compliant with the section 13 duty 
not to directly discriminate on the grounds of age and the section 19 duty not to indirectly 
                                                          
412
 NICE, ‘What we do’ <https://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do> accessed 15 May 2017. 
413
 ibid. 
414
 Equality Act s 29(6) provides that ‘[a] person must not, in the exercise of a public function that is not the 
provision of a service to the public or a section of the public, do anything that constitutes discrimination, 
harassment or victimisation.’ As a statutory non-departmental public body accountable to the Department of 
Health, NICE is performing a public function when it issues guidance to NHS practitioners rather than the 
public.  
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discriminate on the grounds of age. Under these provisions, NICE may recommend age-
stratified treatment or adopt methodology that disadvantages particular age groups, but only 
if this is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. As a public authority, NICE are 
also subject to the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 to 
have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful age discrimination and advance equality for 
people of different ages. 
It is possible to bring a legal claim against a decision by NICE to recommend that a 
particular treatment should not have funding on the NHS. To bring a claim, a complainant 
must apply to the High Court for a judicial review claim that this rationing decision is 
unlawful. For a judicial review claim to proceed, the High Court must grant permission and 
the applicant must have standing.
415
 Standing is granted when the applicant has a ‘sufficient 
interest’ in the matter, and this includes anyone directly affected by the decisions of NICE, 
including those denied treatment as a result of NICE’s recommendations and drug 
manufacturers that are denied the opportunity to provide a service to offer treatments for use 
on the NHS.
416
 For example, an elderly person who has been denied treatment may apply to 
the High Court to bring judicial review on the grounds that NICE’s use of the QALY method 
has disadvantaged older people and therefore violated the duty not to discriminate under 
section 29(6) of the Equality Act 2010. Groups not directly affected by NICE’s decision are 
likely to have standing provided they can demonstrate that they are a prominent campaign 
                                                          
415
 Supreme Court Act 1981 s 31(3). 
416
 ibid. 
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group with expertise in the subject area.
417
 
Once a court grants standing and permission, the High Court can evaluate whether 
NICE’s guidance is discriminatory. If the court find that an age group was in fact 
disadvantaged as a result of the use of the QALY method, then NICE’s guidance would only 
be lawful if NICE can demonstrate that the QALY assessment was a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim.  
It is also possible to judicially review decisions by NHS institutions, including health 
authorities and primary care trusts, if these bodies have been responsible for a decision to 
deny treatments that has the effect of disadvantaging particular age groups.
418
 The NHS is 
providing a service directly to the public and is therefore under a duty from section 29(1) of 
the Equality Act 2010 to perform this service in a way that does not constitute discrimination. 
It is also possible to bring a judicial review application to make a claim against decisions 
made by the Secretary of State for Health to deny funding for treatments.
419
  
                                                          
417
 See R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex parte World Development Movement 
[1994], EWHC Admin, [1995] 1 WLR 386. The High Court accepted that campaign groups can have standing 
to challenge decisions that do not directly affect the group. The Court held that one should consider the 
following to determine when a campaign litigant should have standing: (1) the importance for vindicating the 
rule of law; (2) the importance of the issue; (3) the likely absence of any other responsible challenger; (4) the 
nature of the breach of duty; and (5) the prominent role of these applicants in the field.  
418
 An example of a successful judicial review claim against an NHS health authority is R v North West 
Lancashire Health Authority Ex Parte A, D and G [2000] EWCA Civ 2022, [2000] 1 WLR 977. The Court of 
Appeal held that it was unlawful for the health authority to refuse to offer gender reassignment surgery. The 
health authority adopted a 'blanket policy' to determine the availability of gender reassignment surgery. The 
Court of Appeal held that the proper approach should have been to consider each case on its own merit. An 
example of a successful judicial review against a primary care trust is R (Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care 
Trust and another [2006] EWCA Civ 392, [2006] 1 WLR 2649 where the Court of Appeal held that it was 
unlawful for the primary care trust to deny the applicant the cancer drug Herceptin. 
419
 An example of a successful judicial review claim against the Department of Health is R v Secretary of State 
for Health, ex parte Pfizer Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1566, [2003] 1 CMLR 19. Pfizer successfully argued that the 
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It is worth noting, however, that it is difficult to succeed in a discrimination claim 
against NICE.
420
 As I explain in section 8.33, NICE has greater institutional competence and 
democratic legitimacy than the courts to determine the justifiability of its healthcare 
recommendations. In undertaking the proportionality assessment of NICE’s guidance, it is 
therefore likely that a court would defer to NICE's judgment on the justifiability of its 
guidance. Only in examples where NICE have disregarded the interests of particular age 
groups would it be appropriate to find NICE’s guidance disproportionate and therefore 
unlawful.  
 
8.2 NICE’s use of the QALY Method can Engage the Indirect Age 
Discrimination Provisions 
QALY is a measure used to calculate the cost-effectiveness of a particular treatment or 
medical intervention. The QALY works by a calculating the following: the cost of a 
treatments; the quality of life as a result of the treatment; and the total years gained as a result 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
government acted unlawfully when it issued guidance to doctors advising them to refrain from prescribing the 
drug Viagra. 
420
 To date there has been one successful discrimination claim made against NICE in the case of R (Eisai Ltd) 
(Alzheimer's Society & Shire Ltd, Interested Parties) v the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
[2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin), (2007) 10 CCL Rep 638. The applicant, the manufacturer of the drug Donepezil 
(brand name ‘Aricept’), and the interested third party, the Alzheimer's Society, claimed that it was 
discriminatory for NICE to recommend that Donepezil should not be funded for those in the early stage of 
Alzheimer's disease.  
The Court held that NICE is a public body and is therefore bound by duties under section 19B of the 
Race Relations Act 1972 and section 21B/D of the Disability Discrimination Act. The Alzheimer's Society and 
EISAI successfully argued that the guidance would result in discrimination against ‘atypical groups,’ such as 
those from a non-English speaking background and those with learning disabilities. NICE failed to give due 
regard to the need to eliminate race and disability discrimination, and the Court held that it was unlawful to 
overlook that responsibility under the discrimination legislation.  
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of that treatment.
421
 NICE give a QALY value to each treatment relating to the number of 
quality life years a patient is likely to gain as a result of the treatment minus the number of 
QALY the person would have if untreated. We then must calculate the cost of each QALY 
gained. NICE considers that interventions costing the NHS less than £20,000 per QALY 
gained are cost effective whereas treatment above £30,000 per QALY will not be 
recommended for funding unless there is a very strong case for supporting the treatment as an 
effective use of NHS resources.
422
 Williams has written that ‘[t]he general idea is that a 
beneficial healthcare activity is one that generates a positive amount of QALY, and that an 
efficient healthcare activity is one where the cost of QALY is low, and a low priority activity 
is one where cost per QALY is high.’
423
  
QALY can be used at the macro or micro level. At the macro level, QALY calculates 
the cost effectiveness of a treatment for a health service as a whole. At the micro level, 
QALY calculates whether a treatment is cost effective for a particular patient. 
When NICE use QALY to determine the sorts of treatment that should be funded on 
the NHS and what the access criteria for interventions should be, the method has the potential 
to disadvantage older patients and therefore to engage the indirect discrimination provisions 
of the Equality Act 2010.
424
 QALY can disadvantage older people because the calculation of 
                                                          
421
 NICE, ‘Judging Whether Public Health Interventions Offer Value for Money’ (September 2013) 
<https://www.nice.org.uk/advice/lgb10/chapter/introduction> accessed 15 May 2017. 
422
 ibid. 
423
 Alan Williams, ‘The Value of QALYs’ (2012) in Stephen Holland (ed), Arguing About Bioethics (Routledge 
2012) 423. 
424
 For an account of the discriminatory effects of QALY, see Harris (n 410). 
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QALY uses remaining life expectancy to determine the number of years gained by the use of 
that treatment. Since young people are more likely to have higher QALY because there are 
likely to be greater gains for a younger person in receipt of a life-saving treatment than for an 
older person, young people will be more likely to receive access to treatment under the 
QALY method. For example, while a 20 year old can expect to live for another 55 years, a 70 
year old could only expect to live another 5 years. Saving the life of a 20 year old creates 
more QALY than saving the life of a 70 year old. Therefore, QALY is more likely to 
recommend saving the life of the 20 year old.
425
 
Younger people, however, will not always have higher QALY than an older patient. A 
specific younger person can have lower life expectancy than a specific older person and the 
older person may sometime gain more quality of life than a younger person as a result of a 
medical treatment. In these circumstances, the younger person will have a lower QALY 
score. But where two people with normal life expectancy, and there is an equivalent 
improvement in quality of life for these people, then the younger person will end up 
producing a higher QALY score.  
For these reasons, the use of the QALY method in determining healthcare distribution 
can engage the indirect age discrimination provisions when the NHS denies older people 
treatment that is available for younger people. This will be unlawful unless the distribution is 
                                                          
425
 This argument was supported by the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, who presented to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights the argument that NICE's use of the QALY method has a discriminatory impact 
on older people because it can result in the denial of beneficial treatment to older people. Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, The Human Rights of Older People in Healthcare (HL 156‐I 2006/07; HC 278‐I 2006/07). 
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a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
426
  
However, NICE's use of QALYs usually avoids age discrimination in practice. This is 
because NICE calculates QALY by averaging results across the QALY scores from patients 
of different ages.
427
 NICE therefore assumes treatments will have an equal benefit for 
different age groups by ‘assum[ing] that what applies to one age group within a particular 
appraisal will apply inter alia to others.’
428
 This prevents the majority of calculations and 
recommendations of NICE from engaging the age discrimination provisions.
429
 Some 
treatments, however, are restricted to particular age groups, including access to in vitro 
fertilisation,
430
 flu vaccinations
431
 and cervical screening,
432
 and therefore engage the age 
                                                          
426
 Measures that engage the indirect discrimination provisions but do not fit into an exception to the age 
discrimination provisions are only lawful if they are a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. See 
Equality Act 2010 s 19 (2)(d). 
427
 See Ian Dey and Neil Fraser, ‘Age-based Rationing in the Allocation of Health Care’ (2000) 12.4 Journal of 
Aging and Health 511: ‘The influence of age on QALY league table estimates is normally quite small because 
the estimates derive from averaging results from patients of different ages. Where a treatment is predominantly 
for older patients, the estimate would be affected by the lower life expectancy of the elderly…’ 
428
 Andrew Stevens et al, ‘National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence Appraisal and Ageism’ (2012) 
38.5 Journal of Medical Ethics 258. 
429
 While this macro approach to scoring QALY tends to offer greater support for the social equality principle of 
the pluralist theory of age discrimination by ensuring that different age groups tend to have equal access to 
healthcare, this comes at a cost to the efficiency principle because it establishes equal access to treatment for 
different age groups even though older age groups may only have a small health gain due to having a shorter life 
expectancy. Attaching QALY scores to particular age groups is more efficient because it will lead to high 
QALY scores (and therefore priority for treatments) to groups that are most likely to benefit from treatment. 
430
 Guidance from NICE recommends that up to three IVF cycles should be available on the NHS if the woman 
is aged between 23 and 39 at the time of treatment, and has been diagnosed with a fertility problem or the 
partner has a fertility problem, or if they been infertile for more than three years. NICE recommends women 
aged 40-42 only in more restricted circumstances. 
431
 Those over 18 years of age do have access to free flu vaccination but only if they have an underlying health 
condition (particularly long-term heart or respiratory disease) or weakened immune systems. 
432
 For example, the Department of Health invites women aged 25-49 for a cervical screening test every three 
years, whereas women aged 50-64 are invited every five years. This is because statistics show that the younger 
group are more susceptible to the disease than the older group. In this example, the health service is likely to be 
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discrimination provisions and will only be lawful if the measures are a proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim.  
By averaging results across the QALY scores from patients of different ages, NICE 
generally avoids age discrimination resulting from its cost effectiveness assessment of 
treatments that tend to be accessed by a range of age groups. However, issues of indirect 
discrimination do arise when NICE uses the QALY method to assess the cost-effectiveness of 
treatments that are only or mainly of benefit to older people compared to treatments that 
benefit a range of age groups. This is because ‘[t]he benefits to older people will still be 
lower and so treatments that mostly impact on an older population will still be affected by a 
generally lower ability to produce QALYs.’
433
 Therefore, NICE's use of QALY to assess the 
cost effectiveness of treatments will disadvantage patients who can benefit from treatments 
such as Alzheimer’s disease, osteoarthritis and osteoporosis, which are conditions largely or 
solely affecting older people.
434
 It follows that when an older patient has been denied 
treatment for a condition that solely or largely affects older people, then that patient (or a 
prominent interest group acting on their behalf) may apply to the High Court to bring a 
judicial review claim against NICE. If the court grants permission for judicial review and 
standing is established, then NICE must demonstrate that the use of the QALY method is a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
able to justify offering more regular screening to the younger age group, as this can be understood as a 
proportionate response to statistical evidence that this group is at the greatest risk of developing cervical cancer. 
433
 Richard Edlin et al, ‘Cost-effectiveness Analysis and Ageism: A Review of the Theoretical Literature 
[Prepared for the Department of Health]’ (2008) Leeds Institute of Health Sciences. 
434
 Centre for Policy on Ageing, A Review of Age Discrimination in Primary and Community Health Care, 
Secondary Health Care, Mental Health Care and Social Care Services in the United Kingdom (January 2010). 
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8.3 The Proportionality of the QALY Method  
NICE’s use of the QALY method for conditions that largely or solely affect older people will 
only be proportionate and lawful if it is rationally connected to a legitimate aim, necessary to 
achieve that legitimate aim and does not impose burdens or cause harms to other legitimate 
interests that outweigh the objectives achieved. As I have outlined in detail in Chapter 7, the 
pluralist theory of discrimination can assist in each of these stages of the proportionality test 
to determine legality. For each stage of the proportionality test, we should consider each of 
the five principles of the theory.  
 To determine whether the QALY method is rationally connected to a legitimate aim, 
we should consider whether the method is supporting one or more of the five substantive 
principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination, including equality of opportunity, 
social equality, autonomy, respect or efficiency. Importantly, the respect principle acts as a 
deontological constraint at this stage. Aims cannot be legitimate if they convey the message 
that a particular age group has a diminished social or moral worth. 
In the necessity stage, the pluralist theory of age discrimination comes into play by 
considering whether the original decision maker is in a better position than a court to 
determine whether the treatment is necessary to advance the moral principles of the pluralist 
theory of age discrimination. If they are, then we should defer to the original decision maker's 
judgment that the method is necessary. 
 In the final stage of the proportionality test, we should consider which principles of 
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the pluralist theory of age discrimination are promoted or violated by the QALY method and 
then consider whether NICE have struck an appropriate balance between these principles. 
Deference can also come into play if the original decision maker is in a better position to 
determine where the best balance between the competing principles lies.  
 
8.31: Stage 1: Does the QALY method pursue a legitimate aim?  
The QALY method promotes efficiency by aiming to distribute scarce healthcare resources in 
such a way as to maximise aggregate health benefit. Promoting efficiency is a principle of the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination and can therefore constitute a legitimate aim, but only if 
the efficiency promotes a valuable end and does not amount to treating individuals as if they 
have a diminished social or moral worth. It can be argued that the QALY method does 
promote valuable ends by maximising life expectancy and quality of life. We can defend this 
from a utilitarian perspective: 
  
Health care is a limited resource. It must be allocated in the way which achieves the 
greatest good for the greatest number. If all lives are of equal value more is effected 
by saving the one with more years left. Utilitarianism is necessary if not sufficient for 
ethical rationing decisions.
435
 
 
                                                          
435
 AB Shaw, ‘In Defence of Ageism’ (1994) 20.3 Journal of Medical Ethics 188. 
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From this perspective, the QALY method efficiently rations health resources and, in doing so, 
aims to maximise quality of life and to extend life. This, in turn, maximises welfare.  
We must then consider whether QALY violates the respect principle. Some argue that 
QALY efficiency-based calculations are inherently ageist and convey that older people's lives 
count for less. John Harris, for example, has argued that the QALY method is disrespectful to 
older people because, in his view, it treats younger people as more valuable than older 
people.
436
 It does this, Harris argues, by placing more weight on younger people's desire to go 
on living than an older person's desire to go on living. The QALY method has this effect by 
prioritising patients for treatment who have more life expectancy and this happens to be 
disproportionately young people. Harris argues that, contrary to the QALY method, we 
should treat every person's desire to go on living with equal force because the desire to live 
‘the rest of our lives’ is of equal value whether we are young or old. Because we do not know 
the date of our deaths then the ‘the rest of our lives’ is an indefinite duration, and we each, 
according to Harris, suffer the same injustice if our desire to go on living is cut short as a 
result of someone else’s decision.
437
  
Quigley has argued that the use of QALY is a way of expressing that some lives are 
worth more than others: 
 
When we engage in the sort of evaluations inherent in QALYs, we make value 
                                                          
436
 John Harris makes this argument in The Value of Life (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1985). 
437
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judgments about the kind of people that we think are worth the expenditure of public 
resources. Specifically, we are saying that we think those people who belong to a 
particular category have more worthwhile lives. By using the QALY we are implicitly 
(or perhaps explicitly) accepting that those patients with a better quality of life and 
who live longer have more worthwhile lives. Although it may be acceptable to hold a 
private opinion regarding this, we ought not permit these personal conclusions to 
creep into public policy.
438
 
 
Contrary to Quigley and Harris's argument, however, the QALY method does not imply that 
people with longer life expectancies have more worthwhile lives. The QALY method 
evaluates the worth of treatments and their benefits. This is not the same as evaluating the 
worth of individuals.
439
 QALY requires that we prioritise treatments that are likely to produce 
the greatest health benefits for the population. In this way, QALY values effective treatments 
over ineffective ones rather than valuing some lives more than others. Further, this does not 
imply older people are less worthy of concern and respect. QALY stipulates that it is better to 
choose the most effective treatment whoever may benefit from that treatment, whether young 
people or older people. The QALY calculation simply recognises that treatment that has 
greater health benefits produce more welfare and should be preferred for this reason.  
Part of the error in Quigley and Harris's argument is to suggest that people are equally 
                                                          
438
 Muireann Quigley, ‘A Nice Fallacy’ (2007) 33.8 Journal of Medical Ethics 465. 
439
 Culyer Claxton, ‘Wickedness or Folly? The Ethics of NICE's Decisions’ (2006) 32.7 J Med Ethics 373. 
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wronged if their lives are cut short. The respect principle requires weighting equal interests 
equally but not all individuals have an equal interest in life-saving treatment. Some people 
suffer a greater loss if their wish to live is frustrated and suffer a greater misfortune. An 
example of this is that each of us has an equal interest in living a full, complete life. The 
young in having not had the opportunity to live a complete life (from youth to old age) have a 
stronger claim towards life-saving treatment than people who have reached a full life. We can 
respect people as equals by distributing health resources to ensure people have a chance of 
having a full life.  
It is also possible to doubt Quigley and Harris’s assertion that older people, 
subjectively, have the same desire to live the rest of their lives as younger people. It is 
plausible that the older people are, the less they may feel that they need to live out the 
remainder of their life; partly because what is left is shorter and partly because they have 
already had a 'good innings.' Moreover, even if older people do have as strong a desire as 
younger people to live the remainder of their lives, we might argue that objectively they have 
less basis for the same degree of desire given that they have experienced a long life while 
young people have not.  
 Since the QALY method is consistent with equal respect of different age groups, we 
can conclude that the method pursues the legitimate aim of efficiently rationing healthcare to 
promote quality and length of life.  
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8.32: Stage 2: Is the QALY method necessary to achieve the legitimate aim? 
The necessity stage of the proportionality test requires one to determine whether there are 
methods of health care rationing that can secure the same level of efficiency as the QALY 
method but do so in a way that is less disadvantageous to older people. If we can answer this 
in the affirmative, then the QALY method is unnecessary to achieve the legitimate aim of 
efficiency and therefore is unjustified age discrimination under section 19 of the Equality Act 
2010.  
There are many methods of healthcare rationing advocated in the academic literature, 
but most of these methods are at least as disadvantaging to older people as the QALY method 
and are less likely to be as efficient. For example, an alternative to the QALY method is the 
‘fair innings’ method of healthcare rationing. There are two ways of approaching the fair 
innings argument. Firstly, we can understand it as a duty-based argument inviting older 
people to say of themselves that they have had a fair innings, and to deprioritise their own 
requests for medical treatment. This version is not about denying services to older people, but 
rather encouraging people to exercise restraint in demanding healthcare. 
The second version of the fair innings argument requires prioritising lifesaving 
treatment for younger people because younger people have not had a fair innings in life.
440
 
                                                          
440
 For a defence of this see Shaw (n 435). An interesting example of balancing efficiency with fairness is 
Williams's QALY method adjusted for equality weighting. His method represents a balance between working 
towards efficiency and the goal of ensuring as many people as possible reach old age. Williams explains a 
method for weighting QALY to account for the fair innings argument. The fair innings weight applied to health 
gains of each individual is defined as a function of their present expected lifetime QALY and the fair innings so 
that if their expected lifetime QALY at present age falls short of the fair innings, the weights are larger than 1. 
Alan Williams, ‘Intergenerational Equity: an Exploration of the ‘Fair Innings’ Argument’ (1997) 6.2 Health 
Economics 117. 
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This position incorporates fairness arguments into healthcare rationing. The fair innings 
argument is an equality of opportunity argument that health provision should ensure that each 
person has an equal opportunity for a complete life.   
However, the first version of the fair innings argument is not actually a healthcare 
distribution method because it is not about determining who should receive services. It 
therefore is not an alternative to the QALY method of healthcare distribution. The second 
version of the fair innings argument disadvantages older people because it uses a person's age 
as a reason to determine whether they should be granted treatment. Further, it is unlikely to 
promote the efficiency as effectively as the QALY method. It sacrifices total health benefits 
to minimise the unfairness of younger people dying before they reach old age. The fair 
innings argument will prioritise the young in extending their life even if to do so produces 
fewer QALY and therefore fewer health benefits overall. The fair innings method does not 
render the QALY method unnecessary because the fair innings method will not achieve the 
level of efficiency that the QALY method can secure and will disadvantage older people to at 
least the extent that the QALY method will.  
There are methods of healthcare rationing that do not disadvantage older people, but 
these methods are less likely to maximise quality and quantity of life to the extent that 
QALYs does. Harris, for example, argues for an ‘age-indifference’ method of healthcare 
rationing where health resources are allocated in a way that does not disadvantage any 
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particular age group in accessing treatment.
441
 The age-indifference method, Harris argues, 
values lives equally by assigning equal weight to what remains of a person’s life regardless of 
the person’s life expectancy so long as the person desires to go on living. If competing 
patients want to live and we have to make a choice, the we should toss a coin.
442
 This avoids 
the disadvantaging impact on older people that may result from QALY calculations, but the 
age-indifference method fails to advance the legitimate aim of efficiency to the extent that the 
QALYs method does. The age-indifference method is less efficient because it assigns an 
equal weight to treatments that produce a small amount of health benefit to older people to 
treatments that provide a large gain for young people. This will result in diminished 
aggregate healthcare benefits compared to the QALY method unless there are large increases 
in spending on healthcare. The QALY method, therefore, is likely to be necessary to achieve 
the legitimate aim of efficient rationing of healthcare. 
It is appropriate to defer at this stage of the proportionality test where the original 
decision-maker has greater expertise to determine whether the QALY method is the most 
effective way to maximise healthcare outcomes. NICE are better placed to make this 
judgment than the courts. NICE consists of medical professionals, representatives of patient 
and carer groups and technical experts who work together to assess the evidence for the cost 
effectiveness of treatment. These groups have the expertise to assess the necessity of the 
QALY method to maximise health benefits. In contrast, judges are legal generalists and 
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cannot demonstrate the same degree of knowledge since they lack training and education in 
clinical medicine and therefore lack the expertise to evaluate the most efficient methods for 
healthcare allocation. On the empirical question of whether the QALY method is the most 
efficient way to allocate health resources, the courts should defer to NICE.  
 
8.33 Stage 3: Is the gain in efficiency secured by the QALY method enough to justify the 
disadvantaging impact of the QALY method on older people? 
This final stage of the proportionality test requires an assessment on whether there is an 
acceptable balance between the competing interests at stake in the use of QALYs to ration 
healthcare. This requires a cost-benefit analysis of QALY, including an assessment of 
whether the likely gain in efficiency resulting from the QALY method outweighs its costs to 
older people. If the costs to older people exceed the gain offered by the QALY method, then 
the use of QALY is disproportionate and therefore unlawful.  
At this stage, we must identify which principles of the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination are in play. I have explained that the QALY method promotes efficiency and 
does not violate the respect principle. The use of the QALY method, however, will 
disadvantage older people in accessing treatments. This violates the social equality principle 
when it leads to the denial of treatment for conditions that largely or exclusively affect older 
people. The problem with QALY, on the social equality account, is that it is not strictly based 
on medical need but may benefit those who are younger at the expense of the old. According 
to social equality, no subgroup of society should dominate access to particular valuable 
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resources.  
The QALY method also violates the autonomy principle by providing a lower QALY 
score to treatments that can enhance the autonomy of older people. Conditions that largely or 
exclusively affect older people, including Alzheimer’s disease, osteoarthritis and 
osteoporosis, can have a devastating effect on the autonomy of older people. The failure to 
offer adequate treatment for these conditions can make it harder for older people to retain 
their autonomy as they age.  
The QALY method can be consistent with equality of opportunity to access healthcare 
but only if NICE’s guidance is stable and consistent over time thereby ensuring that people 
will face the same benefits and disadvantages over their complete lives. However, NICE’s 
guidance may not be stable and consistent over time as costs for treatments may change. If a 
treatment previously denied funding on the NHS becomes cheaper, NICE may start 
recommending that treatment for funding. This will mean that young people as they age may 
not face the same disadvantages as older people in accessing treatment. NICE's future 
activities are uncertain, however, and therefore it is uncertain whether different age cohorts 
will have equal access to healthcare over time.  
Despite the fact that the QALY method has the potential to violate social equality, the 
autonomy principle and equality of opportunity, the courts should find that NICE have struck 
an appropriate balance between efficiency and these principles. There are democratic reasons 
for the courts to defer to the judgment of NICE. NICE have incorporated a model of 
participative democracy into their procedures with the establishment of the Citizens Council 
 
276 
 
and it is appropriate for a democratic body to determine a proper balance between competing 
principles in the allocation of resources without interference from a court. The Council has 30 
members of the public and that group of people reflects the general demographic proportions 
of the UK. This groups of people offer a public view on the principles that NICE ought to 
consider when making decisions on guidance. The Council's recommendations to NICE are 
then incorporated into a document called Social Value Judgments and NICE take this into 
account in their method of healthcare allocation. The Council consider views from experts on 
a topic under consideration and the Council discuss and debate the issues by putting their 
view on a particular distributive issue.  
The Council have created a report relating to the use of age in healthcare. In this 
report, the Council concluded age should be used as a consideration in healthcare allocation 
where age is an indicator of either benefit or risk.
443
 This recommendation reflects the QALY 
approach of distributing health resources to maximise the total health benefits even if this has 
the effect of disadvantaging particular age groups.  
In using the values identified by the Council to inform healthcare rationing, NICE 
ensure that their appraisals are receptive to principles held by a wide range of people in 
society. This democratic procedure promotes social equality by providing that a cross section 
of society have a say on health rationing and for this to make a difference in how NICE 
operates. This democratic process for deciding an appropriate balance between competing 
interests is a more ideal form of decision-making on healthcare allocation than the legal 
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process is able to offer. It follows that the courts should defer to NICE's judgment on the 
balance between competing interests unless there is evidence that the use of the QALY 
method disregards the interests of older people. 
Furthermore, the polycentric nature of healthcare rationing offers another reason to 
respect the decisions of NICE on their balancing the competing principles of efficiency 
against social equality and the diminished autonomy of older people. A decision to offer 
treatment is a public expenditure and can limit spending in other areas, including education, 
social security etc. A court only has the competence to look at healthcare resource allocation 
in isolation since it does not have access and control over the national budget.
444
 NICE, in 
contrast, can deliberate upon polycentric matters and, as a Non Departmental Public Body, 
are accountable to the Department of Health which is responsible for the NHS budget. NICE 
is also accountable to Parliament as they are responsible for producing annual reports to 
Parliament on their activities. This provides a further reason to show a somewhat deferential 
approach towards NICE. Again, so long as the QALY method is not operating in an 
oppressive way towards older people, then it is appropriate for the court to defer to NICE on 
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‘A court deciding a case which will affect one form of public expenditure—for example, impose a 
burden on education authorities—has no way of being able to decide whether such expenditure should 
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isolation, it has no way of knowing whether this means that other people dependent upon social 
security, police protection and so on will have to make sacrifices because there is less money for them. 
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their view of the appropriate balance of interests.  
 There is evidence that NICE do not act in an oppressive way towards older people. 
NICE has adopted procedures to ensure that its recommendations on medical treatments have 
limited disadvantaging effects on older people and therefore a limited impact on the social 
equality and autonomy principles. NICE in practice is acutely sensitive to the interests of 
older people and their need to access healthcare. NICE deliberately operates the QALY 
method at a ‘macro’ level – determining which from a range of possible treatments or 
interventions are most cost effective for society a whole, rather than at an individual level – 
in order to ‘assume that what applies to one age group within a particular appraisal will apply 
inter alia to others.’
445
 The result is that age is rarely used as a reason to recommend medical 
interventions and NICE’s guidance rarely disadvantages particular age groups. Further, NICE 
has created End of Life rules. These rules reflect principles that accord additional value, 
largely overlooked by the QALY method, to the last few months of life in situations where 
treatment can extend the life of those with short life expectancy.
446
 This goes some way to 
addressing the concern that the QALY method does not attribute enough value to older 
people's desire to go on living.  
Other safeguards to protect the interests of older people and to minimise harmful 
consequences for these groups include consultation exercises and considering age issues in 
equality impact assessments for every item there are giving guidance on. All of this points 
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towards NICE’s use of the QALY method as proportionate and therefore lawful under the 
Equality Act 2010.  
 
Conclusion 
The QALY method is not intrinsically ageist because it does not necessarily involve direct 
expressions that older patients are less worthy of concern and respect. The QALY method is 
useful for maximising health gains and therefore welfare in society. The downside is that 
QALY have the effect, in theory, of disproportionately benefiting younger people in 
accessing resources (since treatments that largely or solely benefit older people generate 
lower QALY than treatments than benefit younger people or a range of age groups) and 
therefore violating the prescription of social equality that people should be able to access 
resources as equals. Further, it also harms the autonomy principle that requires doing as much 
as possible to ensure that people can live autonomously as they age.  
Nonetheless, I have argued that the QALY method is a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim. The method pursues the legitimate aim of efficiently allocating 
health resources to maximise health benefits. It is also necessary to achieve this aim since 
suggested alternative methods lack the efficiency of QALY and some are at least as 
disadvantaging to older people as QALY. Further, NICE have medical expertise that can 
inform on the efficacy of different methods of healthcare rationing. As a result, the courts 
should defer to NICE on the necessity of the QALY method. 
NICE have also made an appropriate balance between the efficiency of QALY and 
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the impact this has on older people. They have adopted procedures, including the method of 
placing additional value to the last few months of life and ensuring that age is almost never a 
reason for recommending treatment, to minimise the disadvantaging effects of QALY on 
older people. Also, NICE have adopted democratic procedures to inform their decision-
making and NICE are accountable to a democratic government department – the Department 
of Health. This points to a democratic reason for deferring to NICE's approach to balancing 
the competing interests at stake in healthcare rationing. Courts and tribunals should hold that 
NICE's use of the QALY method is proportionate, justified and legal under the age 
discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010. 
The pluralist theory of age discrimination has assisted in determining that NICE’s use 
of the QALY method is proportionate and therefore lawful under the Equality Act 2010. 
Despite the fact that courts should largely defer to the judgment on NICE in allocating 
resources, it has been a valuable exercise to apply the pluralist theory of age discrimination 
through a hypothetical judicial review claim. It ensures that the rationalisation behind NICE’s 
allocative decisions is transparent and subject to scrutiny. This scrutiny also aids the 
legitimacy of NICE’s decisions by ‘structuring decision-making and ensuring that the policy 
choice made, even if reasonable, is explained and justified... [and ensuring] not only that all 
relevant factors are taken into account but also that they are subjected to a rigorous and open 
analysis before a conclusion is reached.’
447 
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9 
Conclusion of Thesis 
 
This thesis has outlined and defended a pluralist theory of age discrimination that offers a 
framework for identifying unlawful age discrimination. In this conclusion, I summarise the 
main features of this theory, the value and limitation of my research method, and the possible 
implications of the theory beyond the scope of the thesis, including the implications of the 
theory for understanding discrimination law more generally, the usefulness of the theory in 
relation to other systems than the UK and the possible value of the theory for identifying 
which grounds should be protected under discrimination law. 
 
9.1 Summary of the Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination 
The Equality Act 2010 holds that unequal treatment on the grounds of age and age-neutral 
treatment that disadvantages particular age groups is lawful only if is a proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim or fits into a specifically prescribed exception.
448
 This 
proportionality test requires that we distinguish justified from unjustified treatment in order to 
determine legality. I have argued that to determine proportionality, we must identify a 
number of principles to explain when and why age-differential treatment wrongs people and 
when and why this treatment can be justified.  
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These principles include the following: equality of opportunity, social equality, 
respect, autonomy and efficiency. I constructed this theory by identifying antidiscrimination 
and equality principles that both fit and justify our moral intuitions about different forms of 
wrongful discrimination and applied these norms to issues of age discrimination. 
Equality of opportunity requires an equal distribution of benefits and detriments over 
people’s complete lives except insofar as inequality is caused by individual choices. This 
principle serves to justify those age-based distinctions, for example, in job recruitment, 
promotion and other terms of employment, which are based on stable policies that apply 
uniformly to all people. 
Social equality requires conditions which offer people opportunities to participate 
equally in social, economic and political life. Age discrimination can violate the principle of 
social equality by contributing to social exclusion, marginalisation and oppression. Social 
equality can also work to justify some age distinctions. I have argued that positive age 
discrimination can promote social equality by integrating people from age groups that 
typically suffer from social exclusion. 
The principle of autonomy requires that people have control over their lives. Age 
discrimination can undermine this principle by diminishing choice over a person's lifetime. 
Age discrimination can also undermine autonomy if the messages conveyed by age 
discrimination become internalised. For example, older people may internalise the stereotype 
that they are less productive and therefore leave the labour force. Like social equality, the 
principle of autonomy can work to justify some forms of age distinctions which work in 
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favour of age groups who typically suffer from lower levels of autonomy. 
The principle of respect recognises the harm of denying access to goods when that 
denial expresses the message that some age groups have a diminished moral and social worth. 
On this account, age-differential treatment wrongs people when based on prejudice, 
stereotyping or other demeaning attitudes. The respect principle acts as a deontological 
restraint on particular actions. It holds that aims that reflect age stereotyping and prejudice 
are illegitimate and should not justify age-differential treatment even if these aims promote 
efficiency or other collective goals. 
The principle of efficiency recognises that we can justify age-differential treatment if 
it efficiently promotes valuable social goods. Age is linked to certain attributes – physical and 
intellectual. Using age as a proxy for these traits can be less costly than assessing each person 
individually. Age distinctions can also force people to sequence and order their lives 
chronologically, and this sequence ensures people undertake certain tasks at a time of life 
when there is the greatest benefit to the individual and society. 
 
9.2 How the Pluralist Theory Assists in Age Discrimination Claims 
Identifying unlawful age discrimination is a four-stage test. The first stage requires 
determining whether a measure engages the direct or indirect discrimination provisions of the 
Equality Act 2010. A measure engages the direct age discrimination provisions when an 
individual is treated less favourably than another person because of their age or the age they 
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are thought to have, or because they associate with someone of a particular age.
449
 A measure 
will engage the indirect age discrimination provisions when that measure disadvantages 
people of a particular age.
450
 
The principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination can identify when an 
impugned measure engages these provisions by determining when a measure treats an 
individual less favourably because of their age and when it disadvantages particular age 
groups.  
If the measure engages the direct or indirect age discrimination provisions, we must 
move on to the second stage, which is to consider whether the treatment is a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim.
451
 Stage 2 requires addressing the first consideration of 
the proportionality assessment, namely, determining whether the measure is rationally 
connected to achieving a legitimate aim. I have argued that we should hold that all aims 
reflecting age stereotyping or prejudice are illegitimate in accordance with the respect 
principle and therefore incapable of justifying age-differential treatment. This acts as a 
deontological constraint on pursuing aims that communicate demeaning messages. Unless 
there are other aims that do not reflect age stereotyping and prejudice, we should hold the 
impugned measure unjustified and unlawful because it is not connected to a legitimate aim.   
If the aim does not reflect age stereotyping or prejudice, then we must assess whether 
                                                          
449
 Equality Act 2010 s 13. 
450
 Equality Act 2010 s 19. 
451
 Equality Act 2010 s 13(2) and s 19(2)(d). 
 
285 
 
the purported aims of the measure relate to one of the remaining principles of the pluralist 
theory of age discrimination, including assessing whether the aims promote social integration 
of a disadvantaged group (the social equality principle), advances the autonomy of members 
of a disadvantaged age group (the autonomy principle), distributes resources or opportunities 
equally (the equality of opportunity principle) or promotes efficiency. If the aims do not 
relate to one or more of these principles, then the measure is unjustified age discrimination in 
accordance with either section 13 (for measures engaging the direct discrimination 
provisions) or section 19 (for measures engaging the indirect discrimination provisions) of 
the Equality Act 2010. 
If the aims promote one or more of these principles, then we move to stage 3 which 
requires assessing whether the measure is necessary to achieve its purported aims. This is an 
empirical calculation of whether there are any alternative methods for pursuing the aims that 
are less harmful to the claimant's interests. It is appropriate to defer to the original decision-
maker on this question if the original decision-maker is in a better position than a court or 
tribunal to assess the necessity of the measure. If this is the case, then we should move to 
stage 4. If the original decision-maker is not in a better position to assess the necessity of the 
measure, then the measure will be unjustified age discrimination if the court or tribunal 
calculates that there are plausible alternatives to the measure that are less harmful to the 
claimant. If the court or tribunal considers there are no equally plausible alternatives, then we 
move to stage 4. 
Stage 4 requires assessing whether the seriousness of the interference with the 
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claimant’s interests are proportionate to the benefits gained in pursuit of the legitimate aims. 
To make this assessment, we should consider which of the principles of the pluralist theory of 
age discrimination are advanced and which are violated.  
Judges should consider deferring to the original decision-maker where the impugned 
measure is the outcome of a democratic process or concerns a polycentric issue that has 
multiple complex outcomes that judges may not be equipped to determine. Judges should 
consider deferring in these circumstances because they may lack democratic accountability 
for deciding on the appropriate balance of principles at stake. Further, judges should also 
consider deferring if the claimant consented to the impugned measure. Respect for autonomy 
means that a court or tribunal should generally assume that voluntary agreements to age 
distinctions match an appropriate balance of competing principles. In these circumstances, 
courts and tribunals should hold the measure justified and therefore lawful.  
If the courts or tribunals do not, ultimately, consider it appropriate to defer at this 
stage, then the court or tribunal should hold the measure justified and lawful only when the 
benefits of the measure in advancing social equality, autonomy, equality of opportunity and 
efficiency exceed the harm to the claimant’s interests. The court or tribunal should consider 
the measure unjustified and therefore unlawful age discrimination when the harm to the 
claimant’s interests exceed the possible benefits of the measure advancing equality of 
opportunity, social equality, autonomy or efficiency. 
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9.3 The Role of Moral Reasoning in Adjudication 
This thesis has argued that judges should engage with moral reasoning in age discrimination 
cases by applying the principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination to determine the 
proportionality of measures that engage the direct and indirect age discrimination provisions. 
The proportionality test directs judges to the complex task of grappling with all the relevant 
moral reasons in an age discrimination claim.
452
 The pluralist theory of age discrimination is 
valuable in assisting judges in identifying all the relevant principles at stake. 
Even though I have argued that courts and tribunals must consider deferring where the 
original decision-maker is better placed to make a decision on proportionality, this deference 
does not mean courts and tribunals should completely forgo making moral judgments in these 
circumstances. Judges must be alive to the fact that these processes may have the effect of 
sidelining the interests of particular age groups. Where this is the case, judges should 
undertake a strict scrutiny of the impugned measure.  
 
9.4 How I Arrived at the Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination 
In Chapter 1, I explained that I would be adopting the reflective equilibrium method, which 
requires that we start from our intuition about the morality of a situation and, on reflecting on 
its plausibility in light of other beliefs that we hold, we consider revising the belief to form a 
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coherent and stable set of principles that can explain our intuitions about a range of scenarios. 
The reflection process requires taking everything relevant into account about age 
discrimination (all the relevant principles that can explain why it is a moral problem and all 
theories relating to the phenomena of age and ageing).  
 This method requires subjecting our moral beliefs to detailed reflection, consideration 
and coherence building. Further to this, I have compared the approaches to age discrimination 
proposed by academics, governments, courts and tribunals to our intuitions about particular 
scenarios and adjusted these suggested approaches to account for our intuitions about age 
discrimination.  
 Before engaging in the reflective equilibrium process, I outlined the structure of age 
discrimination law. In Chapter 2, I explained that age discrimination law requires 
distinguishing justified from unjustified treatment that engages the direct and indirect age 
discrimination provisions. I argued that the leading UK age discrimination cases indicate a 
general problem of courts and tribunals failing to offer principles justifying their decisions. A 
theory of age discrimination, developed from the reflective equilibrium method, I argued, can 
work to present the important moral principles at stake in any age discrimination claim and 
therefore ensure age discrimination cases can be decided fairly and appropriately. 
In Chapter 3, I started the process of identifying principles that can assist in 
distinguishing justified from unjustified age-differential treatment. In this chapter, I identified 
norms that cohere with our intuitions about when and why it is wrong when some are worse 
off than others. Age discrimination creates inequality because it treats some people 'less 
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favourably' than others on the grounds of age.
453
 It follows that a plausible theory of age 
discrimination must address what is wrong with inequality to determine what is wrong with 
discrimination. Further to this, I argued that inequality is wrong when someone is worse off 
than others due to circumstances outside their control (the equality of opportunity principle). 
However, I found that equality of opportunity fails to account for many of our intuitions 
about the wrongness of inequality. I argued that we should revise the equality of opportunity 
principle to incorporate the idea that inequality is wrong when it creates conditions where 
people are unable to interact as equals (the social equality principle).  
In Chapter 4, I verified whether these equality principles can explain the wrongness of 
discrimination. I argued that the equality principles can explain many forms of discrimination 
but not all. A theory of discrimination must incorporate non-equality principles, including the 
principles of autonomy and respect. 
In Chapter 5, I verified whether the principles identified in Chapters 3 and 4 can 
explain the problem of age discrimination and can therefore form a theory of age 
discrimination. Equality of opportunity, social equality, autonomy and respect all play a role 
in explaining our intuitions about when and why age-differential treatment can be wrong and 
also when and why age-differential treatment can be justified. Each of these principles can 
therefore work to guide age discrimination law. These principles should form a theory of age 
discrimination. Furthermore, a background theory of age and ageing reveals that age-
differential treatment is especially well suited to structuring society to maximise the gain of a 
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number of important social goals, including education and health. From this, I argued that a 
theory of age discrimination should incorporate an efficiency principle that can justify age-
differential treatment.  
In Chapter 6, I considered theories of age discrimination proposed by governments in 
their consultation documents on the introduction of age discrimination law and Hansard 
statements relating to age discrimination law. These documents explained the rationales for 
age discrimination law, including the rationales of promoting fairness and promoting business 
efficiency. I argued that courts and tribunals should not defer to the approach to age 
discrimination found in these sources. I rejected the governments' view that age 
discrimination is wrong when it inhibits business efficiency. The efficiency account of the 
wrongness of age discrimination is problematic because it can lead to the position that age 
discrimination is justified so long as it does not harm efficiency. On the contrary, efficiency 
should not be capable of justifying certain types of age-differential treatment. I argued that 
we should revise the pluralist theory of age discrimination to incorporate the idea that 
efficiency or other principles should not be capable of justifying age-differential treatment 
that communicates the message that particular age groups have a diminished moral or social 
worth. 
In Chapter 7, I demonstrated how the pluralist theory of age discrimination can assist 
in deciding age discrimination cases. I compared and contrasted the approach in the UK case 
law with the pluralist theory of age discrimination outlined in this thesis. I argued that the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination offers much greater transparency on the relevant 
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principles at stake.  
In Chapter 8, I tested the pluralist theory of age discrimination in the field of 
healthcare rationing in the UK – the quality-adjusted life year (‘QALY’). I argued that the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination finds that the QALY method is not inherently ageist 
because QALY does not communicate the message that particular age groups have a 
diminished moral or social worth. Further, we should find the method proportionate to 
achieving the legitimate aim of efficiently promoting healthcare resources to the UK 
population. The courts should defer to NICE on its judgment of the necessity of the QALY 
method to achieve efficient healthcare allocation. The courts lack the expertise to determine 
whether the QALY method is the most effective method to maximise healthcare outcomes 
whereas NICE are staffed by medical professionals with the expertise to make this judgment. 
And the courts should defer to the NICE’s judgment that QALY has an appropriate balance 
between competing principles. Healthcare rationing is a polycentric issue which NICE can 
address more satisfactorily than a court. Further, NICE has democratic procedures to make 
this judgment and is accountable to the Department of Health and Parliament. I conclude that 
the QALY should not be held to violate the age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 
2010.  
 
9.5 The Value and Limitations of Reflective Equilibrium as a Method for 
Investigating Legal Issues 
Reflective equilibrium requires formulating abstract moral theories and testing these theories 
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against our intuitions about particular scenarios. This feature of reflective equilibrium has 
enabled this thesis to engage with rigorous philosophical analysis on the one hand and 
doctrinal analysis on the other. Using reflective equilibrium in this way challenges the 
common intellectual approach to understanding the concept of discrimination. The 
philosophical literature on discrimination has tended to engage in philosophical enquiry 
separately from doctrinal analysis, and the doctrinal analysis of discrimination law has tended 
to be undertaken separately from philosophical analysis. In this thesis, in contrast, 
philosophical reasoning and doctrinal analysis have informed the principles that should guide 
age discrimination law.  
Reflective equilibrium has proven useful for investigating age discrimination, but it is 
not limited to this area of the law. When a legal source, such as the Equality Act 2010, 
requires open-ended moral reasoning, judges have to draw on their moral convictions to 
decide cases. The reflective equilibrium process is an effective method for identifying the 
principles they should use in making these sorts of judgments.
454
 Nor is this limited to courts 
and tribunals. Academics, practitioners, organisations and laypeople can equally use 
reflective equilibrium to identify the appropriate principles that assist in identifying 
unjustified and therefore unlawful age discrimination. 
Reflective equilibrium is likely to prove useful for any area of law that ties the 
legality of an action to the moral justifiability of that action. There are swathes of the law that 
require judges to use their moral judgment to decide cases and reflective equilibrium can 
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identify the principles that are relevant. For example, reflective equilibrium can identify 
principles that relate to laws that require judges to determine whether a defendant behaved 
reasonably, fairly or proportionately. The method may prove useful for finding principles to 
guide judges in determining whether an employer has unfairly dismissed an employee or to 
determine the principles that assist in identifying a fair divorce settlement. In administrative 
law, reflective equilibrium can identify the principles that determine when the executive has 
created a legitimate expectation that fairness requires they should be bound to fulfil.
455
 It is 
also likely to prove useful in hard cases where judges must decide which principles should 
prevail.
456
 This includes any area of law that requires judges to engage in a proportionality 
assessment, including human rights and discrimination cases.  
The limitation of reflective equilibrium, however, is that it cannot help judges in legal 
cases when there is clear legal direction. In these circumstances, judges must decide cases 
according to the legal direction and there is little room for moral reasoning through the 
reflective equilibrium process. Nor does reflective equilibrium help direct which outcome a 
judge should choose when there are competing incommensurable values at stake. This is 
because there is no principle that can determine which outcome should prevail in any given 
case. Instead, judges must assess which principles are satisfied and which are violated, and 
they must determine, as best as they can, which among various arguments they find most 
compelling. In many cases, moral intuition might provide direction on the principle that 
                                                          
455
 For an argument that judges do in fact engage in reflective equilibrium when applying the law, see Larry 
Alexander, ‘Banality of Legal Reasoning’ (1997) 73 Notre Dame L Rev 517. 
456
 See Cass Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, (Oxford University Press 1998) chapter 1. 
 
294 
 
should prevail in a particular case.  
On a connected point, the reflective equilibrium method is limited in its capacity to 
build coherence. While the method assists in building coherence between our intuitions and 
more general moral theories, the method has difficulties in building coherence between 
different plausible principles. As I have argued throughout this thesis, adopting pluralism as a 
moral theory is the best way to account for our intuitions, but pluralism comes at the cost of 
different principles pulling in different directions. This means that I have had to temper the 
coherence building of the reflective equilibrium method to account for our intuitions.  
 
9.6 The Implications for the Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination for 
Understanding the Concept of Discrimination More Generally 
In Chapter 5, I argued that moral pluralism is necessary for grasping the complexity of age 
discrimination as a phenomenon. If I am right about unitary accounts of discrimination not 
working in the highly contextual area of age discrimination, then it is unlikely that unitary 
theories of discrimination can work as general theories of discrimination. The implications 
for this are that we should also adopt a pluralist theory when trying to understand other forms 
of discrimination, such as race or sex discrimination.  
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9.7 The Usefulness of the Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination in 
Relation to Systems Other than the UK 
I have made no claims about whether the pluralist theory of age discrimination can assist in 
systems other than the UK. However, the findings in this thesis are likely to work in a 
number of jurisdictions that have discrimination laws that are structured in a similar way to 
the UK. For example, section 9 of the South African Constitution provides that '[t]he state 
may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including... age…' and '[n]ational legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination.'
457
 Like UK law, the South African Constitution requires a moral theory to 
distinguish justified from unjustified treatment although it emphasises fairness rather than 
proportionality. In applying these provisions of the South African Constitution, we would 
need a set of principles to determine when and why age-differential treatment is unfair.  
The principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination could be helpful in doing 
this. Indeed, the South African Courts have grappled with the task of identifying principles to 
identify unfair discrimination. We could use the pluralist theory of age discrimination to 
critique the approach in the South African Courts and perhaps offer a more satisfactory 
account of discrimination than the courts are currently offering.  
In Harksen v Lane, the South African Supreme Court held that courts should consider 
the following principles in identifying unfair discrimination: (i) the position of the 
complainants in society and whether they have suffered from past patterns of discrimination; 
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(ii) the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it; (iii) any 
other relevant factors including the extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights 
or interests of the complainants and whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental 
human dignity.
458
  
This approach bears some similarity to the pluralist theory of age discrimination. For 
example, the first principle identified in Harksen is similar to the equality of opportunity and 
social equality principles outlined in this thesis. The second principle recognises that equality 
of opportunity and social equality can, in some circumstances, justify differential treatment. 
The third principle, which refers to dignity, bears a resemblance to the respect principle of the 
pluralist theory of age discrimination that rules out demeaning treatment.  
The pluralist theory of age discrimination may be useful for pinning down when 
differential treatment violates the principles identified in Harksen. It can explain that 
someone’s dignity is impaired when a discriminator is motivated by prejudice or 
stereotyping, or conveys demeaning ideas about particular age groups. It can also explain that 
'patterns of past discrimination' can amount to conditions that undermine equality of 
opportunity to welfare, resources, or capabilities, and conditions that undermine the equality 
of status of different age groups.  
We can also apply the pluralist theory of age discrimination to Canadian 
discrimination law. Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides 
that '[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
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protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.'  
The pluralist theory of age discrimination can offer principles to assist in determining 
when age-differential treatment means people are not equal before and under the law. And 
the theory can assist in critiquing the approach in the case law. For example, in Law v 
CanadaError! Bookmark not defined. (Minister of Employment and Immigration), the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that wrongful discrimination is 'where the differential 
treatment reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, 
or otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less 
capable, or less worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian 
society.'
459
 In R v Kapp, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a different test that identified 
wrongful discrimination as that which perpetuates group disadvantage and prejudice, or 
imposes disadvantage on the basis of stereotyping.
460
 These cases adopt the respect and 
equality of opportunity principles. The pluralist theory of discrimination may add that the 
courts should also identify wrongful discrimination as differential treatment that undermines 
the social equality principle by undermining equality of status and also differential treatment 
that undermines autonomy of vulnerable groups. 
The theory can also offer a critique of the Courts’ approach to age discrimination in 
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the US. The US Supreme Court in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v Murgia held that 
age-differential treatment by state bodies is constitutional provided the treatment is rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.
461
 The Court explained that, in evaluating the 
constitutionality of age-differential treatment, the courts should adopt a low level of scrutiny 
because older age groups have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or 
been 'subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly 
indicative of their abilities.'
462
  
The pluralist theory of age discrimination can provide a strong argument that the case 
law had taken a wrong turn in its understanding of age discrimination. Contrary to the 
position in the US case law, age discrimination can be wrong for the same reasons that race 
or sex discrimination can be wrong, namely, it can express animosity, convey demeaning 
ideas about people and can undermine autonomy. Murgia should be overturned so that age-
differential treatment is not always subject to a low form of scrutiny. 
 
9.8 The Value of the Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination for Identifying 
which Grounds Should be Protected under Discrimination Law 
The pluralist theory of age discrimination is also likely to be useful for determining which 
characteristics anti-discrimination law should protect from discrimination. For example, we 
may use the theory to determine whether the law should protect hitherto unprotected 
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characteristics, including appearance, weight and/or low socioeconomic status.
463
 If we find 
that other forms of discrimination that are not currently subject to legal prohibition also 
violate the principles of the theory in a similar way to the protected grounds, then this may 
offer a good reason for legal protection for the currently unprotected grounds.  
For example, consider lookism. Imagine two people apply for a role to work in a 
clothing store and the employer chooses one of those candidates because, in the employer’s 
view, that person is more physically attractive than the other candidate.
464
 We can use the 
principles of the theory of age discrimination to consider whether the law should prohibit this 
type of lookism in hiring practices. The practice certainly seems to send a demeaning 
message to the rejected applicant thereby violating the respect principle. Lookism also 
undermines equality of opportunity because less conventionally attractive people have fewer 
opportunities in many areas of life.
465
 There is evidence, for example, that children perceived 
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to be unattractive have more experience with rejection and, as a result, have fewer 
opportunities for social-skills development that can enable them to access valuable 
opportunities.
466
 This can also have the effect of damaging autonomy by foreclosing valuable 
options. We might then conclude that lookism is wrong for similar reasons that racism and 
sexism are wrong and therefore should be unlawful in the way that denial of opportunity on 
the grounds of race or sex is unlawful.  
 
9.10 The Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination and Political Debate 
The principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination may also contribute to political 
debate, for example the grammar schools controversy. The current conservative government 
mooted the idea of developing new grammar schools that will only admit pupils who pass an 
11 plus examination. Many argue that this indirectly discriminates against children from poor 
socioeconomic backgrounds. The government defended the policy on the grounds of the 
belief in social mobility. The pluralist theory of age discrimination can challenge such a 
policy on the grounds that evidence reveals that grammar schools disproportionately benefit 
wealthier pupils at the expense of the poor, thereby undermining equality of opportunity. 
Grammar schools undermine social equality by creating hierarchies, with grammar schools 
having higher status that will bestow higher status on grammar school pupils. On the other 
hand, we would need to weigh these negatives against any promotion of efficiency in 
                                                          
466
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educational attainment, assuming this can be demonstrated.  
It is clear that the pluralist theory of age discrimination has usefulness beyond the 
application of age discrimination law in the UK. Further research can reveal its use for 
discrimination law beyond the UK, its use for identifying the grounds that should be 
protected in discrimination law, for understanding the general concept of discrimination and 
its contribution to different political debates.  
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